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THE CALCULUS OF ACCOMMODATION:
CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, AND OTHER CLASHES
BETWEEN RELIGION AND THE STATE
Robin Fretwell Wilson*
Abstract: This Article considers a burning issue in society today—whether,
and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should
be exempted from the dictates of civil law. The “political maelstrom” over
the Obama administration’s sterilization and contraceptive coverage
mandate is just one of many clashes between religion and the state. Religious groups and individuals have also sought religious exemptions to the
duty to assist with abortions or facilitate same-sex marriages. In all these
contexts, religious objectors claim a special right of entitlement to follow
their religious tenets, in the face of equally compelling claims that religious accommodations threaten access and may impose significant costs
on others. Legislators and other policymakers have struggled with how to
advance two compelling, and at times conflicting, values—access and religious liberty. This Article examines, and responds to, a number of “sticking points” voiced by legislators about a qualified exemption for religious
objectors that would permit them to step aside from facilitating same-sex
marriages so long as no hardship will result. These concerns bear an uncanny resemblance to reasons why some believe the Obama administration should not yield further on the coverage mandate. This Article maintains that religious accommodations qualified by hardship to others can
transform what could be a zero-sum proposition into one in which access
and religious freedom can both be affirmed.
* © 2012, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Class of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. I benefited immensely from presentations of an
early version of this Article to workshops and panel discussions at the Brookings Institution; the Competing Claims of Law and Religion conference at Pepperdine University; the
Georgetown University Law Center; the New York City Bar Forum on Reconciling Rights:
Balancing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Civil Rights with First Amendment
Religious Protection; Oxford University’s Magdalen College; Princeton University; Southern Methodist University; the University of Houston; the University of Illinois; the University of Oklahoma; and Washington and Lee University School of Law’s Faculty Enclave. I
am especially indebted to Tom Berg, Bill Eskridge, Josh Fairfield, David Gamage, Nicole
Huberfeld, David Hyman, Rick Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Tim Jost, Anthony Kreis, Doug
Laycock, Chip Lupu, Tim MacDonnell, Pamela Melton, Kathy Moore, and Stacey Tovino
for insightful, helpful comments on early versions of this Article, and to John Eller, Ron
Fuller, and Claire Hagan for their expert, diligent research support.
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Introduction
2012 has witnessed a “political maelstrom”1 over the Obama administration’s regulations to implement the new health care reform law,
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).2 These
regulations require nearly all employers and health insurers to cover
sterilization procedures and contraceptives,3 including newer emergency contraceptives like ella4 which sometimes act after fertilization to
prevent pregnancy.5 Even before the regulations become final, a hue
and cry arose from the faith community because mandated coverage
places the bulk of religious employers “in the untenable position of having to choose between violating the law and violating their conscience[s]”6—specifically, their religious belief that life begins at con-

1 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Analysis of the Obama Administration’s Updated Contraception
Rule, Wash & Lee U., http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/facultydocuments/jost/contraception.pdf
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029. This Article refers to these laws collectively as the “ACA,” which is becoming the
preferred term in contemporary literature. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the
Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them, 5 St.
Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 27, 27 (2011).
On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, upheld the ACA’s individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power, while striking down a portion of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as
exceeding Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
3 Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15,
2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54).
4 Section 2713 of the Public Health Services Act, enacted through the ACA, requires
insurers to cover women’s “preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration.” Public Health Services Act, § 2713(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
These measures include “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women
with reproductive capacity.” Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, Health Resources & Services Admin., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last
visited Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter HRSA Coverage Guidelines]; see News Release, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Statement of Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html; see also Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8728 (discussing coverage of contraceptive
services by insurers and health plans under the ACA); Jost, supra note 1, at 1 (analyzing
the coverage mandate guidelines).
5 See infra notes 137–156 (discussing the mechanisms of action for ella and Plan B).
6 See Matthew Larotonda, Catholic Churches Distribute Letter Opposing Obama Healthcare Rule,
ABC News ( Jan. 29, 2012, 8:19 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/catholicchurches-distribute-letter-opposing-obama-healthcare-rule.
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ception and should not be destroyed.7 Although the regulations exempt
churches, their cramped definition of religious employer provides no
refuge for religiously affiliated universities, hospitals, and social services
agencies like Catholic Charities, the “arm of compassion” of the Catholic Church.8 As one group that supported the ACA, the Catholic Health
Association, explained: “The impact of being told we do not fit the new
definition of a religious employer and therefore cannot operate our
ministries following our consciences has jolted us. . . . From President
Thomas Jefferson to President Barack Obama, we have been promised a
respect for appropriate religious freedom.”9
These claims of a special right to be exempted from the dictates of
civil law were met by equally vigorous claims that “all women, regardless
of their employer, should be able to access the birth control coverage
benefit.”10 In promulgating the regulations, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL) relied on an Institute of Medicine study showing that “women
have unique health care needs and burdens,” including the need for
7 See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv00501-SLB (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2012) (stating that, as a Catholic programming television
station, Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN) “does not believe that contraception,
sterilization, or abortion are properly understood to constitute medicine,” and that “these
procedures involve gravely immoral practices, including the intentional destruction of
innocent human life”). EWTN argued that “[h]aving to pay a fine to the taxing authorities
for the privilege of practicing one’s religion or controlling one’s own speech is unAmerican, unprecedented, and flagrantly unconstitutional,” and asserted that “the Mandate can be interpreted as nothing other than a deliberate attack by the Defendants on the
religious beliefs of EWTN and millions of other Americans.” Id. at 2–3.
8 See Greg Johnson, Obama’s ‘Fig-Leaf’ Compromise on Contraception Won’t Mollify Conservatives, Knoxville News Sentinel, Feb. 12, 2012, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012 feb/
12/obamas-fig-leaf-compromise-on-contraception-wont. Under the regulations, an organization is an exempt “religious employer” only when it primarily employs and serves those who
share its faith, seeks to inculcate its religious values, and meets Internal Revenue Service tests
for a faith-based body. See HRSA Coverage Guidelines, supra note 4. Religious groups have litigated, and lost, claims that state-level contraceptive coverage mandates too narrowly define
exempt religious organizations. See, e.g., Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 95
(Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 469 (N.Y.
2006).
9 Carol Keehan, Something Has to Be Fixed, Catholic Health World, Feb. 15, 2012, at 1.
Other religious leaders asserted that the coverage mandate treats them as “second class citizens.” See Letter from Thomas J. Olmsted, Catholic Bishop of Phx., to Brothers and Sisters in
Christ ( Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://www.diocesephoenix.org/uploads/docs/RELIGOUSLIBERTY-INSURANCE-LETTER-013012.pdf.
10 See, e.g., Press Release, Planned Parenthood Fed’n, Planned Parenthood Applauds
HHS for Ensuring Access to Affordable Birth Control ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://
www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/planned-parenthood-applauds- hhs-ensuring-access-affordable-birth-control-38582.htm.
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contraceptive services.11 Women’s rights groups, such as the National
Women’s Law Center, cheered the Obama administration for establishing “a major milestone in protecting women’s health.”12 Others decried
the inclusion of even a limited exemption for religious organizations
and encouraged HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius to hold the line
against broader exemptions.13
These competing claims about whether and when to accommodate religious objectors arise because religious objectors are not, as a
matter of federal constitutional right,14 shielded against the burdens of
11 Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8727–28 (Feb. 15,
2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54) (citing Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 16 (2011)). Based on the Institute of Medicine study,
HHS and DOL concluded that “[t]he contraceptive coverage requirement is . . . designed to
serve the compelling public health and gender equity goals described.” Id. at 8729.
12 E.g., Press Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., HHS Decision on Contraceptive Coverage
an Important Milestone ( Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/hhsdecision-contraceptive-coverage-important-milestone.
13 J. Lester Feder, Contraceptive Rule a Pill for Obama, Politico (Dec. 7, 2011, 4:47 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70036.html.
14 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment does not require states to exempt sacramental drug use
from the enforcement of neutral, generally applicable criminal laws). Whether Employment
Division v. Smith was correctly decided or represents an improper limitation on free exercise remains a deeply contested question. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemptions Debate, 11 Rutgers J.L. & Religion 139, 150 n.44 (2009); Symposium, Twenty Years
After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twentieth Century’s Landmark Case on the
Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655 (2011). Nevertheless, I take Smith as a starting point for the need to secure accommodations in the legislative process.
Of course, religious objectors may receive greater protection under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. Cf. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 (1994)), (requiring strict scrutiny for all claims
based on the Free Exercise Clause), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997). Although the Supreme Court in Flores held that the federal RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states, religious objectors may receive protection from statutes
in sixteen states mirroring the federal RFRA. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466, 477 (2010) (listing RFRAs in Alabama,
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia); Eugene Volokh, RFRA State Map, UCLA Sch. L., http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/relmap.pdf (last
visited Sept. 17, 2012) (reporting states with state constitutional amendments, statutory
RFRAs, and state constitutional free exercise clauses interpreted to require strict scrutiny).
The state RFRAs “facially require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices.” See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda with
Test Suites, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 595, 598 (1999) (arguing that although “RFRAs have more
specific, binding text than does the Free Exercise Clause,” they nonetheless leave a number of open questions regarding religious liberty); see also infra note 17 (discussing legal
challenges to the coverage mandate premised on such statutory protections); infra note
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generally applicable laws.15 Instead, as the U.S. Supreme Court specifically noted in the 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith, religious
groups and individuals must look to the political process for these accommodations.16
231 (discussing a recent decision that New Mexico’s RFRA did not apply to actions by a
commercial actor).
In addition, many state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to confer greater
religious rights than the Federal Constitution. Lund, supra, at 466–67. Professor Christopher
Lund notes that thirty states go beyond what is required by Smith and provide greater religious protections than federal law. Id. at 467; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. See generally Angela C.
Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence,
1993 BYU L. Rev. 275 (discussing state constitutions and how they have been interpreted to
confer heightened protection to religious groups and individuals).
15 Importantly, laws that are not neutral may also be struck down in accordance with
Smith. See 494 U.S. at 890. A recent case from Washington, Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, illustrates
how contextual the analysis of neutrality is. See 524 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1266 (W.D. Wash.
2007), vacated, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). In Stormans, a group of pharmacists filed suit
to preliminarily enjoin state rules lacking a conscience exemption. Id. The rules required
them to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, which violated their religious convictions. Id. The federal district court granted this injunction, finding the rules to be neither neutral nor generally applicable given evidence that “strongly suggests that the overriding objective of the [rule] was, to the degree possible, to eliminate moral and religious
objections from the business of dispensing medication.” Id. at 1259.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that, from the
“thin” evidentiary record, the rules were neutral and generally applicable because the “object
of the rules was to ensure safe and timely patient access to lawful and lawfully prescribed
medications . . . [and to] eliminate all objections that do not ensure patient health, safety,
and access to medication.” 586 F.3d at 1131–32, 1142. The court emphasized that the rules
did not single out drugs to which pharmacists might have a religious objection. See id. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case. Id. at 1126.
On remand, the district court conducted a twelve-day bench trial, developing a fiftyfour page record of factual findings, and concluded that the rules were neither neutral
nor generally applicable. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181 (W.D. Wash. 2012). With respect to
neutrality, the court found that the rules “are riddled with exemptions” that undermine
their secular purpose, “but contain no such exemptions for identical religiously-motivated
conduct.” Id. at 1190. Further, the state failed to explain why the refuse-and-refer policy for
secular exemptions would create prohibitive difficulties for religious exemptions. Id. Lastly,
the court found that “[t]he rules are not generally applicable because the State does not
enforce them against all pharmacies, or even to all pharmacies with religious objections to
dispensing [emergency contraception].” Id. at 1199. The court, applying strict scrutiny per
Smith, concluded that the rules were unconstitutional. Id. at 1201.
16 See 494 U.S. at 890 (concluding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment no matter how much they burden an individual’s or organization’s exercise of religious liberty). The Smith Court emphasized:
[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted,
or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and
that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government
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The controversy over the coverage mandate precipitated just such
a political process,17 with the Obama administration making a series of
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or
in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all religious beliefs.
Id.

In January 2012, the Supreme Court, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, held that the ministerial exception, grounded in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, applies to an employee who works in a church-affiliated entity (for example,
in a church school), based on an overall assessment of the role of the employee, which derives partially from the church’s own understanding of that role. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706–07
(2012). Shortly after the decision, a number of commentators grappled with the impact of
Hosanna-Tabor on Smith’s broader holding that religious groups and individuals must look to
the political process for protection. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, What Comes After HosannaTabor, First Things ( Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2012/01/
what-comes-after-hosanna-tabor (comparing Smith’s reasoning that “a blanket rule that religious claims nearly always trigger exemptions to generally applicable laws would in effect
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself,” with Hosanna-Tabor, which said “in effect,
that when it comes to the right to govern themselves in the choice of their clergy, ministers,
leaders, and others whose functions and duties are distinctly religious, churches and other
religious organizations are indeed a law unto themselves”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, Engage, 168, 168–70 (Mar. 2012), http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20120322_EsbeckEngage13.1.pdf (making a similar comparison).
17 The White House has indicated that it does not believe there are “any constitutional
rights issues” presented by the coverage mandate. See Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney
( Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/31/pressbriefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-13112 [hereinafter January Press Briefing]. Amid this political process, thirty separate suits have been filed by religious employers to date, arguing
that the contraceptive mandate, as applied to objecting religious employers, violates the First
Amendment and RFRA. See, e.g., supra note 7 (discussing the suit brought by EWTN). These
suits, which began with the EWTN suit, reached a crescendo on May 21, 2012, when “43
Catholic educational, charitable and other entities filed a dozen lawsuits in federal court . . .
charging that the [coverage mandate] violates their religious freedom.” Julie Roviner, Catholic
Groups Sue Obama Administration over Birth Control Rule, NPR (May 21, 2012, 4:20 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/21/153218446/catholic-groups-sue-obamaadministration-over-birth-control-rule; see HHS Mandate Information Central, Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Sept.
18, 2012) (listing lawsuits); see also supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (noting the religious backlash against the mandate). The University of Notre Dame, as discussed later in this
Article, was among the forty-three institutions. See infra notes 322, 326–327 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuits).
Also among the forty-three institutions was Wheaton College, an evangelical institution.
For some, Wheaton’s inclusion shows that “‘[t]his is not a fight over contraception. Evangelicals, in fact, don’t agree with Catholics on their opposition to contraception and birth control.’” Instead, the “issue is about religious freedom.” Napp Nazworth, Wheaton College, Catholic
University Jointly Sue over Birth Control Mandate, Christian Post ( July 18, 2012, 4:01 PM),
http://www.christianpost.com/news/wheaton-college-catholic-university-jointly-sue-overbirth-control-mandate-78491/#OQD2M1jldBlgCwqI.99 (quoting John Garvey, president of
Catholic University of America).
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attempts to quell the rancor over the coverage mandate. First, it promised to work with religious groups to address their concerns before the
deadline for implementation in subsequent plan years.18 Speaking for
the White House, Domestic Policy Director Cecilia Munoz reiterated
the administration’s commitment “to both respecting religious beliefs
and increasing access to important preventive services.”19 The administration extended the deadline for compliance by one year,20 a concession dismissed by critics as “kicking the can down the road.”21
These suits are now working their way through the courts with varying success. For example, in Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nebraska granted the government’s motion to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice on standing and ripeness grounds. No. 4:12CV3035, 2012 WL
2913402, at *20, 24 (D. Neb. July 17, 2012). The following day, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia dismissed a case without prejudice brought by Belmont Abbey
College, a Catholic liberal arts college, on similar grounds. See Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, No. CIV.A. 11-1989 JEB, 2012 WL 2914417, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012) (“[T]he
Court agrees that Belmont’s injury is too speculative to confer standing and that the case is
also not ripe for decision.”). In August 2012, the same court dismissed Wheaton College’s
suit, concluding that in light of “concrete steps” by the Obama administration “to address
Wheaton’s concerns, including their commitment not to enforce the challenged regulations against Wheaton while accommodations are being negotiated, Wheaton has not alleged a concrete and imminent injury [necessary for] judicial review.” Wheaton Coll. v.
Sebelius, No. 12-1169, 2012 WL 3637162, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012).
By contrast, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado granted a preliminary
injunction in a suit brought by a private, for-profit company, Hercules Industries, Inc.,
whose formal policies are based on Catholic principles. Newland v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV1123-JLK, 2012 WL 3069154, at *1–2 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012). The court compared the
possible harms threatening the plaintiff, the government, and the public and concluded
that “[o]n balance, the threatened harm to Plaintiffs, impingement of their right to freely
exercise their religious beliefs, and the concomitant public interest in that right strongly
favor the entry of injunctive relief.” Id. at *5. The court, however, specifically limited the
scope of its order so as not to enjoin the enforcement of the coverage mandate against
other parties. Id. at *9.
18 See Press Briefing by Press Sec’y Jay Carney (Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/06/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-26201
2 [hereinafter February Press Briefing]. Until the deadline, employers would be required to
direct employees seeking contraceptives to clinics or health centers. See Jost, supra note 1, at
1–2.
19 Cecila Munoz, Health Reform, Preventive Services, and Religious Institutions, The White
House Blog (Feb. 1, 2012, 6:35 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/healthreform-preventive-services-and-religious-institutions.
20 See Memorandum from the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. on Guidance on the
Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 2 (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/
resources/files/Files2/02102012/20120210-Preventive-Services-Bulletin.pdf (delaying enforcement “until the first plan year that begins on or after August 1, 2013” for “nonexempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established or maintained by non-profit
organizations whose plans have not covered contraceptive services for religious reasons at
any point from . . . February 10, 2012[] onward,” but requiring the plan to notify employees). HHS issued guidance on August 15, 2012, which clarifies that the safe harbor is avail-
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The Obama administration then proffered its much-maligned “accommodation” for religious employers.22 The President explained:
[I]f a woman’s employer is a charity or a hospital that has a religious objection to providing contraceptive services as part of
their health plan, the insurance company—not the hospital,
not the charity—will be required to reach out and offer the
woman contraceptive care free of charge without co-pays,
without hassle.23
This suggestion, too, was met with derision from critics. In a statement issued after the President’s announcement, more than five hundred scholars, university presidents, religious leaders, and others— including Catholic Cardinal Timothy Dolan, archbishop of New York and
president of the U.S. Council of Bishops—labeled the accommodation
“unacceptable,” hiding a “grave violation” of religious liberty behind a
“cheap accounting trick.”24
able to plans that object to covering “some but not all contraceptive[s],” as well as to objectors who unsuccessfully attempted before the February 10, 2012 safe harbor date to exclude or limit contraceptive coverage in their plans. See Memorandum from the Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. on Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 1 (August 15, 2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/prev-services-guidance08152012.pdf. But see H.H.S. 1-Year Extension May Not Apply to Student Plans, Campus Notes:
The Cardinal Newman Soc’y Blog (Feb. 2, 2012, 9:20 AM), http://blog.cardinalnewman
society.org/2012/02/02/hhs-1-year-extension-may-not-apply-to-student-plans [hereinafter
Campus Notes] (discussing the possible exemptions to the extension).
21 Johnson, supra note 8 (quoting the Catholic Archbishop of Miami, Thomas Wenski).
22 See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501,
16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54) (advance notice of proposed
rulemaking); Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54).
23 See Richard Wolf, Obama Tweaks Birth Control Rule, USA Today (Feb. 10, 2012, 3:57
PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/02/source-obama-tochange-birth-control-rule/1 (noting that “White House officials took pains to avoid the word
‘compromise,’ [because] under the accommodation, no woman who wants access to contraceptives should be denied”).
24 John Garvey et al., Unacceptable, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, 1 (Apr. 11,
2012),
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Unacceptable-4-11.pdf
(observing that “it is unrealistic to suggest that insurance companies will not pass the costs of
these additional services on to the purchasers,” and thus “[i]t is no answer to respond that
the religious employers are not ‘paying’ for this aspect of the insurance coverage”). Other
critics have also labeled the accommodation a “shell game.” See Wolf, supra note 23 (quoting law professor Robert Destro of Catholic University).
Religious objections have come not only from Catholics, but also from representatives
of numerous Muslim, mainline Christian, and evangelical Christian universities. See generally id. (including as signatories the leaders of Arizona Christian University, Biola University, Dordt College, East Texas Baptist University, Houston Baptist University, Oklahoma
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At each step, the Obama administration has responded that its position strikes “the appropriate balance between religious beliefs and the
need to provide preventive services to American women.”25 White
House Chief of Staff Jacob Lew maintained that this final accommodation “set[s] out [the administration’s] policy. . . . We are going to finalize it in the final rules [because] we think that’s the right approach.”26
Baptist University, Oklahoma Christian University, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Union University, and Zaytuna College,
among other religious institutions of higher education).
25 See February Press Briefing, supra note 17. The ACA has drawn criticism on other
grounds as well, including the creation of perverse incentives for employers to drop lowerincome or sick employees on the insurance exchanges. See David Gamage, How the Affordable Care Act Will Create Perverse Incentives Harming Low and Moderate Income Workers, Tax L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at *2–3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067138; Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 Va. L. Rev. 125, 172–80 (2011) (discussing the post-ACA incentives for employers to discontinue health care coverage for sick
employees); Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Why Obamacare Will End Health Insurance as We Know It, Issues 2012 (Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, New York, N.Y.), Mar.
2012, at 3, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ir_7.pdf (characterizing
President Obama’s promise that under the ACA, “you can keep your own insurance,” as
inconsistent with changes dictated by the ACA to “key contractual provisions in ways that
make existing coverage unaffordable, or unavailable at any price”).
Among the perverse incentives created by the ACA are that:
The ACA . . . deter[s] low- and moderate-income taxpayers from accepting jobs
with employers that offer “affordable” health insurance; . . . discourage[s] many
low- and moderate-income taxpayers from attempting to increase their household incomes; . . . dissuade[s] employers from hiring low- and moderateincome taxpayers and . . . encourage[s] employers to reduce the salaries paid to
some low- and moderate-income employees; . . . prompt[s] employers to shift
some low- and moderate-income employees from full-time to part-time positions; . . . [and] induce[s] employers to stop offering ‘affordable’ health insurance to at least some low- and moderate-income employees . . . .
See Gamage, supra, at *2–3.
26 See Obama Chief of Staff: No More Compromise, Contraceptive Rule Is Done Deal, FoxNews.com (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/02/12/obama-chiefstaff-no-more-compromise-contraceptive-rule-is-done-deal. The Obama administration finalized the regulations on February 15, 2012. See Coverage of Preventive Services Under the
ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 8728. Since the Obama administration signaled its unwillingness to
compromise further, the U.S. Department of Justice has asked the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania to dismiss a suit challenging the coverage mandate because
“the administration is working on an amendment to address the religious objections.” Brian
Bowling, Feds Ask Judge to Dismiss ‘Morning-After’ Lawsuit, Pittsburgh Trib.-Rev. (May 1, 2012,
1:44 PM), http://triblive.com/home/1292708-74/college-lawsuit-drugs-says-amendmentgeneva-administration-coverage-department-federal (reporting the government’s additional
argument that the plaintiff “cannot satisfy the imminence requirement for standing”); see
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, 6, Geneva
College v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00207-JFC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2012).
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At least one later poll suggests that a majority of the American people
in fact believe that exemptions for religious employers are warranted.27
These claims for exemption from the coverage mandate are far
from the only claims for accommodation being made by religious
groups today.28 Since 2009, two major medical centers have “revers[ed]
a long-standing policy exempting employees who refuse[d to assist with
abortions] based on religious or moral objections.”29 In each case,
nurses alleged that they were threatened with firing or professional discipline for resisting participation in or training for abortions. In both
cases, the nurses sued, asserting both constitutional and statutory
rights30 to not assist in abortion procedures in violation of their moral
27 In a March 2012 poll, 57% of Americans responded that religiously affiliated employers, such as hospitals or universities, should be allowed to opt out of mandated coverage for
birth control. See Jim Rutenberg & Marjorie Connelly, Obama’s Rating Falls as Poll Reflects Volatility, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 2012, at A1. Of those responding, 61% of men supported an optout, compared to 53% of women. See id. Among all respondents, 37% believed the debate to
be over religious freedom, whereas 51% thought it centered on “women’s health and their
rights.” N.Y. Times & CBS News, 2012 Poll 22 (Mar. 7–11, 2012), available at http://s3.
documentcloud.org/documents/324884/new-york-times-cbs-poll.pdf. A poll commissioned
by Planned Parenthood in 2012 found that “[o]nly 39% of voters support an exemption for
Catholic hospitals and universities from providing the benefit, while 57% are opposed to
one.” See Tom Jensen, Our Polling on the Birth Control Issue, Pub. Pol’y Polling (Feb. 10, 2012,
10:24 AM), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2012/02/our-polling-on-the-birthcontrol-issue.html.
28 Questions of conscientious objections arise in other contexts, too. See generally
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal, 21 J.
Clinical Ethics 163 (2010) (surveying conscientious refusal laws and reviewing recent
related legislative developments and lawsuits).
29 Rob Stein, N.J. Nurses Sue over Abortion Policy, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 2011, at A2 (discussing a lawsuit against the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ)).
30 Federal conscience protections contemporaneous with the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade provide that:
No entity which receives [certain grants, contracts, loans or loan guarantees],
may—
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of any physician or other health care personnel, or
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to [such] personnel,
because he performed or assisted . . . a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion, [or] refused to perform or assist [one] . . . [due to] his religious beliefs
or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c)(1) (2006) (popularly known as the “Church Amendment”); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1973) (holding that a woman’s decision to have an
abortion is protected by her right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution). Twenty states similarly provide conscientious
objectors with an absolute exemption from participating in sterilizations and abortions. See
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or religious convictions.31 Those suits reached very different outcomes.32
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Health Care
Context, in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts 77, 299–
327 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Emerging Conflicts].
31 In 2011, in Danquah v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, a dozen nurses
sued UMDNJ in federal court, alleging that they were forced, under threat of professional
discipline or dismissal, to assist with abortions in violation of their moral or religious convictions. See Verified Complaint at 2, 14–15, Danquah v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J.,
No. 2:11-cv-06377-JLL-MAH (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.lifenews.com/
wp-content/uploads/2011/11/newjerseynursesabortion.pdf (alleging violations of U.S.
Const. amend XIV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-7(d), 1983 (2006), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:65A-1
(West 2000)); see also Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, Danquah, No. 2:11-cv-06377-JLLMAH (Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahSettlementTranscripts.pdf [hereinafter Danquah Transcript of Proceedings] (noting the nurses’ strong
religious beliefs). The nurses alleged that in 2011, UMDNJ changed its policy of assigning
only willing same-day surgery unit nurses to participate in abortion procedures. Verified
Complaint, supra, at 7. In a marked departure from this policy, hospital staff “repeatedly
[told] them and their colleagues that they must assist abortions or they would be terminated . . . [and] that any objecting nurses might theoretically be relocated to significantly
less favorable job positions.” Id. at 7–8. Staff required some nurses, including Sharon L.
Danquah, to train for abortions without providing them with advance notice. Id. at 9. When
Danquah objected on religious grounds, a staff member responded that the hospital “has ‘no
regard for religious beliefs’ of nurses who so object, that ‘everyone on this floor is required
when assigned to do TOPs [terminations of pregnancy; abortions],’ that such nurses ‘are
trained to care for patients’ elective procedures,’ and that ‘no patients can be refused by any
nurse.’” Id. The objecting nurses requested and received a temporary restraining order on
November 3, 2011. Temporary Restraining Order at *2, Danquah, No. 2:11-cv-06377-JLLMAH (Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/DanquahTRO.pdf.
Two years earlier, in Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital, an operating room nurse
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against her
employer, claiming that she was coerced into assisting with a late-term, twenty-two-week
abortion, in violation of the Church Amendment. See Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 6, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2010 WL 169485
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09-03120), aff’d, 626 F.3d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 2010), available at
http://oldsite.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/Cenzon-DeCarloPIbrief.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum for Preliminary Injunction]. The plaintiff, Cathy Cenzon-DeCarlo, alleged
that although the hospital had staffed around her religious objection to assisting with
abortions for years, on May 24, 2009, her superior threatened not only to terminate her if
she did not help with an abortion, but also to report her to the nursing board for “patient
abandonment.” See id.
32 Danquah was fully resolved by a settlement on the record memorializing the parties’
agreement that, except when the mother’s life is at risk and there are no other nonobjecting staff members available to assist, nurses with conscientious objections will not
have to assist with abortions. See Danquah Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 31, at 5–6.
In such rare cases, “the only involvement of the objecting plaintiffs would be to care for
the patient until such time as a non-objecting person can get there to take over the care.”
Id. at 6. Judge Jose Linares retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure compliance with
the agreement. Id. at 5. By contrast, the federal district court hearing the Cenzon-DeCarlo
case dismissed the suit, concluding that the Church Amendment did not confer a private
right of action. See Cenzon-DeCarlo, 2010 WL 169485 at *4. The decision was affirmed by the
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While the clashes over contraception and abortion play out on the
national stage, parallel claims for religious accommodations have been
advanced in several states that have considered, and in some cases enacted, same-sex marriage legislation.33 Religious objectors to same-sex
marriage have asked for a way to both honor their religious convictions
and comply with the law.34 Specifically, they have asked to step aside
from celebrating, facilitating, or recognizing same-sex marriages when
doing so would violate their religious beliefs.
In a May 2012 statement to ABC News, the first of its kind by a sitting president, President Obama supported the rights of same-sex couples to get married.35 At the same time, President Obama said that the
state should respect religious liberty: “[I]t’s important to recognize that
folks who feel very strongly that marriage should be defined narrowly
as between a man and a woman, many of them are not coming at it

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cenzon-DeCarlo, 626 F.3d at 697, 699; see also
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Empowering Private Protection of Conscience, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 101,
104 (2010) (dissecting the legislative history of the Church Amendment and concluding
that it does not support a private right of action). Cenzon-DeCarlo filed separate state
court claims that are currently on appeal. See Cenzon-Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Nos.
2011-02282, 2011-07705 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 12, 2010).
The New Jersey statute cited in Danquah’s complaint, which states that “[n]o person
shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of an abortion or sterilization,”
provides an unqualified exemption for objectors to those procedures. See N.J. Stat. Ann.
2A:65A-1. Concerns that unqualified exemptions impose hardships on those seeking procedures or services are not unfounded. As Part IV of this Article explains, exemptions
qualified by hardship are necessary to equitably balance both access and religious liberty.
See infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of
Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Health Care Procedures, 34 Am. J.L. & Med. 41, 41
n.5 (2008) [hereinafter Wilson, Limits of Conscience] (arguing that exemptions for pharmacies from the duty to stock emergency contraceptives pose a much greater threat to patient
access than exemptions for individual pharmacists, and offering instead that state legislatures should prefer individual exemptions over institutional ones provided that the individual exemptions are qualified by hardship to patients).
33 See infra app. A (collecting state statutory provisions relating to same-sex marriage).
34 To be clear, not all religious believers object to same-sex marriage. In fact, some denominations allow ministers to choose whether to marry same-sex couples, resulting in
internal divisions over whether to perform same-sex marriages. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, True
to Episcopal Church’s Past, Bishops Split on Gay Weddings, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2011, at A1 (noting that in New York City, two out of five Episcopalian dioceses allow same-sex couples to
be married in church); Churches Debate: May Clergy Marry Gays?, USA Today, July 17, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-07-17-gay-marry-clergy-churches_n.htm.
35 See Melissa Rogers, Obama and the Two Types of Marriage, Huffington Post (May 17,
2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-rogers/civil-and-religious-marriageand-obama_b_1521981.html; Sam Stein, Obama Backs Gay Marriage, Huffington Post (May 9,
2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/09/obama-gay-marriage_n_1503
245.html.
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from a mean-spirited perspective. They’re coming at it because they
care about families.”36
Like President Obama, many state legislators have struggled with
reconciling two compelling, and at times conflicting, values in the same
piece of legislation—marriage equality and religious liberty. They perceive difficult tradeoffs, such as how to protect religious liberty without
offending the dignity of same-sex couples or condoning anti-gay animus, among other concerns. The real-world points of resistance that
state lawmakers articulate echo the concerns voiced about exemptions
to the new coverage mandate.
This Article summarizes a number of sticking points voiced to me
by legislators about a hardship exemption that I, and others, have tried
to secure in state same-sex marriage laws, together with some responses
that may be offered.37 Assuming that spoken concerns reflect real ones,
as I believe they do, it is worthwhile to examine points of resistance to
religious liberty protections in same-sex marriage laws as a way of testing the strength of claims for exemptions on other questions over
which the public remains deeply divided.
Part I explores the threshold question troubling many legislators:
if the political will is there to recognize same-sex marriage, why should

36 Rogers, supra note 35 (quoting President Obama).
37 This Article draws on a series of letters I coauthored arguing for the inclusion of robust exemptions in same-sex marriage bills, including letters to New Hampshire governor
John Lynch, D.C. City Council chairman Vincent Gray, New York Senate majority leader
Dean Skelos, Maryland state senator Brian Frosh, Connecticut state representative Christopher G. Donovan, New Jersey state senator Paul Sarlo, Washington governor Christine
Gregoire, New Jersey governor Chris Christie, and the Iowa State Legislature, as well as a
letter about the proposed rescission of the Bush Conscience Regulation to the HHS’s Office of Public Health and Science. See Memos/Letters on Religious Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage, Mirror of Just. (Aug. 2, 2009, 12:59 AM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirror
ofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html (providing
the full text of some of these letters). The remaining letters are on file with the author.
This Article also draws on a model religious liberty provision that two groups of legal
scholars have crafted and advocated for in jurisdictions considering same-sex marriage
legislation. See infra app. B. One group of scholars consists of myself, Thomas C. Berg of
the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Carl H. Esbeck of the University of Missouri
School of Law, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. of Valparaiso University School of Law, Richard W. Garnett of the University of Notre Dame Law School, and Marc D. Stern, member
of the New York State Bar for Legal Advocacy. This group takes no position for or against
same-sex marriage, but argues that robust religious liberty protections should be included
in any legislation. The second group, led by Douglas Laycock of the University of Virginia
School of Law, consists of Professor Laycock, Marc D. Stern, and Michael Perry of Emory
University School of Law, all of whom explicitly endorse same-sex marriage. In May 2012,
Bruce Ledewitz of Duquesne University School of Law joined the second group.
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the legislature accommodate anyone?38 This Part offers a simple response: exemptions serve the interests of same-sex marriage supporters—in addition to being the right thing to do and maximizing individual liberty.39 This Part contends that without accommodations,
public attitudes about same-sex marriage are likely to harden, delaying
marriage equality. It charts how a winner-takes-all approach to same-sex
marriage—offering exemptions only to the clergy, who do not need
them because of the First Amendment—has failed to garner sufficient
support to become law. By contrast, bills providing meaningful protections for religious objectors have succeeded, suggesting that religious
exemptions take a powerful argument away from same-sex marriage
opponents. Part I then explores how an inflexible approach to requests
for religious accommodations to the coverage mandate may likewise
backfire if not tempered.
The Article then turns to a host of practical considerations raised
by religious liberty accommodations. Part II asks, as District of Columbia councilmember Phil Mendelson did, “how . . . policy maker[s] can
know . . . that [a religious objector] is really acting on fundamental religious belief [rather than] prejudice?”40 Section A argues that although sincerity issues do arise, the significant personal cost of objecting gives objectors little incentive to make insincere claims. Further,
courts have shown the institutional competence to separate sincere
from insincere claims in a range of contexts, from military conscientious objections to suits by prisoners. Section B then considers a related
concern in the health care context—that exemptions legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas. This Section recaps the argument made by
family planning advocates that emergency contraceptives like Plan B
act only to prevent fertilization—and never after. This Section reviews
emerging evidence about ella’s mechanisms of action that shows that
ella’s enhanced effectiveness in preventing pregnancy stems in part
from post-fertilization effects. More fundamentally, Section B argues
that if claims of faith receive protection only when the rest of society

38 See infra notes 46–109 and accompanying text.
39 See infra note 46 (discussing the goods served by having the personal liberty to live
out one’s sexual identity and one’s religious identity).
40 See infra notes 110–163 and accompanying text; see also Religious Liberty Implications of
D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill: Hearing on Bill 18-482 Before the D.C. Council, 19th Sess. 6:59:40
(Nov. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill] (statement of councilmember Phil Mendelson), videorecording available at http://oct.dc.gov/services/on_demand_
video/channel13/november2009/11_02_09_JUDICI.asx.
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agrees with the objector’s belief, then almost nothing would remain of
religious freedom.
Part III then explores how broad any legislative accommodation
should be.41 This Part examines whether religious objectors should be
protected only when they are noncommercial actors or when directly
performing a morally freighted service, like solemnizing a marriage or
terminating a pregnancy. It argues that appropriately crafted exemptions can avoid the real concern driving efforts to cabin an exemption’s
scope—dislocation to the individuals seeking the contested service.
Part IV assesses a claim made by White House press secretary Jay
Carney that the coverage mandate “does not direct an individual to do
anything,” and so there can be no real threat to religious liberty.42 The
Part first documents the steep penalties that religious objectors face in
both the health care and same-sex marriage contexts without specific
protections. It then takes the claim at face value, concluding that if the
changing legal landscape really does not direct objectors to do anything, then religious accommodations cost nothing to grant but can
allay significant fears at a time of great social change.
Part V explores the notion that no one should have to bear the
cost of another’s religious objection, a claim now made in fights over
both the coverage mandate and same-sex marriage.43 This Part first explains that appropriately crafted exemptions can vindicate both values
at stake: access and religious liberty. It then acknowledges that qualified
exemptions—that is, accommodations that allow religious objectors to
avoid civil dictates only when a hardship will not result for those seeking a service—impose some costs on both sides, but also turn down the
temperature on heated social debates.
Part VI then explores the question of hardship in the especially
difficult context of insurance benefits, both for same-sex spouses and
for deeply divisive services like contraception.44 This Part argues that
failing to include religious accommodations in benefit mandates often
leads to greater hardships—namely, the choice to discontinue objectionable coverage rather than violate a religious belief. Religious objectors have resorted to this “nuclear option” on multiple occasions when
an exemption was not forthcoming, and they may continue to do so.
Outside the health care context, religious objectors can take the nuclear option at no real cost. Even after the ACA, the nuclear option re41 See infra notes 164–207 and accompanying text.
42 January Press Briefing, supra note 17; see infra notes 208–246 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text.

1432

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1417

mains available to institutions that object to the coverage mandate—
notwithstanding the steep penalties the ACA imposes on larger employers that drop health care coverage for their employees. Indeed,
many employers that drop coverage are likely to come out ahead financially. This Part then asks a question almost entirely overlooked in the
controversy over the coverage mandate: what happens to the individual
who morally objects to contraceptives and sterilization—what do they
do after the ACA? For them, the penalties are likely to be draconian,
imposing a significant encroachment on religious liberty.
Part VII tackles the idea that accommodations for religious objectors should not be allowed because of harm to the dignity of others.45 It
argues that legislators frequently must address two dignitary harms, not
one—for example, the harm to lesbian and gay couples who are turned
aside and the harm to religious believers who are told that their beliefs
are not to be tolerated, at least not in the public sphere. Although the
competing claims about dignitary losses cannot resolve the question of
whether to give accommodations, they can and should guide the structure of accommodations to cabin the possibility of dignitary harm.
Finally, the Article concludes that in the end, no matter how
thoughtful an exemption or a claim for exemptions may be, to realistically obtain religious liberty protection in the legislative or regulatory
process requires proponents to understand how exemptions look to
decisionmakers on the ground.
I. First Sticking Point: Why Accommodate Anyone?
Like the Obama administration’s evolving efforts to vindicate two
competing values—access and religious freedom—state legislators have
had to confront the obvious question: if the political will is there to
recognize same-sex marriage, why should the state accommodate anyone? The short answer is this: self-interest.
Before describing why religious liberty guarantees are in the interest of both sides, in both debates, I should note that this focus on pragmatic considerations is not intended to detract from principled arguments favoring exemptions. The same fundamental values of personal
liberty that support an individual’s right to follow and fulfill his or her
essential identity, including sexual identity and same-sex relationships,
also support an individual’s right to live according to his or her religious

45 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text.
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convictions.46 Not all observers agree with such principled arguments,
however.47 For such people, a practical argument may have an appeal,
even when more normative claims do not. So let’s talk practicality.
A. Religious Accommodations Are a Pathway to Same-Sex Marriage
In the absence of accommodations, public attitudes toward samesex relationships are likely to become more divided, not less, as Professor Douglas Laycock has noted:
To impose legal penalties or civil liabilities on a wedding planner who refuses to do a same-sex wedding, or on a religious
counseling agency that refuses to provide marriage counseling
to same-sex couples, will simply ensure that conservative religious opinion on this issue can repeatedly be aroused to fever
pitch. Every such case will be in the news repeatedly, and every
such story will further inflame the opponents of same-sex mar46 Professor Chai Feldblum argues that the “identity liberty” same-sex couples have in
marriage and the “belief liberty” objectors have in their religion both constitute core values and deserve protection, but these values directly conflict when civil rights laws force
one to accommodate the other. See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties,
in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 123, 157. Professor Feldblum concludes that the
conduct demanded by civil rights laws “can burden an individual’s belief liberty interest,”
but “[a]cknowledging [the burden’s impact] does not necessarily mean that [civil rights]
laws will be invalidated or that exemptions . . . will always be granted to individuals holding
such beliefs.” Id.; see also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims
Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 206, 219–20, 230–32 (2010) (critiquing Professor
Feldblum’s argument). Many other scholars also offer principled arguments. See generally
Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes
Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 236
(2010) (arguing that religious objections to same-sex marriage do not necessitate additional statutory protections because those objections predate the debate over same-sex
marriage); Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars,
5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 260 (2010) (discussing four reasons to maintain religious liberty
accommodations for those opposed to same-sex marriage); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 274 (2010) (distinguishing between freedom of clergy and claims of “religiously motivated individuals,” and concluding that although some religious freedoms are sufficiently protected under the U.S.
Constitution, others receive less protection, and thus same-sex marriage opponents would
be wise to find common ground to secure robust exemptions now rather than wait); Marc
D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 307 (2010) (advocating qualified religious exemptions as a solution to preserving religious liberty without diminishing the equality of same-sex couples); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens:
The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc.
Pol’y 318 (2010) (arguing that government employees with religious objections should be
granted exemptions).
47 See, e.g., Shannon Gilreath, Book Review Essay, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage
and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 205, 221.
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riage. Refusing exemptions to such religious dissenters will politically empower the most demagogic opponents of same-sex
marriage. It will ensure that the issue remains alive, bitter, and
deeply divisive.48
By creating religious martyrs, the likely outcome is to delay social acceptance of gay marriage, not to hasten it.
In the United States, our over-decade-long experience with attempts to secure legislation recognizing same-sex marriage suggests
that religious accommodations likely have helped same-sex marriage
advocates secure long-sought victories. To date, seven jurisdictions have
enacted, and retained, laws recognizing same-sex marriage: Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York,
Vermont, and Washington.49
In three of those states—New York, Maryland, and Washington—
proposed legislation offering protection only to the clergy failed to
garner enough support to become law only months before revised bills
passed.50 The fact that same-sex marriage bills with more expansive
48 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, in Shannon Gilreath, The End of Straight Supremacy: Realizing Gay Liberation 260, 260–61
(2011) (predicting that “[t]he number of people who assert their right to conscientious
objection will be small in the beginning, and it will gradually decline to insignificance if
deprived of the chance to rally around a series of martyrs”).
49 See infra app. A. Maine’s same-sex marriage law, which contained a clergy-only exemption, was repealed in a “people’s referendum,” and a similar measure passed the New Hampshire legislature only to be vetoed by Governor John Lynch. See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Charting the Success of Same-Sex Marriage Legislation (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/132 (summarizing the
history of same-sex marriage legislation in every state to consider it to date). The New Hampshire legislature amended the bill to include more expansive exemptions and Governor
Lynch subsequently signed it into law. See id.
50 On May 12, 2009, the New York Assembly passed legislation containing a clergy-only
exemption by a vote of 89–52—only to see it defeated in the New York Senate on December
2, 2009, by a vote of 24–38. See Jeremy W. Peters, Making Gay Marriage Personal and Political,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 2009, at A1; Dwyer Arce, New York Senate Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Legislation, Jurist (Dec. 2, 2009, 3:19 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2009/12/new-york-senaterejects-same-sex.php. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (summarizing the development of the
key issues in the same-sex marriage legislation of New York, Maryland, and Washington). Two
years later, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo proposed the Marriage Equality Act, a revised bill
that included more expansive religious liberty protections. See infra app. A. The New York
Assembly approved that bill on June 15, 2011, by a vote of 80–63. Kenneth Lovett, New York
Assembly Passes Bill to Legalize Gay Marriage 80-63; Legislation Now Heads to Senate, N.Y. Daily
News, June 15, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-15/local/29681615_1_gaymarriage-exemptions-from-anti-discrimination-laws-senate-republicans. The New York Senate
then revised the bill to include yet more protections, facilitating the bill’s passage on June 24,
2011 by a vote of 33–29. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2011, at A1. Although robust
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protections were enacted such a short time later suggests that exemptions mattered to the ultimate success of those bills.51 A number of observers drew precisely this conclusion.
protections played an important role in New York, so too did money and political maneuvering in convincing Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos to allow the bill to reach the Senate
floor in the first place. Strenuous lobbying by Governor Cuomo and New York City mayor
Michael Bloomberg persuaded Skelos not to block the vote, and must have also persuaded
some Republican members of the Senate to support the final bill. See Michael Barbaro, Behind Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of Forces, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2011, at A1; Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, Wealthy Donors to G.O.P. Are Providing Bulk of Money in Gay Marriage
Push, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2011, at A15; Thomas Kaplan, After Pushing Gay Marriage, Cuomo Is
Thanked with Money, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2011, at A29.
Efforts to pass same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland followed a similar trajectory.
In 2008, Maryland legislators introduced bills containing clergy-only exemptions, but neither House Bill 351 nor Senate Bill 290 was voted upon by either chamber. See generally
Wilson, supra note 49 (summarizing same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland). In 2009,
bills containing identical clergy-only exemptions died in their respective committees. Id. In
2011, the Maryland House considered two bills that contained the same clergy-only exemption. Id. The Senate, however, added more expansive protections for religious objectors to the original House bill. Id. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 25–21 on February 24, 2011, but the bill languished in a House committee, never to be voted upon by the
full House. See id. In the next legislative session, the House took up legislation proposed by
Governor Martin O’Malley, which contained additional protections. See id. The Maryland
House passed that bill on February 17, 2012, by a vote of 72–67, and the Senate approved
it on February 23, 2012 by a vote of 25–22. See Sabrina Tavernise, In Maryland, House Passes
Bill to Allow Gays to Wed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2012, at A13; see also John Wagner, Same-Sex
Marriage Bill Nears Passage, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 2011, at B1 (reporting that the Maryland
Senate preliminarily voted in favor of same-sex marriage by a vote of 25–22). Nevertheless,
opponents of the bill collected enough signatures to prevent the Maryland law from taking
immediate effect, and it will be considered in a referendum in November 2012. See Rebecca Berg, In Maryland, Gay Marriage Seeks a “Yes” at the Polls, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2012, at
A16.
In Washington, a bill offering protection only to clergy failed to gain traction in 2011
and was reintroduced in 2012. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing the legislative
history of Washington’s same-sex marriage bill). Legislators then introduced a competing bill
containing more robust protections, which was substantially amended and ultimately passed
the Senate on February 1, 2012 by seven votes, with a total vote of 28–21. See id. The Washington House passed the Senate’s engrossed bill by a vote of 55–43 on February 8, 2012. Id. The
bill was signed into law by Governor Christine Gregoire on February 13, 2012. See Joel Connelly, Gregoire Signs Same-Sex Marriage Bill, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (Feb. 13, 2012, 1:00
PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/connelly/article/Make-History-Gregoire-signs-samesex-marriage-3312315.php; Andrew Garber, Gay-Marriage Bill Passes House, Awaits Gregoire’s
Signature, Seattle Times (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:18 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2017459861_gaymarriage09m.html. Like Maryland’s law, the law legalizing samesex marriage in Washington was placed on hold in June 2012, when opponents gathered
sufficient signatures to block the law from taking immediate effect pending a November
2012 referendum on the legislation. See Laura L. Myers, Gay Marriage in Washington Blocked by
Proposed Referendum, Reuters ( June 6, 2012, 7:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/06/06/us-usa-gaymarriage-washington-idUSBRE8551JE20120606.
51 The two exceptions to this pattern are Connecticut and Maine. In 2007, Connecticut
considered, and failed to pass, proposed same-sex marriage legislation containing protec-
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After Governor Andrew Cuomo signed New York’s same-sex marriage law in the summer of 2011, the New York Times observed that the
religious exemptions “proved to be the most microscopically examined
and debated—and the most pivotal—in the battle over same-sex marriage. Language that Republican senators inserted into the bill legalizing same-sex marriage provided more expansive protections for religious organizations and helped pull the legislation over the finish line
. . . .”52 Similarly, in Maryland, religious liberty exemptions shifted the
question for some legislators from whether to embrace marriage equality
to how to balance that good with religious liberty.53
tions only for the clergy. See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing same-sex marriage in
Connecticut). On Oct. 28, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner
of Public Health, held that “the state’s disparate treatment of same sex couples [in excluding
them from the institution of marriage] is constitutionally deficient.” 957 A.2d 407, 412
(Conn. 2008). With the judiciary’s thumb on the scales, legislators then introduced a samesex marriage bill with substantial protections that ultimately passed in 2009. See Chase Matthews, Connecticut Gov. Signs Gay Marriage into Law, ChicagoPride.com (Apr. 23, 2009, 12:00
AM), http://chicago.gopride.com/news/article.cfm/articleid/7272400.
In Maine, legislation containing a clergy-only exemption attained overwhelming support before being repealed in a popular referendum. See generally Wilson, supra note 49
(discussing same-sex marriage in Maine). That bill passed in 2009 by votes of 89–57 and
21–13 in the lower and upper chambers, respectively. See id.
Although it is impossible, after the fact, to say definitively that more expansive exemptions proved decisive in the success of these same-sex marriage laws, the number of narrowly defeated bills that later succeeded when revised to include more expansive exemptions is suggestive. Also suggestive is Maine’s experience: even where a same-sex marriage
bill passed both chambers of the legislature by substantial majorities, the new law containing protection only for the clergy was narrowly rejected by voters. See id.
It remains to be seen whether new legislation in Maryland and Washington, containing more expansive exemptions, will satisfy voters in a referendum. In these states, opponents have collected sufficient signatures to force a November 2012 referendum on the
legislation. See Berg, supra note 50; Myers, supra note 50. See generally Wilson, supra note 49
(summarizing recent developments in same-sex marriage legislation in Maryland and
Washington).
52 See Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, June 26,
2011, at A20.
53 See Robin Wilson & Anthony Kreis, Same-Sex Marriage Symposium: The Overlooked Benefit of Leaving Perry in Place, SCOTUSblog (Sept. 18, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2012/09/same-sex-marriage-symposium-the-overlooked-benefit-of-leaving-perry
in-place/ (quoting Maryland House of Delegates Speaker Michael Busch’s statement that
“I know for a fact that for two or three delegates [including religious liberty protections]
was an important component in their decision to vote for it”); see also John Wagner & Aaron C. Davis, Governor Unveils Details of His Legislative Agenda, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 2012, at
B5 (explaining that “[r]eligious-exemption language included in O’Malley’s same-sex
marriage bill is intended to pick up additional support in the House of Delegates, where a
bill fell unexpectedly short last year after clearing the Senate”); Annie Linskey, After Soul
Searching, Swing Votes Make Difference for Same-Sex Marriage, Balt. Sun (Feb. 18, 2012), http://
articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-18/news/bs-md-same-sex-sunday-20120217_1_marriagebill-opponents-of-gay-marriage-vote-count (discussing the passage of same-sex marriage
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These successful attempts to recognize same-sex marriage resulted
from a delicate process in which legislators reached a set of compromises about how best to balance marriage equality with other goods in
society. This should surprise no one. Competing interests are often balanced in a pluralistic, democratic society. In the civil rights era, exemptions for religious objectors and others served as the pathway to social
change, not an obstacle to it.54
What sparked those compromises? Religious organizations do
much good in society but frequently need the space to do so in accordance with their convictions.55 In the same-sex marriage context, withlegislation) (noting that the bill passed with one vote to spare, and that one of the votes in
favor of the bill came from a delegate who is a “devoted Methodist [who] was worried
about churches that did not want to preform [sic] same-sex marriages”).
54 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, prohibiting discrimination based on race,
color, religion, or national origin in public accommodations engaged in interstate commerce, contains a provision known as the “Mrs. Murphy exemption,” which exempts dwellings with four or fewer families, if one of them is the owner’s. See 42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(2)
(2006). The fictional Mrs. Murphy, an Irish widow engaged in renting rooms in her home,
emerged during congressional debate over Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when
lawmakers expressed concern about restricting an individual’s right of commercial association without interfering with his or her deep personal convictions. See Marie A. Failinger,
Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and
Religious Landlords, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 383, 383–87 (2001). Many proponents of the exemption feared Title II would not pass without this accommodation, because public empathy
for homeowners who are forced to let rooms to support their families would deter lawmakers from enacting an unqualified law. See Peter Evans Kane, The Senate Debate on the
1964 Civil Rights Act 50 (Aug. 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University),
available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/dissertations/AAI6806320. Like Title II, Title VIII
exempts owner-occupied dwellings with no more than four families, as well as religious
organizations operating noncommercial dwellings—accommodations that Senator Walter
Mondale at the time labeled as “politically necessary.” 114 Cong. Rec. 2495 (1968).
55 See Byron R. Johnson, Ctr. for Research on Religion & Urban Civil Soc’y, Objective Hope: Assessing the Effectiveness of Faith-Based Organizations: A Review
of the Literature 7 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/crrucs_
objective_hope.pdf (noting that “[b]y some estimates, [Faith-Based Organizations] provide
$20 billion of privately contributed funds to social service delivery for over 70 million Americans annually”); Avis C. Vidal, Urban Inst., Faith-Based Organizations in Community
Development (2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/faithbased.
pdf (noting, in a foreword by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development general
deputy assistant secretary Lawrence L. Thompson, that “recently, there has been greater
recognition and value given to the contributions of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in providing social services,” and that “[h]istorically, FBOs have been particularly prominent in
providing food, clothing, and shelter to people in need”); White House Office of FaithBased & Cmty. Initiatives, Guidance to Faith-Based and Community Organizations
on Partnering with the Federal Government 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.ethics
institute.com/pdf/Faith%20Based%20Federal%20Grants.pdf (“Faith-based and community
groups are the unsung heroes in helping Americans in need. Their compassionate care
and neighborly love turn lives around and provide hope where it has been missing. These
groups do not provide care because they have to, but because they want to.”).
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out such protections, groups and individuals that hew to their religious
beliefs about marriage would be at risk of losing government contracts
and benefits and would also be subject to lawsuits from private citizens.
These risks are not speculative. The City of San Francisco withdrew $3.5
million in social services contracts from the Salvation Army when it refused, for religious reasons, to provide benefits to its employees’ samesex partners.56 In New Jersey, the state’s Division of Civil Rights of the
Office of the Attorney General found that a Methodist nonprofit association violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination when it denied the requests of two same-sex couples to use the group’s boardwalk
pavilion for their commitment ceremonies.57 Separately, local tax authorities stripped the group of its exemption from ad valorem property
taxes on the boardwalk pavilion and billed the group close to $20,000
in “rollback” taxes, although it ultimately paid less.58 More recently, a
Vermont bed-and-breakfast settled a suit seeking “symbolic and punitive
damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief” brought by a lesbian
couple, joined by the Vermont Human Rights Commission.59 The cou56 See Don Lattin, Charities Balk at Domestic Partner, Open Meeting Laws, S.F. Chron., July
10, 1998, at A-1.
57 See N.J. Att’y Gen., Div. on Civil Rights, Finding of Probable Cause, Bernstein v. Ocean
Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008, at 12 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://
www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf. The administrative
law judge who heard the case determined that the association “was renting space at the Pavilion for weddings, an activity largely detached from associational expression or speech,” had
rented “wedding space to heterosexual couples irrespective of their [religious] tradition,”
and had never “inquire[d] into religious beliefs or practice because it did not sponsor, or
otherwise control, these weddings,” and thus that the association had violated New Jersey’s
Law Against Discrimination when it refused to permit the couple’s civil union ceremony. See
Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. CRT 6145-09, 2012 WL 169302, at *4–5
(N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Jan. 12, 2012). The federal courts refused to intervene when the
association filed suit. See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of the United Methodist Church
v. Vespa-Papaleo, No. 07-3802-JAP, 2007 WL 3349787, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2007) (granting
the defendant’s motion to dismiss on abstention grounds), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 339
F. App’x 232 (3d Cir. 2009).
58 See Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Gay Rights, Religious Liberties: A Three-Act Story, NPR ( June
16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91486340; see also Judy
Peet, Gay Unions Dispute Could Cost Group: State Pulls Association’s Tax-Exempt Status, StarLedger (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 18, 2007, at 19 (indicating that taxes on the pavilion would be
roughly $11,000 as a result of the property’s loss of exemption under New Jersey’s Green
Acres Program, which requires that the property “be available equally to all persons”). Under
the Green Acres Program, the tax exemption requires that covered property “is open to all
on an equal basis and that a tax exemption . . . would be in the public interest.” See Letter
from Lisa Jackson, Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to Scott Hoffman, Adm’r, Ocean Grove
Camp Meeting Ass’n (Sept. 15, 2007) (on file with author).
59 See Third Amended Complaint at 1, Baker v. Wildflower Inn, No. 183-7-11 CACV (Vt.
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/wildflower_third_amended_complaint.pdf (providing the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims for relief).
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ple filed suit after an employee indicated in an e-mail that the inn does
not “host gay receptions” due to the innkeepers’ “personal feelings,”60
although it remains disputed whether the employee’s statement did, in
fact, represent the inn’s policy.61 Nonetheless, the inn agreed to pay a
$10,000 civil penalty, place another $20,000 in a charitable trust, and
no longer host weddings or receptions for any member of the public.62
The jurisdictions that have recognized same-sex marriage legislatively have all acknowledged the impact of same-sex marriage laws on a
wide swath of the public that adheres to a traditional (i.e., heterosexual) view of marriage.63 Each law provides religious liberty protections
to the clergy64 in addition to guarantees extending beyond those
60 See Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at Exhibit A, Wildflower Inn, No. 183-7-11 CACV (Vt. Super. Ct. May 10, 2012), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/wildflower_answer_and_affirmative_defenses_to_plfs_third_amen
ded_complaint.pdf [hereinafter Answer and Affirmative Defenses] (containing a printed
copy of the e-mail from the inn’s employee). The couple alleged that the innkeepers had
made public statements that they could not offer their services “because it goes against everything that we as Catholics believe in.” Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at 6.
61 Compare Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at 6 (alleging that the owners of
the inn reaffirmed that hosting same-sex weddings contradicted their religious beliefs),
with Answer and Affirmative Defenses, supra note 60, at 4 (denying this assertion as inaccurate, and claiming that the employee who denied services did not follow the inn’s policy).
Significantly, the employee offered the services of her own private company in the same email, to which the mother of one of the plaintiffs responded that “[they] will have no
shortage of good choices.” See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 59, at Exhibit A. As
explained in Part V, the possibility of a hardship to the couple should influence society’s
willingness to provide an exemption. See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text.
62 See Vermont Inn, 2 Women Settle Gay Marriage Lawsuit, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/AP59a61574cce14b349a527456541a0c7c.html (reporting the
terms of the settlement). The inn did not qualify for the statutory exemption contained in
Vermont’s same-sex marriage law for religious organizations and associated nonprofits that
refuse, for religious reasons, to provide services “related to the solemnization of a marriage
or celebration of a marriage.” See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(l) (Supp. 2011).
63 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on the laws enacted in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and
Washington).
64 Clergy protections appear in each of the laws offering more expansive protections.
For instance, Vermont’s same-sex marriage law provides that it “does not require a member of the clergy authorized to solemnize a marriage . . . to solemnize any marriage, and
any refusal to do so shall not create any civil claim or cause of action.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
18, § 5144(b) (Supp. 2011). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing the text of enacted legislation and a breakdown of protections in proposed and enacted bills). The idea
of “forced officiating” is “a distraction from real situations where religious conscience [may
be] at risk.” See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson et al. to Iowa Governor Chet Culver
( July 9, 2009) (on file with author).
Some proposed exemptions that insulate only the clergy and churches from the duty
to solemnize same-sex marriages have failed to garner enough support to become law. See
infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
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granted by the First Amendment.65 A core of protections has emerged
for religious organizations66 and individuals67 who cannot celebrate or
facilitate any marriage—including a same-sex marriage, interfaith marriage, or second marriage—when doing so would violate their religious
convictions.68
Although each law describes the exempt activities in slightly different terms, generally they encompass the provision of “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if
. . . related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage.”69 Each jurisdiction insulates religious organizations from civil
65 See supra notes 14–15 (discussing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890, and reviewing the Court’s
conclusion that neutral and generally applicable laws do not violate the First Amendment
regardless of their burden on the exercise of religious liberty).
66 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a (West Supp. 2011) (covering “a religious
organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated,
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or
society”); D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (covering “a religious society, or a
nonprofit organization that is operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction
with a religious society”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2011) (covering “a
religious organization, association, or society, or any individual who is managed, directed,
or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, or
any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society”); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10b(1) (McKinney 2011) (covering “a religious entity . . . or a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law . . . or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or
controlled by a religious corporation, or any employee thereof, being managed, directed,
or supervised by or in conjunction with a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a notfor-profit corporation”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (covering “a religious organization,
association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised,
or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society”).
67 See supra note 14 (discussing state RFRAs).
68 These religious exemptions encompass “all” marriages, including interfaith marriages,
second marriages, and same-sex marriages. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (noting that religious organizations “shall not be required to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request for such services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization of
a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage”) (emphasis added);
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (noting that religious organizations “shall not be required to provide
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or
celebration of a marriage”) (emphasis added); see also infra app. A (providing other statutory
examples). Some faiths oppose interfaith marriage. See Cent. Conference of Am. Rabbis,
Reform Judaism and Mixed Marriage (Responsa No. 146), reprinted in American Reform Responsa: Collected Responsa of the Central Conference of American Rabbis 1889–
1983, at 445 (Walter Jacob ed., 1983) (“The Central Conference of American Rabbis, recalling its stand adopted in 1909 ‘that mixed marriage is contrary to the Jewish tradition and
should be discouraged,’ now declares its opposition to participation by its members in any
ceremony which solemnizes a mixed marriage.”).
69 See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l). New Hampshire also requires that “such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of [the objector’s] reli-
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suits for refusing to celebrate marriages,70 and six of the seven explicitly
protect such organizations from punishment at the hands of the government.71 All insulate religious nonprofit organizations, like Catholic
Charities or the Salvation Army, from the duty to celebrate or solemnize marriages that violate their religious tenets.72 Four extend these
protections to benevolent religious organizations, like the Knights of
Columbus, or to religious groups that sponsor marriage retreats or provide housing for married individuals.73 In New York, New Hampshire,
gious beliefs and faith.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III). See generally Wilson, supra note
49 (providing the text of each law).
70 E.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l) (“Any refusal to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges in accordance with this subsection shall not create
any civil claim or cause of action.”); see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a (using similar language); D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(1); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 10-b(2). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on these statutes).
71 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1). Vermont provides an exemption
without specifying more. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4502(l).
72 See supra note 66 (providing the text of relevant statutes).
73 Three states expressly allow benevolent organizations to limit membership or insurance benefits to spouses in traditional marriages. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(IV)
(Supp. 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9 § 4501(b) (Supp. 2011); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 43d Sess.
(Md. 2012). A fourth, New York, includes “a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law” in its general exemption. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (McKinney
Supp. 2012). See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing more detail on these statutes).
As to religious counseling programs, three jurisdictions—the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and New Hampshire—expressly protect religious organizations from the promotion of marriage through religious counseling programs and retreats. See D.C. Code
§ 46-406(e)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (noting that religious societies “shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to
the solemnization or celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage through
religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the religious
society's beliefs”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (exempting certain organizations
from providing services if “the promotion of marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals, and such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or her religious beliefs
and faith”); H.B. 430, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (noting that religious organizations “may not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges to an individual if the request . . . is related to . . . the promotion of
marriage through any social or religious programs or services, in violation of the entity’s
religious beliefs”). New York’s exemption may provide protection as well:
[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right . . . of any religious
or denominational institution or organization, or any organization operated
for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization . . . from taking such
action as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained.
See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2).
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and Washington, individual employees of these groups receive protection, too.74 Although no state legislature has yet to protect religious objectors in the for-profit sector or in government employment,75 the religious liberty protections enacted to date sweep far beyond the church
sanctuary, providing accommodations that exceed what most scholars
believe would be constitutionally demanded.76 Importantly, however,
the legislative accommodations in some states were cobbled together
quickly during the legislative process, resulting in some drafting problems.77
Contrast these legislative victories with the resounding defeats that
have occurred when advocates have adopted an inflexible approach to
religious accommodations. Since 2004, legislators in nine states and the
District of Columbia have introduced proposed same-sex marriage legislation shorn of protections for anyone other than the clergy and
churches.78 This legislation has failed in every jurisdiction in which it
has been offered.79

74 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1) (“[A]ny employee . . . being managed, directed, or
supervised by . . . a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-for-profit corporation
. . . shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a marriage. Any such refusal
. . . shall not create any civil claim . . . .”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (“[A]ny individual . . . .”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(4) (West 2005) (“[A]n individual
. . . .”). These provisions immunize employees of religious organizations from civil suit
directly and possibly also from being compelled by their employers to participate in marriage celebrations. Other states do not provide explicit exemptions for individual employees of religious organizations. See infra app. A.
75 The religious liberty accommodations that I and others have worked to secure, however, would not allow religious individuals in government employment or commerce to
serve as roadblocks on the path to marriage; on the contrary, they would only allow these
individuals to step aside from facilitating a marriage when doing so would violate their
sincerely held religious beliefs, but only when substantial hardship for same-sex couples
would not result. See infra app. B.
76 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
77 See, e.g., infra notes 131–133 and accompanying text (discussing the suggestion to
limit the application of the model provision in Appendix B to sincerely held religious beliefs).
78 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (providing a summary of key provisions in selected
states’ same-sex marriage legislation).
79 See generally id. (reviewing various protections and exemptions considered by state
legislators in drafting same-sex marriage bills). This is not to say that all same-sex marriage
bills that include more expansive exemptions succeed. For example, Maryland’s proposed
legislation in 2011 included a clergy-only exemption. The legislation was amended by the
Senate to include more expansive exemptions, only to die in the House because the Senate’s provisions were effectively frozen—no further changes could be made by the House
in time to be heard by the Senate in that legislative cycle. See id.
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Such measures have failed at the ballot box, too. In 2009, Maine
legislators repeatedly refused to include expansive religious liberty protections in the state’s same-sex marriage law.80 Instead, the legislature
elected to provide only “faux” protections already guaranteed by the
Constitution and turned down more expansive religious liberty protections like those advocated for by some scholars.81 Maine voters turned
back the law in a “people’s veto” by a relatively narrow margin: 52.9%
to 47.1%.82 The inflexible, winner-takes-all character83 of the Maine
statute naturally elicited the question raised by Professor Dale Carpenter the next morning: would “includ[ing] broader protection for religious liberty in the legislature’s [same-sex marriage] bill” have made a
difference?84 Arguably it would have—after all, if a mere 2.9% of voters
80 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Winner-Takes-All Approach to State Same-Sex Marriage Laws Is
Self-Defeating, SCOTUSBlog (Aug. 29, 2011, 4:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/
08/a-winner-takes-all-approach-to-state-same-sex-marriage-laws-is-self-defeating.
81 Maine’s same-sex marriage law provided “protection” that was coterminous with constitutional guarantees. It expressly did not “authorize any court or other state or local governmental body . . . to compel, prevent or interfere in any way with any religious institution’s
religious doctrine, policy, teaching or solemnization of marriage within that particular religious faith’s tradition as guaranteed by the Maine [or] United States Constitution[s].” An Act
to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 2009 Me. Laws 150–
51 (abrogated by people’s veto). It provided no other protections. See id. Provisions like these
offer “faux” protection because “[n]o one seriously believes that clergy will be forced, or even
asked, to perform marriages that are anathema to them.” See Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 1.
82 In response to Question 1: People’s Veto, An Act to End Discrimination in Civil
Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, 52.9% of Maine voters responded “Yes” when
asked, “Do you want to reject the new law that lets same-sex couples marry and allows individuals and religious groups to refuse to perform these marriages?” compared to 47.1%
who responded “No.” See Dep’t of the Sec’y of State, November 3, 2009 General Election Tabulations, Maine.gov, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
83 Professor Jana Singer argues for winner-takes-all legislation stripped of any religious
accommodations. See Jana Singer, Balancing Away Marriage Equality, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 29,
2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/balancing-away-marriage-equality. She
suggests that “broad-based exemptions are both constitutionally problematic and politically
unwise.” Id. If Professor Singer’s over-accommodation argument were correct, thousands of
state and federal religious statutory accommodations would be invalidated—from military
conscientious objection provisions to Native American peyote use, which received statutory
exemption in response to Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1 (2010) (discussing the extent of
existing religious liberty accommodations).
84 Dale Carpenter, There’s Always Next Year, Volokh Conspiracy (Nov. 4, 2009, 1:21
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/11/04/theres-always-next-year (“Some will say that we
should have included broader protection for religious liberty in the [Maine] legislature’s
[same-sex marriage] bill.”). Professor Carpenter did not attribute the law’s demise to this
omission, however: “I don’t get the sense that the supposed erosion of religious liberty was
the main Maine issue or that broader protection would have made an electoral differ-
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could have been swayed to change their votes by live-and-let-live religious liberty protections, Maine would have same-sex marriage today.85
Together, these experiences suggest that exemptions take a powerful
argument against same-sex marriage away from opponents.86
As with the legislative process, religious liberty accommodations
can mute a powerful argument used in constitutional amendment
fights. Sadly, this did not occur in California with Proposition 8. There,
the Yes on 8 campaign . . . [argued that] religious institutions
would be in danger of losing their tax exempt status or being
sued if they refused to perform same sex marriages or to allow
the use of their properties for that purpose. Religiously affiliated adoption agencies would be sanctioned if they refused to
allow same sex couples to adopt and religious parents would
be harmed when public schools taught that same sex marriages were as legitimate as heterosexual marriages.87
ence. . . . Instead, the central concern seems to have been what will be taught in public
schools to children being raised by heterosexual parents.” Id. Others chalk up the demise
of Maine’s same-sex marriage law to the vitriol in the referendum. See Jeff Jacoby, Wedded to
Vitriol, Backers of Gay Marriage Stumble, Bos. Globe, Nov. 11, 2009, at A11.
85 The strength of preference matters, of course. A voter could tend to favor religious
liberty over gay rights, but not know how to weigh or evaluate evidence of a religious liberty impact. If a voter’s preference or weighting is not strong enough to change his or her
vote or position, then it is irrelevant. Certainly the fact that same-sex marriage opponents
in Maine and California invested money in messaging about religious impacts in order to
influence the outcome of referenda suggests that they think it mattered. See Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 111, 167 n.292 (2010) (“Opponents of same-sex marriage in
Maine [invested in] advertisements claiming that if same-sex marriage became legal, homosexuality would be taught in schools.”); Patricia A. Cain, Contextualizing Varnum v.
Brien: A “Moment” in History, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 27, 48 (2009) (“The first advertisement that opponents of same-sex marriage launched was one that said same-sex marriage threatened to take away the tax-exempt status of California churches.”). The real
assay of whether religious liberty concerns move undecided citizens will come in the 2012
referenda on the Maryland and Washington bills containing more expansive religious
liberty protection. See supra note 50.
86 Other factors may explain this legislative track record. For example, Rhode Island’s
2011 same-sex marriage bill contained a clergy-only exemption. See generally Wilson, supra
note 49 (summarizing the key provisions of Rhode Island’s proposed same-sex marriage
legislation). However, given the fact that Rhode Island is the most Catholic state in the
nation, the same-sex marriage bill may have failed to garner sufficient support, whatever
exemptions were proffered. See Religious Identity: States Differ Widely, Gallup (Aug 7, 2009),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122075/religious-identity-states-differ-widely.aspx (reporting
that 53% of Rhode Islanders identify as Roman Catholic). Nonetheless, the pattern strongly correlates with the refusal to embrace more expansive exemptions.
87 Helene Slessarev-Jamir, Religious Conservatives’ Success in Constructing Gay Marriage as
a Threat to Religious Liberties 3 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n 2012 Annual Meeting Paper), avail-
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These arguments received traction precisely because no legislation was
enacted on the heels of the California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision
in In re Marriage Cases.88 The California legislature missed a crucial opportunity to balance religious liberty concerns with marriage equality,
as Connecticut’s legislature did after Connecticut’s supreme court held
in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health that laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples violated same-sex couples’ equal protection rights
under Connecticut’s Constitution.89
As each of these examples illustrates, religious accommodations
need not work against the marriage-equality agenda. As one prominent
gay rights leader, Jonathan Rauch, has pointed out, the smart move is
to “bend toward accommodation,” not away from it.90
B. Religious Accommodations Can Cement Greater Access to Needed Services
Just as an inflexible, winner-takes-all stance may backfire in the
same-sex marriage context, it may also backfire with the coverage mandate. This is so not because a legislative victory hangs in the balance—
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107976; see California Marriage Act.
88 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that “to the extent the current California statutory provisions limit marriage to opposite-sex couples,
these statutes are unconstitutional”), superseded by constitutional amendment, California Marriage Protection Act, Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (2008). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit subsequently held that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095
(9th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S.
July 30, 2012) (No. 12-144).
89 See 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2008); supra note 51 (discussing the genesis of Connecticut’s legislation). Religious liberty protections may also impact challenges to same-sex
marriage bans. See Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions of
LGBT Privilege and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (“The current policy debates in states enacting marriage equality will
help sustain sexual minority’s claims to a fundamental right to marry. The statutory
schemes enacted are indispensable evidence for judges that the interests of the LGBT
community do not undermine the rights of religious institutions, religious social service
groups, or other fraternal organizations.”).
90 Jonathan Rauch, Majority Report, Advocate, Dec. 2010–Jan. 2011, at 24–27. Rauch
argues for gay marriage advocates to adopt a two-pronged shift in strategy:
First, accept legal exceptions that let religious organizations discriminate
against gays whenever their doing so imposes a cost we can live with. Second,
dial back the accusations of ‘bigot’ and ‘hater’. . . . Not every religious accommodation is valid, and it’s not always clear where to draw all the lines. But
the smart approach is to bend toward accommodation, not away from it,
whenever we can live with the costs.
Id.
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the ACA has already been enacted, although Congress is now considering a number of bills to limit the coverage mandate91— but because religious objectors, when left no choice on other matters, have often chosen to exit the market rather than violate their religious beliefs.92
Such exoduses have occurred again and again over the past decade. In 2006, Catholic Charities of Massachusetts shuttered its adoption
business after placing children with Boston families for 103 years.93 In
the months preceding the closure, the state’s bishops learned that the
organization had placed children for adoption with a handful of gay
and lesbian parents—placements that accorded with Massachusetts law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.94 Still, the
state’s bishops abruptly discontinued the practice.95 The bishops then
sought “relief from the regulatory requirements,” asking then-Governor

91 Efforts have begun in Congress to broaden the exemption or eliminate the coverage
mandate. Laurie Kellman, GOP Senators Fail to Reverse Birth Control Rule, Bos. Globe (Mar.
1, 2012), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2012/03/01/gop_senators_fail_to_
reverse_birth_control_rule.
92 See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4 (stating that religious organizations may
choose to leave the health care market and arguing that “[w]hatever one thinks of the
moral questions involved, this controversy . . . is also sure to impose additional pressures
on the [ACA]”).
93 Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, Bos. Globe, Mar. 11, 2006,
at A1.
94 See 102 Mass. Code Regs. 1.03(1) (1997) (requiring adoption agencies to obtain a
state license and “not discriminate in providing services to children and their families on
the basis of race, religion, cultural heritage, political beliefs, national origin, marital status,
sexual orientation or disability”) (emphasis added). This requirement dates back to 1989,
“when Massachusetts amended its antidiscrimination statute dealing with employment,
housing, and government services to include sexual orientation as one of the forbidden
grounds of discrimination.” Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil
Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 781, 832 n.301 (2007).
95 Catholic Charities originally placed thirteen children with gay or lesbian parents, although it is unclear whether the adopting parents were at the time in same-sex relationships.
Compare Wen, supra note 93 (noting that “approximately 13 children had been placed by
Catholic Charities in gay households” (emphasis added)), with Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in
Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services, Catholic News Serv. (Mar. 13, 2006), http://
www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm (indicating that Catholic Charities
“had arranged the adoption of 13 children by same-sex couples over the past 20 years” (emphasis added)). After reports surfaced regarding the organization’s placements, the state’s bishops directed Catholic agencies not to place children with gay or lesbian parents. Wen, supra
note 93. Eight members of Catholic Charities’ forty-two member board, which had voted
unanimously to continue placing children with lesbian and gay parents, then resigned. Patricia Wen, In Break from Romney, Healey Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion, Bos. Globe, Mar. 3, 2006, at
B4.
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Mitt Romney for assistance.96 Governor Romney initially signaled
“openness” to the request, but ultimately said that any exemption would
have to come from the legislature or a court.97 When relief was not
forthcoming, however, Catholic Charities discontinued its adoption services altogether.98
In February 2010, the Catholic Archdiocese of Washington ended
its eighty-year-old foster care placement program rather than approve
same-sex couples for placement, which presumably would have been
required under the District of Columbia’s nondiscrimination laws and
its new same-sex marriage law.99 Recently, Illinois’s same-sex civil union
law ushered in a new requirement that all social service agencies that
receive state money, including religiously affiliated ones, “must consider same-sex couples as potential foster-care and adoptive parents.”100
The state’s Catholic bishops lobbied against the civil union law, but
contended that they and other religious leaders were given the impression that it would not affect state contracts with Catholic Charities and
other religious social services.101 Finding themselves without an exemption, many groups are shedding their adoption services, closing them,
or transferring them outside the church qua church to nonprofit organizations.102
96 See Statement of the Mass. Catholic Conference on Behalf of Archbishop Sean P.
O’Malley et al. (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.bostoncatholic.org/uploadedFiles/
News_releases_2006_statement060228.pdf.
97 See Patricia Wen, Bishops Dealt Setback in Pursuit of Gay Adoption Exemption, Bos.
Globe, Feb. 17, 2006, at B3; Patricia Wen & Frank Phillips, Romney Shifts on Adoption by
Gays, Bos. Globe, Mar. 1, 2006, at B1.
98 See Wen, supra note 93; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral
Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 475, 479–83 (2008) (documenting the exit
of religious social services providers and other vendors from the market in the absence of
an exemption).
99 See Michelle Boorstein, Catholic Archdiocese Ends D.C. Foster-Care Program, Wash. Post,
Feb. 17, 2010, at B1; Emily Esfahani Smith, Washington, Gay Marriage and the Catholic Church,
Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 2010, at A11.
100 See Laurie Goodstein, Illinois Bishops Drop Program over Bias Rule, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
2011, at A16.
101 Explaining why the Catholic dioceses did not lobby for a specific exemption, Bishop Thomas J. Paprocki said, “It would have been seen as, ‘We’re going to compromise on
the principle as long as we get our exception.’ We didn’t want it to be seen as buying our
support.” See id. Notably, Connecticut and Maryland’s same-sex marriage laws exempt social services agencies so long as they receive no government funding. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 46b-135b; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
102 See Goodstein, supra note 100 (describing the process by which Illinois bishops “followed colleagues in Washington, D.C., and Massachusetts who had jettisoned their adoption services rather than comply with nondiscrimination laws”); William Wan, Catholic
Charities to Limit Health Benefits to Spouses, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting that
“Catholic Charities last month transferred its foster-care program—43 children, 35 families
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The coverage mandate likewise may hasten such extreme measures. Chicago’s Cardinal Francis George asked in a recent op-ed:
What will happen if the HHS regulations are not rescinded? A Catholic institution, so far as I can see right now,
will have one of four choices: 1) secularize itself, breaking its
connection to the church, her moral and social teachings and
the oversight of its ministry by the local bishop. This is a form
of theft. It means the church will not be permitted to have an
institutional voice in public life. 2) Pay exorbitant annual fines
to avoid paying for insurance policies that cover abortifacient
drugs, artificial contraception and sterilization. This is not
economically sustainable. 3) Sell the institution to a nonCatholic group or to a local government. 4) Close down.103
Cardinal George then noted that the Archdiocese’s directory contained
“a complete list of Catholic hospitals and health care institutions in
Cook and Lake counties,” and ominously warned that “two Lents from
now, unless something changes, that page will be blank.”104
Other religious leaders have issued similar warnings. The president of Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic-affiliated institution in
North Carolina that has filed suit against HHS, told the Gaston Gazette
that “[w]e want to serve our community but we feel cornered. . . . I believe we would go there [and close the college]” rather than comply
with the coverage mandate.105
Of course, dire predictions may turn out to be nothing more than
empty threats. The amount of weight decisionmakers should give to the
possibility of an exodus of religious providers will necessarily depend on
and seven staff members—to another provider, the National Center for Children and Families”).
103 Francis Cardinal George, What Are You Going to Give Up This Lent?, Catholic New
World (Feb. 26, 2012), available at http://www.catholicnewworld.com/cnwonline/2012/
0226/cardinal.aspx. Cardinal George went on to say that the Church:
would love to have the separation between church and state we thought we
enjoyed just a few months ago, when we were free to run Catholic institutions
in conformity with the demands of the Catholic faith, when the government
couldn’t tell us which of our ministries are Catholic and which not, when the
law protected rather than crushed conscience.
Id.

104 See id.
105 See Amanda Memrick, Belmont Abbey Officials Explain Health Care Lawsuit, Gaston
Gazette (Gastonia, N.C.), Nov. 20, 2011, at 1B; see also Campus Notes, supra note 20 (discussing the difficulties faced by Catholic colleges if they are forced to provide contraceptive coverage to students).
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the specific context. For example, with health care services, legislators
and policymakers wisely would consider a range of factors, including
market concentration, the scarcity of other providers, the market share
of the possible exiting organizations, the likelihood that the exiting organizations would sell the organization rather than shutter it, the likelihood of a private buyer or the government acquiring the facility in advance of any shutdown, the probable time frame for any transition, and
how likely it might be that the objector will choose to accede to civil
strictures rather than actually exiting the market.106 Catholic-affiliated
hospitals account for seventeen percent of all hospital admissions nationally,107 and with many markets served exclusively by a sole, Catholicaffiliated hospital,108 policymakers may well be loathe to engage in a
high-stakes game of chicken.109
II. Second Sticking Point: Exemptions Condone Prejudice or
Crazy Ideas
In the same-sex marriage context, legislators readily accept that
“member[s] of the cloth . . . clearly ha[ve] deeply held fundamental
religious beliefs,” but sometimes express deep skepticism about wheth106 With adoption services, legislators considering a religious exemption might consider a variety of factors, such as the impact an exemption (or denial of one) would have
on children awaiting adoption and on same-sex couples seeking to adopt. Among other
questions, legislators should also ask whether other providers of adoption services would
readily serve gay couples seeking to adopt, whether information-forcing rules could direct
prospective parents to willing providers, and, if the state rejects religious accommodations,
whether objecting agencies would exit the market, and if so, how many children would
they have placed and how many of these children would be picked up by other agencies
after their exit. See Wilson, supra note 98, at 479–83.
107 Rachel Benson Gold, Advocates Work to Preserve Reproductive Health Care Access When
Hospitals Merge, Guttmacher Rep. on Pub. Pol’y, Apr. 2000, at 3, 3, available at http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/2/gr030203.pdf.
108 See Reed Abelson, Catholic Gains in Health Care Includes Strings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
2012, at A1. See generally Liz Bucar, Catholics for a Free Choice, Caution: Catholic
Health Restrictions May Be Hazardous to Your Health (1999), available at http://
www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/1998cautioncatholichealthrest
rictions.pdf (listing counties throughout the United States that, as of 1999, were served
solely by Catholic hospitals).
109 Of course, under the hardship accommodation described in Part V of this Article,
the Catholic hospital that exclusively serves its market is likely to be in a blocking position
in some instances, and thus would have to provide the needed service, notwithstanding its
religious objection. Importantly, the model provision in Appendix B does not limit the
ability of religious organizations to object only when no hardship results, a point over
which the groups of scholars I have worked with remains deeply divided. See infra notes
249–258 and accompanying text (describing instances in which a religiously affiliated hospital would occupy a blocking position, warranting qualification of any exemption).
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er other objectors are “really acting on fundamental religious belief
and doctrine as opposed to just a prejudice. . . . How do I make that
distinction with [a wedding] photographer?”110 A related concern arises in the health care context, where some argue that religious liberty
accommodations legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas, such as the
notion that emergency contraceptives act as abortifacients.111
This Part first takes up the claim that insincere objections will receive protection as a result of religious liberty accommodations. It then
examines whether such accommodations validate completely groundless notions.
A. Concerns About Insincere Beliefs
Consider first concerns about sincerity. Whether a claimed belief is
sincere or a convenient screen for ignoble acts is an issue common to
many, but not all, religious freedom protections. Unlike freedom of
speech, freedom of conscience does not protect the insincere.
Patently, some individuals may be motivated to make a religious
freedom argument in order to receive better work hours, get away with
using illegal drugs, or avoid criminal charges.112 Many claims for protection, however, seek the ability to perform an act that is not only personally burdensome, but meaningless apart from the religious faith that
gives the act meaning. So, for example, claims to go without medical
care113 or to adhere to kosher dietary laws114 burden the claimant sig110 E.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:54:40 (statement of
Councilmember Phil Mendelson).
111 See infra notes 134–156 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of ella and
Plan B).
112 E.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834–35 (1989) (allowing a religious objection to working on Sundays, even though other members of defendant’s religion did not share this belief); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 429, 445 (D.D.C. 1968)
(attempting to avoid prosecution for drug use by arguing that marijuana was a sacrament
in the defendant’s religion, the “Boo Hoos”); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 1189–90 (3d ed. 2006); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 25) (on file with author)
(“[I]f the claim for an exemption is not to work on Saturday, or to refrain from having a
child vaccinated, we can imagine that someone who wishes to spend the day with his family, or to avoid vaccination risks for his child, might announce an insincere objection in
conscience.”).
113 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Miss. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265–69 (1990); Schloendorff
v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 128–30 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). Of course, some religious believers assert claims of faith not to avoid
health care for themselves, but to avoid some forms of health care for their children. See
generally Understanding Family Law § 7.05, at 212–15 ( John De Witt et al. eds., 3d ed.
2005). These protections have been criticized on a number of grounds. See James Dwyer,
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nificantly, but impose very little cost on others, making it very unlikely
that someone would make an insincere claim.115
Other claims for protection encompass acts that may impose a cost
on others, but that nonetheless open the claimant up to significant personal costs. Consider the nurse at Mt. Sinai Hospital who alleged that
she was coerced into assisting with a late-term, twenty-two-week abortion, despite federal and state statutes giving her an unqualified right to
refuse.116 She was threatened not only with termination, but with losing
her nursing license for “patient abandonment.”117
Individuals who object on religious grounds to facilitating same-sex
marriages have also incurred significant wrath in the marketplace, suggesting that an objector would not lightly feign an objection. When a
New Jersey bridal salon refused to assist a woman with a bridal gown for
her same-sex marriage, the story went “viral,” soon gracing not just the
pages of a local newspaper, but national media outlets as well. ABC
News, the Los Angeles Times, Time Magazine, and Reuters all covered the
story.118 As others have noted,
[i]f an exemption, say from participating in the sale of morning after pills, confers no ordinary advantage on the person
who claims that participation would violate his conscience,
and if the seeking of an exemption is likely to cause irritation
The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Law as Denials of
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321, 1323–24 (1996) (asserting that children do not receive equal protection of the law when their parents claim
religious exemptions based on beliefs in faith-healing); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Perils of
Privatized Marriage, in Marriage and Divorce in a Multicultural Context: Reconsidering the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion 258–61 ( Joel A. Nichols ed., 2011)
(examining the serious costs to children when states give parents complete authority to
make treatment decisions).
114 See, e.g., Doswell v. Smith, 139 F.3d 888, 1998 WL 110161, at *1–2, 5–6 (4th Cir.
1998) (unpublished table decision).
115 See Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 25–26 (“One way of minimizing the success of insincere claims is, as I have suggested, to limit an exemption to religious claims, which
many people may be more hesitant to make up, given the typical tie of religious convictions to institutional affiliations.”).
116 See supra note 31 (discussing Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital).
117 See supra note 31 (same).
118 See Stephanie Rabiner, NJ Bridal Store Refuses to Sell Lesbian a Dress, Reuters, Aug. 18,
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/19/tagblogsfindlawcom2011-free
enterprise-id US2751876420110819; Megan Gibson, New Jersey Bridal Shop Refuses to Sell Wedding Gown to Lesbian Bride, Time (Aug. 21, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/21/
new-jersey-bridal-shop-refuses-to-sell-wedding-gown-to-lesbian-bride/#ixzz1jjPMLGhe;
Tina
Susman, N.J. Bridal Salon Slammed for Refusing to Sell Gown to Lesbian, L.A. Times (Aug 22, 2011,
9:46 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/08/bridal-salon-slammed-forrefusing-gown-to-lesbian.html.

1452

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1417

of superiors or colleagues that could down the road hurt
[one’s] chances for a promotion or informal benefits, a person has no incentive to make an insincere claim.119
Even though many individuals will not be motivated to feign a
religious objection, sincerity questions can and do arise in some cases—from prisoners requesting religious accommodations to military
conscientious objectors. In each context, courts have generally proven
competent to separate the sincere plaintiff from the insincere. In the
prison context, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) directs prison officials not to “impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined
to an institution.”120 Some prisoners bring lawsuits based on religious
claims to harass prison administrators or to gain perks they cannot
otherwise secure. For instance, in 2010, an inmate in an Orange
County, California jail claimed to celebrate the Seinfeld holiday, Festivus, in order to get double portions of food.121 There, prison officials
determined that the inmate’s religious claim was not sincere.122 Obviously, many other prisoners do bring claims with merit.123
Because both sincere and insincere claims can arise, in the 2005
case Cutter v. Wilkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court gave prison officials
considerable leeway to test the sincerity of a prisoner’s stated need for
accommodation, without which a prisoner-plaintiff cannot take advantage of federal statutory religious accommodations:
[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic. Although RLUIPA bars inquiry into
whether a particular belief or practice is central to a prisoner’s
religion, the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity
of a prisoner’s professed religiosity. The truth of a belief is not
open to question; rather, the question is whether the objector’s beliefs are truly held.124

119 Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 25.
120 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006).
121 Tony Barboza, Inmate Claims Bogus Religion, L.A. Times, Dec. 15, 2010, at AA4.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary
judgment against a pro se Rastafarian inmate suing under RLUIPA because prison officials
cut the plaintiff's dreadlocks).
124 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Similarly, the military has long had a detailed system for evaluating the
sincerity of conscientious objections to military service.125
Tests for sincerity parallel the examination of “pretext” that is
common to most employment discrimination litigation in the federal
courts. Under the framework developed by the Supreme Court in the
1973 case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, courts must evaluate
whether an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for an
adverse employment action is a pretext for invidious discrimination.126
Although these contexts differ in important ways, together they
underscore that courts have the institutional competence to judge
whether a claimed religious objection to same-sex marriage is sincere
or merely pretext for animus. This is not to say, however, that deciding
the sincerity of a religious belief is an easy task. Sincerity must be determined “without a view as to [the] truth or falsity” of the religious
belief being claimed, a point the Supreme Court established in the
1944 decision in United States v. Ballard.127 There, the government indicted leaders of a religion called “I Am” for mail fraud after the leaders solicited donations from individuals they promised to cure of diseases. The Court held that a jury could properly decide whether the
leaders sincerely believed that they possessed healing abilities, but
could not evaluate the religious belief itself.
Moreover, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky points out, “[t]here is
no measure for sincerity.”128 A number of commentators have suggested guides for evaluating sincerity. For example, Professor Kent
Greenawalt notes that when someone “loses her job or is demoted because she actually refuses to perform an act,” this helps to “demonstrate
a true claim of conscience.”129 But he observes that “those whose claim
for an exemption is granted usually are not put to such a clear
test, . . . opening an exemption . . . to those with lukewarm reservations.”130

125 See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 973, 979–81 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the
U.S. Army’s determination under Army Regulation 600-43 that a claimed conscientious
objection was not “sincere and deeply held”).
126 See 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
127 Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1190; see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–
86 (1944).
128 Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 1190.
129 Greenawalt, supra note 112, at 26 (discussing moral objections, as opposed to religious objections).
130 Id.
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Although it is true that the legislative accommodations described
in Appendix B are designed to insulate religious objectors from lawsuits, this does not mean that objecting is cost-free. As noted above,
many refusals are met with social opprobrium or stigma from one’s
employer, coworkers, or community, even when there are existing protections.131 Neither does it mean that religious objectors get a free pass.
Lawsuits may follow even when a legislative accommodation is made. If
an exemption is structured like that in Appendix B,132 an objector, if
sued, may find that his or her beliefs are, in fact, subjected to a searching examination for sincerity. In the end, the difficulty of assessing sincerity remains “one reason for the law to avoid exemptions,” but that
reason “must be measured against the positive reasons to grant such
exemptions.”133
B. Concerns About “Crazy” Beliefs
In the health care context, some worry that religious exemptions
will legitimize scientifically unfounded ideas. Two different religious
beliefs underpin objections to the coverage mandate: one contends
that all sexual intercourse should have the potential for creating life—
thus, procedures that sterilize a person and drugs that prevent fertilization are both objectionable.134 The second belief focuses on emergency

131 See supra note 30 (discussing the exemptions available to abortion objectors), supra
notes 31–32 (describing attempts to penalize workers claiming exemptions under existing
laws).
132 See Appendix A for statutory accommodations that have been enacted, some of
which were cobbled together in last-minute negotiations, as a consequence of which, they
have drafting problems. Unlike the model provision in Appendix B, the enacted exemptions are not limited by sincerity. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 46-406(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
133 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness 110 (2006).
134 Some religious objectors emphasize the concern over contraceptive coverage. See, e.g.,
Bishop Robert H. Brom, Contraception and Sterilization, Catholic Answers (Aug. 10, 2004),
http://www.catholic.com/tracts/contraception-and-sterilization (“[O]ver the course of time
the Church has called greater attention to the unitive aspect of marital intercourse, yet it
remains true that the procreative aspect of each particular marital act must not be frustrated.”). Many find the objection to contraceptive coverage to be incomprehensible. See, e.g.,
Nicholas D. Kristof, Beyond Pelvic Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR11; Guttmacher Inst.,
Testimony Submitted to the Comm. on Preventive Servs. for Women, Inst. of Med. 16 (2011),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf; Press Release, Majority of
Catholics Think Employers Should Be Required to Provide Health Care Plans That Cover Birth Control
at No Cost, Pub. Religion Res. Inst. (Feb. 7, 2012), http://publicreligion.org/newsroom/
2012/02/january-tracking-poll-2012. In his column in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof
wrote:
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contraceptives as covered drugs, with objectors maintaining that emergency contraceptives act after fertilization to destroy a life-in-being.135 It
is this second belief that gets tagged as unfounded.
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG),
for example, opposed pharmacy and pharmacist exemptions from the
duty to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, saying “provider
refusals to dispense emergency contraception based on unsupported
beliefs about its primary mechanism of action should not be justified.”136 ACOG argued that drugs like Plan B do not act as abortifacients, thus objectors have no medically sound basis for claiming an exemption from filling prescriptions.137
Factually, however, this contention is simply more complicated
than ACOG’s blanket assertion suggests. Plan B was approved in
1999,138 and its label states that “[i]t works mainly by stopping the release of an egg from the ovary. It is possible that Plan B One-Step may
also work by . . . preventing attachment (implantation) to the uterus

I may not be as theologically sophisticated as American bishops, but I had
thought that Jesus talked more about helping the poor than about banning
contraceptives. . . . The cost of birth control is one reason poor women are
more than three times as likely to end up pregnant unintentionally as middleclass women.
Id. Indeed, the majority of Americans believe that it is often socially responsible to have sex
without procreation. In a survey of 591 adults nationwide, who were asked whether “the
birth control pill has made American family life better,” 50% of those randomly telephoned responded that it had, and 56% believed that “the birth control pill has made
women’s lives better.” See CBS News, Poll: The Birth Control Pill: 50 Years Later 1–2
(2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_Birth_Control_Pill_050710.
pdf. Religious believers did not share this view as widely. Id. (reporting that 38% of Catholics and 41% of white Evangelicals believed the birth control pill had made American family life better).
135 Gene Veith, Church Organizations Must Provide Free Contraception and Abortifacients, Cranach ( Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.geneveith.com/2012/01/24/church-organizations-mustprovide-free-contraception-abortifacient (“Christian organizations that oppose abortion as a
matter of religious conviction will be required by law to pay for abortifacients and thus violate
their religious convictions.”).
136 Am. Coll. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Committee Opinion No. 385: The
Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine 4 (2007), available at
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co
385.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20120728T1211090439.
137 See id.
138 FDA’s Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers, FDA.gov (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/ucm109795.htm.
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(womb).”139 As late as 2004, Charles Lockwood, a member of the scientific advisory committee to the U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) that held hearings about whether to make Plan B available
over the counter and now dean of Yale University’s medical school,
explained that:
[m]any on the FDA panel perceived that a contragestive effect
[e.g., an effect after fertilization occurs] was possible and we
recommended that the package labeling should describe the
drug’s potential mechanism of action so that women could
make an informed choice about its use and avoid inadvertently violating their own moral or religious beliefs.140
Despite these early concerns about a post-fertilization effect, since
Plan B’s initial approval by the FDA, the only way that Plan B has been
139 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Plan B One-Step Prescribing Information 7 (2009)
[hereinafter Plan B Prescribing Information], available at http://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2009/021998lbl.pdf.
140 Charles J. Lockwood, OTC Emergency Contraception: The Right Choice, Contemp. OB/
GYN, Jan. 2004, at 15 (discussing the available evidence and positing “that even if 10% of
women experience the contragestive effect of Plan B, its [over-the-counter] availability will
prevent far more abortions, performed further along in gestation”). Lockwood cited work
showing a contragestive effect, and noted that by 2002:
There [was] also evidence that the endometrial epithelium in both the periovulatory and luteal phases is disrupted by [Plan B], leading one group of
investigators to conclude that its emergency contraceptive effect was mediated by alteration of the endometrial surface and, therefore, receptivity [of
the implanting embryo]. Because many of the key regulators of blastocyst attachment and early implantation (such as integrins, cytokines, and glycopeptides) are regulated by steroid hormones, there is also the potential for more
subtle biochemical derangements.
Id.; see also G. Ugocsai et al., Scanning Electron Microscopic (SEM) Changes of the Endometrium
in Women Taking High Doses of Levonorgestrel as Emergency Postcoital Contraception, 66 Contraception 433, 433 (2002) (“[E]mergency methods of contraception. . . . exert their negative effect on fertility by . . . creating unfavorable conditions for the implantation or for the
establishment of a pregnancy.” (emphasis added)).
Despite this evidence, in an editorial the New York Times lamented:
Belief that [Plan B] might be an abortifacient stems from speculative language that the [FDA] approved for its original label, which listed a number of
physiological processes by which the pill might prevent pregnancy, including
preventing fertilized eggs from implanting in the womb. There was no evidence to support that view at the time, and there is none to support it now.
Editorial, How Morning-After Pills Really Work, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2012, at A20, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/how-morning-after-pills-really-work.html; see
also Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be Unfounded, N.Y. Times June 6,
2012, at A1 (reviewing evidence that Plan B acts to prevent fertilization).
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demonstrated to operate is as a contraceptive—meaning that it works
to prevent fertilization entirely.141 Studies report, for example, that Plan
B works to prevent fertilization by: (1) impeding the sperm’s ability to
reach the egg and (2) delaying ovulation so there is no egg released to
meet the sperm.142 Still, while Plan B appears to have no effect after
fertilization, the authors of the studies supporting this conclusion acknowledge that post-fertilization effects cannot be definitively ruled
out.143
The evidence about newer emergency contraceptives like ella, approved in 2010, is shaping up very differently.144 Whereas Plan B is ef-

141 See infra note 142.
142 Gabriela Noé et al., Contraceptive Efficacy of Emergency with Levonrgestrel Given Before or
After Ovulation, 81 Contraception 414, 414, 419, 420 (2010) (stating that “[i]t is established that preovulatory administration of LNG [Plan B] interferes with the ovulatory process” and finding from a comparison of the number of expected and actual pregnancies
after “unprotected intercourse during fertile cycle days” among women who took LNG-EC
[Plan B] on the day of ovulation or immediately thereafter” that the “difference was not
statistically significant,” showing that Plan B “is very effective in preventing pregnancy
when it is administered before ovulation, but it is ineffective in preventing pregnancy once
fertilization has occurred”); James Trussell & Beth Jordan, Editorial, Mechanism of Action of
Emergency Contraceptive Pills, 74 Contraception 87, 87 (2006) (“Levonorgestrel [Plan B]
also interferes with sperm migration and function at all levels of the genital tract.”).
143 Although studies of Plan B’s contraceptive mechanism of action are now seen as
dispositive, the authors of those studies acknowledge that “[i]t is unlikely that this question
can ever be unequivocally answered, and we therefore cannot conclude that [emergency
contraceptives] never prevent pregnancy after fertilization.” Trussell & Jordan, supra note
142, at 87; see also Noé et al., supra note 142, at 414 (conceding that studies of the impact
of Plan B on “endometrial receptivity,” a post-fertilization effect, “are not consistent, and
current knowledge on cellular and molecular markers of endometrial receptivity in the
human is insufficient to resolve this controversy”).
We cannot be one hundred percent sure about how Plan B or other emergency contraceptives work in humans because, as noted by Jeffrey Keenan, a professor of obstetrics
and gynecology and director of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility
at the University of Tennessee Medical Center, the “Phase 2 and 3 clinical studies were not
designed to assess this possibility.” Jeffrey Keenan, Ulipristal Acetate: Contraceptive or Contragestive?, 45 Annals of Pharmacotherapy 813, 814 (2011). To be sure of the mechanism of action would require “each study participant to undergo laboratory evaluation and
possibly sonographic examination to determine whether ovulation had already occurred.”
Id. Presumably, the makers of emergency contraceptives would not want to do such studies.
144 Some commentators lump Plan B and ella together in their discussions, failing to distinguish between the mechanisms by which the two drugs appear to work. See, e.g., Keith
Fournier, Plan B and Ella: Morning After Contraceptives Can Induce Abortion, Catholic Online
(Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.php?id=44730 (discussing
Plan B and ella and concluding that they both “may result in the eviction of an embryonic
human person”). For those who, like the Catholic Church, maintain that life begins at conception, parsing the exact mechanisms of Plan B and ella is irrelevant to the moral calculus
of dispensing them.
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fective for up to 72 hours after unprotected sex,145 ella works up to 120
hours after unprotected sex146 and is much more effective in preventing pregnancy than Plan B. In one study, ella prevented 85% of expected pregnancies, compared to Plan B’s 69%.147
A number of authorities believe that ella’s enhanced effectiveness
stems in part from post-fertilization mechanisms of action, although
ella clearly also works to prevent the release of an egg from the ovary,
and therefore prevents fertilization itself, as Plan B does.148 A 2011 article in the Annals of Pharmacotherapy concluded that if a woman happens
to take ella within five days after unprotected sex—and after the egg has
already been fertilized—ella’s “mechanism of action is much more accurately described as contragestive, since only gestation (implantation
and growth) of the embryo [fertilized egg] is prevented” during that
time frame.149 Indeed, this contragestive effect likely accounts for ella’s
“enhanced effectiveness . . . compared with [Plan B].”150
One author posits that with ella, “there is a unique circumstance
and time period in which [ella] would have a direct abortifacient effect”
—defined in the article to mean “loss of the embryo occurring either at
the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage”151— “rather
than a contraceptive effect.”152 This would occur when “unprotected
intercourse occurs within the fertility window (i.e., less than 120 hours
(5 days) before ovulation or not more than 24 hours after ovulation)
and [ella] is taken after fertilization.”153 Professor Ralph Miech, an asso145 Plan B Prescribing Information, supra note 139, at 7.
146 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ella Prescribing Information *7 (2010) [hereinafter Ella Prescribing Information], available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsat
fda_docs/label/2010/022474s000lbl.pdf.
147 Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Chun-Xia Meng, Emergency Contraception: Potential
Role of Ulipristal Acetate, 2 Int’l J. Women's Health 53, 57 (2010).
148 Id. at 59 (“UPA [ella] has been demonstrated to have a direct inhibitory effect on
follicular rupture. This allows UPA [ella] to be effective even when administered shortly
before ovulation when the LH surge has already started to rise, a time period when use of
LNG [Plan B] is no longer effective.”).
149 Keenan, supra note 143, at 814; see Ella Prescribing Information, supra note 146,
at *9.
150 Keenan, supra note 143, at 814.
151 Ralph P. Miech, Immunopharmacology of Ulipristal as an Emergency Contraceptive 3 Int’l
J. Women’s Health 391, 392 (2011) (noting that “[t]his report [uses] the classical definitions of abortion and contraceptive. Abortion is defined as the loss of the embryo occurring either at the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage and contraception is defined as the prevention of fertilization.”).
152 Id. (noting elsewhere that “[a]n abortifacient effect of [ella] can occur when [ella]
is taken post-fertilization but prior to implantation, when the progesterone levels are relatively low”).
153 Id.
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ciate professor emeritus of molecular pharmacology, physiology, and
biotechnology at Brown University, believes that ella “blocks the immunotolerance effects of progesterone on the maternal innate immune
system . . ., resulting in the immunorejection of an embryo attempting
to implant.”154
In line with this evidence, ella’s FDA label states under the heading
“How does ella work?” that “ella is thought to work . . . primarily by
stopping or delaying the release of an egg from the ovary. It is possible
that ella may also work by preventing attachment (implantation) to the
uterus.”155 As with Plan B, evidence of ella’s precise mechanisms of action may evolve as new studies accumulate.156
The evidence of a contragestive effect, as opposed to a contraceptive one, begs the question of whether a drug that acts after fertilization
or implantation should count as an abortifacient—itself a deeply contested matter.157 But whatever one considers to be an abortifacient,
more than half of women in one study—fifty-three percent—said they
would not use a birth control method that acts after fertilization.158 In
154 Id. at 391. As Professor Miech explains, "Inadequate progesterone synthesis results
in spontaneous abortions" as a matter of course. Id.; see also Pamela Stratton et al., Endometrial Effects of a Single Early Luteal Dose of the Selective Progesterone Receptor Modulator CDB2914, 93 Fertility & Sterility 2035, 2039–40 (2010) (“[ella caused] a significant dosedependent decrease in endometrial thickness [and] an increase in glandular [progesterone] receptors. . . . Either effect . . . may hamper implantation.”). See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Erupting Clash Between Religion and the State over Contraception, Sterilization
and Abortion (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing a more complete discussion of this and other studies demonstrating that ella works not only as a contraceptive but also as a contragestive).
155 Ella Prescribing Information, supra note 146, at *9; see Veith, supra note 135.
156 Popular reporting on ella emphasizes both the findings about ella’s possible mechanisms of action and the uncertainty remaining about those mechanisms. See, e.g., Belluck,
supra note 140 (“Research on Ella . . . is less extensive, but the F.D.A., Dr. Blithe, and others say evidence increasingly suggests it does not derail implantation, citing, among other
things, several studies in which women became pregnant when taking Ella after ovulating.
The studies, focused on Ella’s effectiveness, were not designed to determine if it blocked
implantation, but experts still consider them significant.”); Rob Stein, 5-Day-After Contraceptive Wins FDA Approval, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2010, at A1 (“Ella . . . works as a contraceptive by blocking progesterone’s activity, delaying the ovaries from producing an egg. But
progesterone is also needed to prepare the womb to accept a fertilized egg and to nurture
a developing embryo . . . Ella’s chemical similarity to RU-486 [a controversial abortifacient] raises the possibility that it might do the same thing, perhaps if taken at elevated
doses. But no one knows for sure whether the drug would induce an abortion, because the
drug has never been tested that way.”).
157 See Wilson, supra note 154.
158 Huong M. Dye et al., Women and Post-Fertilization Effects of Birth Control: Consistency of Beliefs, Intentions and Reported Use, 5 BMC Women’s Health, no. 11, Nov. 28, 2005, at 3, available
at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-6874-5-11.pdf (surveying 748 women,
aged 18–50, seen in Utah and Oklahoma family practices and OB/GYN clinics).
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the same study, forty-four percent of women said they would “stop using” their birth control method if told that “there was even [a] remote
possibility” that it acted after fertilization.159
Like ordinary women across multiple cultures,160 objectors could
seek exemptions not because they positively knew that by filling a prescription they were cutting short a potential life, but because they could
not positively know they were not. Ultimately, then, this is a question
about who gets to decide in instances of uncertainty.161
Of course, when claims of faith are involved, the requirement that
the rest of society agree with the objector’s belief in order for the objector to receive protection would leave almost nothing of religious freedom. As Justice William Douglas noted, writing for the Supreme Court
in Ballard, “Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs.”162 The Court reiterated this principle in
its 1981 decision in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division, explaining that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection.”163
III. Third Sticking Point: Objectors Are Protected from Doing
the Deed—Solemnizing a Marriage or Performing an
Abortion—and That Is Sufficient
Accommodations invariably raise the question about who precisely
will receive protection. In both the same-sex marriage context and the
health care context, many readily concede that religious objectors
should be protected when actually performing a morally freighted service, like presiding over nuptials or ending a pregnancy, but resist protections for others acting in less direct capacities. Put another way, some
contend that, on these questions, society should protect only priests and
doctors.
159 See id. at 4.
160 See Wilson, supra note 154 (collecting studies across multiple countries of women’s attitudes toward using birth control methods that may act after fertilization or implantation).
161 To be sure that emergency contraception was acting only to prevent fertilization,
and not at a later stage (either before or after implantation), would require “historical
knowledge of the woman’s menstrual cycles, ultrasound examination, and [certain] hormone surge testing.” Keenan, supra note 143, at 814. Surely, nobody really wants to resolve
this uncertainty at the expense of women.
162 Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86–87.
163 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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Consider this claim first as to same-sex marriage. Every draft
same-sex marriage bill has unambiguously protected the refusal to
solemnize a marriage,164 notwithstanding the shared intuition that
churches and clergy cannot be forced to solemnize marriages in violation of their religious tenets.165 But legislators responsible for the text
of the draft bills have been much more skeptical when it comes to
crafting a “compromise that permits continued discrimination outside
of solemnizing a marriage in a church sanctuary.”166 In a clever column,
Professor John Corvino captures the tension over protecting more than
solemnization:
[T]he gay-rights debate concerning religious accommodation
is not about worship. No serious person argues that the government should force religions to perform gay weddings (or
ordinations or baptisms or other religious functions) against
their will. That would violate the First Amendment, and beyond that, it would be foolish and wrong. Rather, the debate is
about the not-strictly-religious things that religious organizations
often do: renting out banquet space, for example, or hiring
employees for secular tasks. And it’s about religious individuals who for reasons of conscience wish to discriminate in secular settings.167
Professor Corvino’s comments encompass three related claims,
although they are unstated: (1) that facilitating a ceremony is not a religious act in the way that performing the ceremony itself is; (2) that an
objector’s claim weakens when it extends to services routinely provided
by commercial entities, such as renting a banquet hall; and (3) that a
religious objector may legally or morally object when asked directly to
“do the deed” —to solemnize a relationship—but that an objector’s
moral or legal claim weakens when less direct actions are at stake.168
164 See generally Wilson, supra note 49 (discussing the legislative history of same-sex
marriage legislation in selected states).
165 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I; Letter from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. to Deborah
Kelly regarding D.C. Bill No. 18-0482, “Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality
Amendment Act of 2009,” at 4 (Nov. 9, 2009) (on file with author) (remarking on “how
[the District of Columbia’s] bill so thoroughly addresses the non-threat of compelled officiating at religious ceremonies”); John Corvino, Religious Exemptions and the Slippery Slope,
Meefers.com (Dec. 7, 2009), http://dev.meefers.com/features.asp?id=629.
166 See, e.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 7:00:32 (statement
of Councilmember Phil Mendelson).
167 Corvino, supra note 165 (emphasis added).
168 See id. Also implicit is the assumption that social services provided by religious organizations are not as inherently “religious” as other activities. Yet religious organizations
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The first claim to assess is whether facilitating a same-sex marriage
should be entitled to protection. Religious objectors, from wedding
planners to landlords, all may seek to step aside from providing certain
services because they “feel that they are being asked to promote or facilitate sin in a way that makes them personally responsible for the sin
that ensues.”169 Professor Douglas Laycock believes there is a tendency
“to dismiss these feelings of moral responsibility” because “the person
providing services to a same-sex couple is not participating in
the . . . conduct she considers immoral and cannot reasonably think of
herself as responsible for it.”170 Yet, he contends, “that is a mistake” because “[m]any religious traditions have a long history of theological
teaching attempting to identify the point at which one who cooperates
with another’s wrongdoing, or even one who fails to sufficiently resist,
becomes personally responsible for that wrongdoing.”171 Certainly, with
other actions, ideas of complicity and vicarious moral responsibility
have not seemed so far-fetched. They underpinned, for example, boycotts of companies doing business in South Africa during apartheid.172
The religious liberty exemptions contained in recently enacted
same-sex marriage laws clearly see claims of facilitation as worthy of respect: all of them exempt religious institutions from facilitating or celebrating a marriage through such actions as providing the space for a
reception.173 In three instances, the laws exempt individual employees
of religious organizations more generally from the duty to “celebrate[]
or promote[]” same-sex marriage if doing so would violate their “religious beliefs and faith.”174
may view these services as part of a larger ministry to which the group is called. See Thomas
C. Berg, Taking Exception: Gay Marriage Legislation, 26 Christian Century 12, 12 (2009)
(“People from many perspectives—religious progressives as well as traditionalists—should
affirm the principle that the exercise of religion does not stop at the church door, but
carries over into organizational works of charity and justice motivated by faith.”); Thomas
C. Berg, Other People’s Freedom, Christian Century (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.christian
century.org/blogs/archive/2011-12/other-peoples-freedom (“[F]or progressive Christians,
acts of mercy and justice, serving all people, are at the heart of the gospel, even if these
acts witness implicitly rather than explicitly. Catholic social services and health-care institutions reflect that model, as do many evangelical agencies.”).
169 Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in Emerging Conflicts, supra note 30, at 195.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 195–96.
172 See id. at 196.
173 See infra app. B; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing one case
addressing this issue, Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n).
174 Compare N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III) (Supp. 2011) (exempting individuals
associated with religious organizations from providing “services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request . . . is related to the
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But those same laws offer no protection to businesses or individuals in the marketplace who provide catering, flowers, reception halls, or
gowns.175 This brings us to the question of whether the law should distinguish between religious organizations and for-profit commercial
vendors, even when providing identical services.
In other contexts, the law has not drawn the line for an exemption
along a non-profit versus for-profit divide. For example, with respect to
abortion, many conscience clauses exempt non-profit and for-profit
providers alike. Thus, for example, the Church Amendment provides
that the receipt of certain federal funds cannot be used by courts or
public officials to force any entity to “make its facilities available for the
performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if [it] is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions,”
or “provide any personnel for [such services].”176 This protection is not
limited to nonprofit organizations or denominational hospitals. Clearly,
the services at issue are provided in the commercial marketplace by
non-objecting institutions.177 Therefore, at least in the abortion context, it is not who the objector is, but what the objector is being asked to
do that merits protection.
Moreover, the law has not always required direct participation in
order to receive protection. Again, the abortion conscience clauses are
illustrative. Many insulate not just the physician who performs the abortion, but any person asked to assist in its performance. This is true of

solemnization of a marriage, the celebration of a marriage, or the promotion of marriage
. . . and such solemnization, celebration, or promotion of marriage is in violation of his or
her religious beliefs”), with N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b (McKinney Supp. 2012) (providing
that “any employee” of “a religious entity . . . or a corporation incorporated under the
benevolent orders law . . . or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious corporation . . . shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or celebration of a
marriage”) and H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (exempting religious officials
from any requirement “to solemnize or officiate any [ ] marriage” if doing so would impede the official’s free exercise rights).
175 To date, states have provided protection to religious institutions and nonprofit organizations when they provide space for a reception or otherwise facilitate or celebrate a
marriage. See supra notes 63–77 and accompanying text. Thus, they would exempt a
church-affiliated nonprofit from hosting a wedding reception for same-sex couples, but
would not exempt a commercial bed-and-breakfast. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (discussing suits against the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association and the
Wildflower Inn).
176 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2) (2006).
177 See Wilson, Limits of Conscience, supra note 32, at 53 (discussing the network of
Planned Parenthood clinics across the country).
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both state-level exemptions178 and federal conscience protection.179
Some federal protections reach services outside those that most would
view as “core” —the abortion procedure itself—to encompass more peripheral activities, like training and referrals for abortion.180 Some
health care conscience clauses are so broad that they exempt objectors
from performing any service they find objectionable if the facility receives certain program funding from the federal government.181
The accommodation of an employee’s religious beliefs in the employment context follows this pattern as well. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for an employee’s religious practice or belief unless the employer will experience an undue hardship.182 As thinned-out
as Title VII’s protections are now,183 Title VII imposes this duty even
178 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 36-2154(A) (Supp. 2011) (“any other person”); Ark.
Code Ann. § 20-16-601(a) (2005) (“No person shall be required”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 186-104 (2011) (“A person who is a member of or associated with the staff”); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 24, § 1791(a) (2011) (“No person”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.0111(8) (West 2008 & Supp.
2012) (“No person”); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-142(a) (2011) (“any person who states in
writing an objection”); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 453-16(e) (2011) (“any person”); Idaho Code
Ann. § 18-612 (2004) (“Any such person”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510 / 13 (West
2010) (“employee thereof”); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-1-4 (LexisNexis 2011) (“[e]mployee
or member of the staff of a hospital or other facility”); Iowa Code Ann. § 146.1 (West
2005) (“An individual”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-443 (2002) (“No person”); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1591–92 (2004) (“other person”); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.20181
(West 2008) (“associate of the staff, or other person connected therewith”); Minn. Stat.
§ 145.414(a) (2010) (“No person”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-2 (2004) (“A person who is a
member of, or associated with, the staff of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital”); N.Y.
Civ. Rights Law § 79-i (McKinney 2009) (“any person . . . by filing a prior written refusal”); N.D. Cent. Code § 23-16-14 (2012) (“No . . . physician, nurse, hospital employee,
nor any other person”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.91(D) (West 2004) (“No person”);
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3213(d) (West 2000) (“no medical personnel or medical facility,
nor any employee, agent or student thereof”); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17-11 (2008) (“A physician or any other person who is a member of or associated with the medical staff of a
health care facility or any employee of a health care facility . . . and who shall state in writing an objection.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-12 (2011) (“No physician, nurse, or other person.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-204 (2010) (“no person”); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-75
(2009) (“any person”); Conn. Agencies Regs. § 19-13-D54(f) (2006) (“No person”).
179 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d) (“No individual”).
180 See, e.g., id. § 238n.
181 See, e.g., id. § 300a-7(d) (“No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the
performance of any part of a health service program or research activity funded in whole
or in part under a program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
if his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program or activity would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”).
182 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e( j), 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
183 In the 1977 case Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement narrowly to hold that an employer need not provide reasonable accommodations to an employee if it would impose
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when the objector does not directly facilitate the activity to which she
objects. Thus, Title VII’s protections have extended to nurses who do
not want to assist with abortions,184 clerks who process draft registration
forms at the post office,185 and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents
who process applications for tax exemption for abortion providers.186
Although employers may consider hardships to themselves and other
employees in granting or refusing an accommodation, nothing suggests
that only those directly involved in a challenged activity can or should be
exempted. The expansive protections in the employment and health
care contexts reflect the reality that many people believe they are personally accountable for facilitating another person’s actions.
It is possible that a claim for exemption may be so remote that it is
beyond cognizance and society’s willingness to protect it. For instance,
in the health care context, an Iowa Attorney General Opinion concluded that the state’s abortion conscience clause extended by its terms
only to those who “recommend[], perform[], or assist[] in an abortion
more than a de minimis burden on the employer or an employee’s coworkers. See 432 U.S.
63, 84 (1977).
184 For example, in the 2000 case Shelton v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered staff nurse Yvonne Shelton’s Title VII religious discrimination claim that she was required to perform emergency
abortions despite her request not to. 223 F.3d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2006). Although the court
ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Shelton’s employer, a state hospital, it
concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Id.
at 225, 228. Shelton worked in the hospital’s Labor and Delivery (L&D) section. Id. at 222.
Although elective abortions were not performed in the L&D section, emergency abortions
occasionally were. Id. A devout Pentecostal, Shelton refused to participate in the emergency abortions, delaying treatment on several occasions. Id. at 223. Budget cuts made it
impossible for the hospital to hire staff around Shelton’s refusal. Id. The hospital informed
Shelton that she could no longer work in L&D, but it offered to transfer her to another
unit or to help her secure an open position elsewhere in the hospital. Shelton, 223 F.3d at
223. When Shelton refused, she was fired; subsequently Shelton brought suit under Title
VII, alleging religious discrimination. Id. The court concluded that Shelton had established a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII, which shifted the burden “to
the Hospital to show either that it offered Shelton a reasonable accommodation, or that it
could not do so because of a resulting undue hardship.” Id. at 225. The court concluded
that the hospital provided reasonable accommodations for Shelton because the proffered
transfer would not have resulted in a loss of pay or benefits, and the service Shelton would
perform in another unit would not have been “religiously untenable.” Id. at 226. Shelton’s
steadfast refusal to “cooperate in attempting to find an acceptable religious accommodation” ultimately doomed her claim. See id. at 228.
185 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 354–55 (discussing Am. Postal Workers Union, S.F. Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986) and McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512
F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1980)).
186 See id. at 355–57 (discussing Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C.
1979)).
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procedure.”187 Consequently, nurses who provide comfort to a patient
and pharmacists who prepare the saline solution used in abortions
could not use the conscience clause to refrain from doing their jobs.
The opinion emphasized the slippery slope that a contrary decision
would create: “[O]ne could eventually get to the point where the man
who mines the iron ore that goes to make the steel, which is used by a
factory to make instruments used in abortions could refuse to work on
conscientious grounds.”188 Clearly, the state can and must draw lines to
avoid hardships to the public, as well as frivolous claims of conscience.
The exemptions proposed in Appendix B would exempt religious
groups from “provid[ing] goods or services that assist or promote the
solemnization or celebration of any marriage” when the group cannot,
for religious reasons, celebrate or promote a given marriage, and they
would insulate such groups from private suit or government penalty for
such refusal,189 as numerous states now do.190 The proposed package of
exemptions would also provide protection to individuals in commerce
and government employees, but only in those situations in which no
substantial hardship for same-sex couples would result.191
Professor Kent Greenawalt has asked about the outer boundaries
of such exemptions: would they cover only the clerk who assists with
and processes the marriage paperwork, or would they also extend to a
clerk who hands blank forms to the couple or to the cashier who takes
their license fee?192 All these services arguably facilitate the marriage
because they all directly involve the marriage licensing process. It is difficult to pinpoint the precise degree of involvement warranting an exemption. But clearly, an exemption should not cover the security officer who unlocks the clerk’s office in the morning because unlocking
the building is not particular to facilitating same-sex marriages—the
office must be unlocked to facilitate all of the office’s other business
throughout the day. Put another way, because the office must be open
187 41 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 474, 478 (1976).
188 See id.
189 See infra app. B, § (b)(1)(A). Separate provisions address employee benefits and
housing.
190 See infra app. A.
191 See infra app. B. In the case of government employees, the couple must be able to
receive the requested service immediately, but for commercial vendors, the couple must be
able to secure the desired service without substantial hardship. See infra app. B. Thus, these
exemptions would not allow religious individuals in commerce or government employment
to act as a roadblock on the path to marriage.
192 See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be
Accommodated?, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 47, 60 (2010).
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to the public for a number of services, there is no meaningful sense in
which the guard’s service “celebrates” or “assists” the “solemnization” of
any particular couple’s marriage. Neither is there any reason for the
security guard to know the occasion for any particular couple’s visit to
the clerk’s office; this suggests that any refusal has nothing to do with
sincere religious objections to the marriage.
More fundamentally, there is no reason to take a crabbed view of
assistance in the same-sex marriage context. It is true that limiting exemptions to direct involvement in a morally freighted activity is a device
for minimizing hardships to same-sex couples, but an exemption qualified by hardship to same-sex couples also serves this limiting function.
Thus, at a time when the public remains deeply divided about same-sex
marriage, legislators can soften the blow of legislative defeat for people
who cannot, consistent with their faith, facilitate same-sex marriages by
allowing them to step aside—without imposing great costs on same-sex
couples.
In the health care context, others have observed that, although
exemptions have been granted in life-and-death matters—like abortion
and physician-assisted suicide,193 both of which involve being forced to
end a life—more general protections for conscience objections have
not been as forthcoming.194 One way to interpret this pattern is that a
religious objector’s claim weakens significantly when less direct actions
are required.
At least one commentator would count as providing “assistance”
anyone with “significant personal contact with the patients,” but not,
for example, the person who makes a patient’s bed.195 Advocates like
the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), which represented the nurses in
193 The federal government and forty-seven states have provided some exemptions to
the duty to assist with abortion. See Wilson, supra note 30, at app.; see, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 127.885(4) (2011) (“No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by statute or by any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a qualified patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”).
194 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 290 n.80. Conscience protections may be more
capacious than Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle suggest. Some exemptions allow
providers to step away from any service that violates their moral or religious beliefs—if the
service is funded by specific federal programs. See supra note 181 (providing the text of the
Church Amendment). Other federal conscience clauses reach services unconnected to the
abortion procedure itself to encompass peripheral activities, such as training or referrals.
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (2006).
195 See Greenawalt, supra note 192, at 60 (“I do not think everyone remotely connected
to patients . . . should have a right of conscience to refuse based on the procedure the
patient undergoes. The tie to the objectionable practice is too remote.”). Professor
Greenawalt’s argument concerns those who would not have qualified for protection in his
view, but he may not intend “patient care” to be a requisite for protection for all objectors.
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both Danquah v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital, described in the Introduction, contend that a nurse “assist[s] with the abortion [and therefore is entitled
to protection] even if [he or she is] taking down [a] name, holding a
patient’s hand during the procedure, or walking them to the door.”196
Certainly, ADF’s test reaches too far. As with the religious objections to same-sex marriage discussed above, not every person who has
contact with a patient seeking abortion services actually facilitates the
objectionable procedure. For example, the attendant who wheels the
patient to the hospital entrance for curbside pick-up does this for any
patient who needs this assistance. There is nothing unique to the
abortion procedure that the attendant makes possible through her
work. Contrast this with removing the remains of a fetus after a dilation and extraction or prepping the operating room for the abortion
procedure itself—in both cases, the procedure could not happen
without the specific services described.197
As these examples make clear, providers can facilitate an abortion
without significant patient contact. Likewise, a provider can have significant personal contact with a patient and still not facilitate an abortion. Thus, the operating room technician who ordinarily uses an autoclave to sterilize instruments would be able to claim an exemption from
sterilizing a particular batch of instruments used only in abortion procedures, but he would not be able to object to sterilizing instruments
for other surgeries. Similarly, a technician who disposes of medical
waste could claim an exemption for refusing to dispose of the remains
from an abortion, but not for refusing to dispose of remains per se.
The Cenzon-DeCarlo case offers a useful illustration of what would
count as assistance—and thus receive protection—and what would not.
In Cenzon-DeCarlo, the clinical nurse manager who was responsible for
“facilitating the flow” of the hospital’s daily surgeries, testified that Cenzon-DeCarlo’s supervisor offered to allow Cenzon-DeCarlo to leave the
operating room during the abortion procedure.198 The hospital, however, would require Cenzon-DeCarlo “to perform her pre-operative job
196 Seth Augenstein, 12 Nurses Accuse UMDNJ of Forcing Them to Assist in Abortion Cases
Despite Religious and Moral Objections, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.) (Nov. 14, 2011, 8:11 PM),
http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates_impact/print.html?entry=/2011/11/12_nurses_accus
e_umdnj_of_forc.html; see Stein, supra note 29; see also supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah and Cenzon-DeCarlo).
197 See Gillian Flett & Allan Templeton, Induced Abortion, in Dewhurst’s Textbook of
Obstetrics and Gynecology 95 (Keith Edmonds ed., 8th ed. 2012).
198 Affidavit of Maura Carpo 1–3, Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 10237-10
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2011).
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duties because [the hospital] had not been able to locate a replacement for [her] and the physician made clear that the patient’s life was
at risk.”199 The issue of whether anyone else could perform CenzonDeCarlo’s services remains contested, and presumably will figure
prominently in any trial.200 Under the test articulated above, CenzonDeCarlo’s pre-operative procedures in preparation for a secondtrimester abortion would clearly constitute “assistance.” Nonetheless, as
explained in Part V below, accommodations for religious objectors
should be qualified by hardship to the patient.201
The pressure to limit the scope of “assistance” stems precisely from
the desire to avoid hardships on patients, employers, coworkers, and
others that might be created by an unbounded exemption. The qualified hardship exemption illustrates, however, that there are more direct
ways to satisfy this important, overriding objective.202 A number of
states, in fact, have recognized the possibility of hardships for patients
and raised the bar for objecting to assistance with abortion services—
which states are free to do because the Church Amendment does not
preempt this entire area of law. For example, Iowa law provides that
“[a]n individual . . . shall not be required against that individual’s religious beliefs or moral convictions to perform, assist, or participate in
such procedures” unless “necessary to save the life of a mother.”203
Likewise, South Carolina law provides that “[n]o private or nongovernmental hospital or clinic shall be required to . . . permit their facilities to be utilized for the performance of abortions,” but may not “refuse an emergency admittance.”204
A number of common sense devices can also reduce dislocations
to patients and others. Making objectors disclose ex ante any objections
in writing would both eliminate the possibility of unfair surprise to
those seeking services and give employers an opportunity to staff
199 Id. at 3.
200 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah).
201 See infra notes 247–288 and accompanying text.
202 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Legal Column: Conscientious Objection by Health Care
Providers, Lahey Clinic J. Med. Ethics, Winter 2011, at 4, 4 (discussing the “evolving nonuniform patchwork of [state] laws” protecting conscientious exemptions and identifying
trends).
203 Iowa Code Ann. § 146.1 (West 2005); see also Md. Code Ann., Health–Gen. § 20214 (LexisNexis 2009) (no person shall be required to perform an abortion, except when
it may cause “death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury to the patient”
or when it would be “contrary to the standards of medical care”); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (West 2011) (providing that public employees need not perform abortions except when “necessary to save the life of the mother”).
204 S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-40 (2002).
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around the objector.205 Disclosure ex ante would serve an important
screening function as well—separating individuals with deeply held objections from those with less sincere or more ambivalent feelings.
The likelihood of hardships could be reduced by limiting the ability to object, as Title VII does, to only those situations in which an employee’s objections would not render her “unable to perform a substantial proportion of the duties of a particular position.”206 Kentucky and
Pennsylvania make it unlawful to discriminate against an abortion objector when the health care facility is not operated exclusively for the
purpose of performing abortions,207 but facilities that exist precisely to
conduct abortions may elect not to hire and could legally discharge an
abortion objector. Obviously, giving protections to abortion objectors
inside an abortion clinic would cause real mayhem. In this way, states
such as Kentucky and Pennsylvania have struck a workable balance between respecting the religious beliefs of objectors and ensuring the
continued availability of abortion services. Policymakers in a range of
contexts should strive to follow this example and minimize the likelihood of significant hardships to all parties.

205 See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
206 See Haring, 471 F. Supp. at 1178–84 (holding that the IRS violated Title VII’s protections against religious discrimination when it refused to promote a Catholic IRS agent
“solely” because he “refus[ed] to handle applications for exemptions from persons or
groups which advocate abortion or other practices to which he objects,” he objected to
working on cases comprising a tiny fraction of the overall volume of his work, and the IRS
could have staffed around the agent without any undue hardship).
207 The Kentucky statute states:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for . . . [a]ny public or private
agency, institution or person . . . [to] discriminate against any applicant for
admission thereto or any physician, nurse, staff member, student or employee
thereof, on account of the willingness or refusal . . . to perform or participate
in abortion or sterilization by reason of objection thereto on moral, religious
or professional grounds, or because of any statement or other manifestation
of attitude by such person with respect to abortion or sterilization if that health
care facility is not operated exclusively for the purposes of performing abortions or sterilizations.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.800(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania statute uses similar language. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3213(d) (West 2000)
(“Except for a facility devoted exclusively to the performance of abortions, no medical personnel or
medical facility, nor any employee, agent or student thereof, shall be required against his
or its conscience to aid, abet or facilitate performance or an abortion or dispensing of an
abortifacient . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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IV. Fourth Sticking Point: No One Is Being Asked to Do
Anything So No One Needs Protection
Some assert that laws recognizing new civil rights do not need religious liberty guarantees because they do not require religious objectors
to do any particular thing. For example, White House press secretary
Jay Carney has said that the coverage mandate “does not signal any
change at all in the administration’s policy on conscience protections”
because it “does not direct an individual to do anything.”208
Like Carney, legislators have expressed genuine confusion about
how same-sex marriage can trigger a threat to religious liberty, asking
for:
[C]oncrete examples . . . that would justify anything along the
lines of this exemption. . . . I’m finding this very amorphous,
you know, just understanding what the concern is, you’ve got
to concretize the concern to get my attention on this. Otherwise I think we’re just, kind of, thinking in kind of an airy
fairy way about possible problems and I want to know what
the serious things are that you are, that you prompt us to consider this.209
The fallacy of the notion that no one will be asked to do anything
that would burden them is clearest in the same-sex marriage context. It
overlooks a stream of advice to government officials and employees
that they must serve all members of the public, even when another willing provider can do so immediately. After Massachusetts recognized
same-sex marriage, the chief counsel to then-Governor Mitt Romney
told the state’s justices of the peace that they must “follow the law,
whether you agree with it or not.”210 One linchpin of that law is Massa208 See January Press Briefing, supra note 17.
209 E.g., Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 7:29:55 (statement of
Councilmember Jim Graham). Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle make a similar claim
as to government officials: “We have discovered no law on the question whether a Justice
of the Peace or other official authorized to officiate is under a statutory duty to perform
marriages when requested, and we expect no such specific duty exists.” See Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 46, at 294.
210 Katie Zezima, Obey Same-Sex Marriage Law, Officials Told, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2004, at
A15. In Massachusetts, some justices of the peace had previously announced that they would
resign if forced to perform same-sex marriages. Kathleen Burge, Justices of the Peace Confront
Gay Marriage, Bos. Globe, Apr. 18, 2004, at B1; see also 158 Cong. Rec. E1370 (daily ed. Aug.
1, 2012) (statement of Rep. Laura Richardson) (“Simply put, religious freedom requires
religiously affiliated employers to obey the law rather than to become a law unto themselves.”). Although this is a common refrain in discussions of whether to enact religious lib-

1472

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1417

chusetts’ statute forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which subjects violators to as much as $50,000 in civil fines.211
Similarly, in the wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 same-sex
marriage decision, Varnum v. Brien,212 the Iowa attorney general told
county recorders:
We expect duly-elected county recorders to comply with the
Iowa Constitution as interpreted unanimously by the Iowa
Supreme Court. . . . Our country lives by and thrives by the
rule of law, and the rule of law means we all follow the law as
interpreted by our courts—not by ourselves. . . . Recorders do
not have discretion or power to ignore the Iowa Supreme
Court’s ruling. . . . All county recorders in the state of Iowa
are required to comply with the Varnum decision following issuance of procedendo from the Supreme Court, and to issue
marriage licenses to same sex couples in the same manner as
licenses issued to opposite gender applicants.213
As if this were not emphatic enough, the attorney general added: “if
necessary, we will explore legal actions to enforce and implement the
Court’s ruling, working with the Iowa Dept. of Public Health and county attorneys.”214
Similarly, on the heels of New York’s same-sex marriage law, the
Office of Vital Records of the New York State Department of Health, in
an informational memorandum to town and city clerks, told clerks that
“[u]nder New York State Law the town or city clerk must provide a license to an applicant who meets all marriage requirements for New
York State. It is a misdemeanor violation if the clerk refuses to do so for
any reason.”215 These unmistakable messages from the executive deerty protections, it is not helpful to say that an objector must follow the law when the dialogue is about what the law should be.
211 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5(c) (2010) (imposing such a fine on those who
have “been adjudged to have committed 2 or more discriminatory practices during the 7year period ending on the date of the filing of the complaint”).
212 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009)(holding that an Iowa statute defining marriage as
between a man and a woman violated the equal protection rights of same-sex couples under the Iowa Constitution).
213 Statement of Tom Miller, Iowa Att’y Gen., County Recorders Must Comply with Supreme Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html.
214 Id.
215 Informational Memorandum to New York State Town and City Clerks, Office of Vital Records, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health ( July 13, 2011), available at http://site.pfaw.org/
pdf/Jordan_Belforti_NY_Marriage.PDF; see also Dan Wiessner, New York Town Clerk Quits
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partments of Iowa and New York left little doubt about local marriage
clerks’ new obligations in those states.
Government employees and officials believe they are at risk. At
least one Iowa magistrate, authorized by law to preside over weddings,216 has stopped performing marriages.217 Although some judges
believe the decision to preside over weddings is entirely a “discretionary
function,” a spokesperson for Iowa’s Attorney General’s office cautioned that “judges and magistrate judges have discretion whether they
choose to participate in wedding ceremonies . . . . [but i]f they do, they
should certainly do so without bias or prejudice, as per the Code of Judicial Conduct.”218 In Massachusetts, several justices of the peace said
they would resign because no exemption was available, and at least one
did so.219 In New York, two clerks resigned in advance of the law’s effective date rather than violate their religious beliefs.220
In a case that has received national attention after it was first profiled in the New York Times, the town clerk for Ledyard, New York, Rose
Marie Belforti, assigned the task of issuing marriage licenses to a deputy
clerk, who would issue the licenses by appointment, rather than as a
walk-in service.221 Belforti, a “self-described Bible-believing Christian,”
instituted the new process saying:

over Gay Marriage License, Reuters, July 12, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
07/12/us-gaymarriage-newyork-resignation-idUSTRE76B7BJ20110712 (quoting Governor
Andrew Cuomo as saying, “When you enforce the laws of the state, you don't get to pick
and choose the laws”).
216 See Iowa Code Ann. § 595.10(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011).
217 See Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Performing Marriages, Edge Boston (Apr. 23,
2009), http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2=news&sc3=&id=903
10.
218 See id. (quoting a spokesperson for Iowa’s Office of the Attorney General).
219 See Emily Shartin, Clerks in Suburbs Ready for May 17, Bos. Globe, May 13, 2004, at
A1 (reporting that a Bellingham, Massachusetts town clerk planned to resign her post as
justice of the peace “because she fe[lt] ‘uncomfortable’ about the prospect of performing
same-sex marriages”); Steve Inskeep, Mass. Justice of the Peace Resigns over Gay Marriage, NPR
(May 14, 2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1896321 (indicating that a Charlton, Massachusetts justice of the peace “chose to resign her post rather
than perform gay marriages”).
220 See Efrem Graham, Town Clerks Bullied over NY Gay Marriage Law, Christian Broad.
Network (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2011/November/TownClerks-Bullied-over-NY-Gay-Marriage-Law-/ (quoting one clerk as saying, “I’d like to see
[clerks] protected. . . . I think they should have a right to their religious beliefs, their biblical beliefs. . . . [T]hey should be able to stay in the office and just appoint someone else to
do the job. It’s a very small percentage of work in a rural community”).
221 See Thomas Kaplan, Rights Collide as Town Clerk Sidesteps Role in Gay Marriages, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1.
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For me to participate in the same-sex marriage application
process I don’t feel is right. . . . God doesn’t want me to do
this, so I can’t do what God doesn’t want me to do, just like I
can’t steal, or any of the other things that God doesn’t want
me to do.222
Not surprisingly, the same-sex couple who presented for a marriage license on August 30, 2011, Katie Carmichael and Deirdre DiBiaggio,
chafed at being put off to a later date, saying that “[s]eparate but equal
is not equal. . . . We do not want to have to go in there on another day
and be treated like a second-class citizen.”223 Later news reports suggest
that the office—which serves a population of 1900 people, is open nine
hours a week,224 and “issues fewer than seven marriage licenses a year”
—now issues all marriage licenses by appointment.225 People for the
American Way, together with attorneys at Proskauer Rose LLP, have
threatened suit on behalf of Carmichael and DiBiaggio, arguing that
“[p]ublic officials can’t pick and choose the laws they want to follow. . . .
If a public official simply decides to shirk the obligations of her office,
then she should resign and be replaced by someone who will do the job
and carry out state law.”226 To date no suit appears to have been filed.
As explained more fully below, the claim that government employees
must perform all services offered by a government office conflates the
public’s legitimate claim to receive the service from the state with a
claimed entitlement to receive it from each employee of the office.227
222 See id.
223 See Tyler Kingkade, New York Town Clerk Refuses to Let Same-Sex Couple Get Married, Huffington Post (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/15/newyork-town-refuses-to-marry-gay-couple_n_964595.html (quoting Carmichael).
224 See Kaplan, supra note 221.
225 See Graham, supra note 220.
226 See Press Release, People for the American Way, PFAW Foundation Demands That
NY Town Clerks End Marriage Discrimination (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.
pfaw.org/press-releases/2011/09/pfaw-foundation-demands-ny-town-clerks-end-marriage-dis
crimination (quoting the president of People for the American Way Foundation); see also
Letter from James E. Gregory, Esq., Proskauer Rose LLP, to Mark Jordan, Ledyard Town
Supervisor and Rose Marie Belforti, Ledyard Town Clerk (Sept. 9, 2011), available at http://
site.pfaw.org/pdf/Jordan_Belforti_NY_Marriage.PDF.
227 New York law appears to authorize town clerks to delegate services to a deputy in
certain instances:
[T]he clerk of any city with the approval of the governing body of such city is
hereby authorized to designate, in writing filed in the city clerk’s office, a
deputy clerk, if any, and/or other city employees in such office to receive applications for, examine applications, investigate and issue marriage licenses in
the absence or inability of the clerk of said city to act, and said deputy and/or
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Countries with a longer experience with same-sex marriage have
also witnessed resignations and firings over the question of what duty is
owed to same-sex couples.228 Although the laws governing in each jurisdiction surely differ in material ways, such resignations and firings
provide further evidence that the law cannot simply remain silent on
the question of duties.
The claim that “no one has to do anything” also overlooks the existing nondiscrimination statutes in every state that has embraced samesex marriage, whether by legislation or judicial decision.229 Many of
these state antidiscrimination laws contain some religious liberty protections.230 Yet, where statutes prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination do not contain religious liberty accommodations, they have
been used to fine a photographer who refused to photograph weddings231 and to sue a Methodist association that refused to open its faemployees so designated are hereby vested with all the powers and duties of
said city clerk relative thereto.
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 15(3) (McKinney 2010).
228 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 324–25 (chronicling resignations in Canada, dismissals
in the Netherlands, and disciplinary actions against employees in the United Kingdom).
229 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81c (West Supp. 2011) (employment); D.C.
Code § 2-1402.11 (LexisNexis 2012) (employment); D.C. Code § 2-1402.21 (housing);
D.C. Code § 2-1402.31 (public accommodations); D.C. Code § 2-1402.41 (educational
institutions); Iowa Code Ann. § 216.6 (West 2005) (employment); Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151B, § 4 (2010) (employment); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:6 (2009) (employment);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 495 (2009 & Supp. 2011) (employment).
230 Of the twenty states with laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, eighteen provide exemptions for religious institutions. See Joan Frawley Desmond,
Same-Sex Marriage Bill and Religious Freedom, Cathoholic (Apr. 13, 2009, 8:57 AM), http://
www.thecathoholic.com/the_cathoholic/2009/04/mesex-marriage-bill-religious-freedom.
html (quoting a Becket Fund study). The remaining two states, Hawaii and Wisconsin, have
broad prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination with no exemption for religious
organizations. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 (2010 & Supp. 2011); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.31
(West Supp. 2011).
231 See Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Colliding Causes: Gay Rights and Religious Liberty, Deseret
News (Feb. 12, 2012, 12:09 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/700224421/
Gay-Liberty.html; see also Hagerty, supra note 58. A suit arising from a photographer’s denial
of service to a same-sex couple under New Mexico’s Human Rights Act is currently percolating through the New Mexico courts. Recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the
photographer’s argument that the New Mexico State Constitution required a religious exemption to the state’s Human Rights Act. Further, the court dismissed the photographer’s
claim that the Human Rights Act compelled speech under the First Amendment. Elane Photography v. Willock, No. 30,203, at 11 (N.M. Ct. App. May 31, 2012), available at http://
www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/nmca/slips/CA30,203.pdf. The court reasoned:
The [New Mexico Human Rights Act] regulates Elane Photography’s conduct
in its commercial business, not its speech or right to express its own views
about same-sex relationships. As a result, Elane Photography’s commercial
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cilities to same-sex civil union ceremonies.232 Antidiscrimination statutes have provided a vehicle for these challenges, raising the question
of whether objections to same-sex marriage are like any other form of
discrimination against lesbians and gays.233
Many laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and other prohibited classifications date to the 1960s and 1970s, long before
same-sex marriage was widely considered.234 These laws largely address
commercial services, like hailing taxis, ordering burgers, and leasing
apartments, for which it is hard to imagine that a refusal to serve another individual can reflect anything other than animus toward that
individual.235
Refusals to assist a same-sex marriage are different in character,
however—they can stem from something other than anti-gay animus.236

business conduct, taking photographs for hire, is not so inherently expressive
as to warrant First Amendment protections. The conduct of taking wedding
or ceremonial photographs, unaccompanied by outward expression of approval for same-sex ceremonies, would not express any message from Elane
Photography.
Id.

Finally, the appellate court rejected the claim that the state’s RFRA could be used as a
defense because the RFRA was intended to limit governmental intrusions into religious
freedom and not suits between private parties. See id.
232 Jill P. Capuzzo, Church Group Complains of Pressure over Civil Unions, N.Y. Times, Aug.
14, 2007, at B4; see Hagerty, supra note 58.
233 E.g., Flynn, supra note 46, at 251–54.
234 The Netherlands first recognized same-sex marriage in 2001, but same-sex marriage was not accepted in any U.S. jurisdiction until 2004, when Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969–70 (Mass. 2003); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to
Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1184, 1229
n.191 (2004) (noting the genesis of same-sex marriage legislation in Europe); Carolyn
Lochhead, Pivotal Day for Gay Marriage in U.S. Nears, S.F. Chron., May 2, 2004, at A1.
235 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
a dwelling).
236 This is not to say that every objection will be made in good faith. See supra notes
110–207 and accompanying text (discussing tests for the sincerity of claims). Although
some faith traditions object to homosexual sex, an objection to facilitating a same-sex marriage on this ground alone would not be protected under the model provision in Appendix
B, infra. The model provision, by its very terms, would protect refusals to “solemniz[e] or
celebrat[e] [ ] any marriage” only when doing so would force one to “violate their sincerely
held religious beliefs.” See infra app. B (emphasis added). All civil rights laws prohibit covered entities from discriminating on certain bases yet allow them to act on others. As a
result, courts often must parse legitimate, permitted grounds from illegitimate ones, taking into account all surrounding circumstances. Cf. Ash v. Tyson Foods, 664 F.3d 883, 898
(11th Cir. 2011) (examining the possible legitimate and illegitimate reasons for an employer’s failure to promote an African American employee).
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For many people, marriage is a religious institution and wedding ceremonies are a religious sacrament.237 For them, assisting with marriage
ceremonies has a religious significance that ordering burgers and hailing taxis simply do not have. Many of these people have no objection
generally to providing services to lesbians and gays, but they would object to facilitating a marriage directly—just as some religious believers
would object to facilitating an interfaith or second marriage.238 Without explicit protection in the antidiscrimination or same-sex marriage
law, many will be faced with a cruel choice: your conscience or your
livelihood.
The penalties for violating antidiscrimination laws are sobering. In
Massachusetts, individuals violating the nondiscrimination statute can
be fined up to $50,000.239 In Connecticut, business owners who violate
the statute may be found guilty of a Class D misdemeanor, which can
lead to thirty days in jail.240 In the District of Columbia, the penalties
for violation of the Human Rights Act include liability for all of the typical money damages in civil cases, including damages for emotional distress and attorney’s fees.241 The defendant can also be forced to pay stiff
civil penalties to the city: $10,000 or less for the first violation, $25,000
or less for a second offense in a five-year period, or $50,000 or less for a
third offense in a seven-year period.242 These are harsh penalties in today’s economy, especially the threat of private lawsuits.

Although exemptions seek to protect bona fide objections to facilitating a marriage,
some may seek to take advantage of such exemptions for malign reasons. The fact that an
exemption creates the possibility of misuse by some does not condone such misuse. More
importantly, as Parts II and III of this Article explain, sincerity tests and information-forcing
rules serve an important screening function and should discourage bad faith attempts to
seek the cover of an exemption. See supra notes 110–161, 219 and accompanying text.
237 See Charles Reid, Marriage: Its Relationship to Religion, Law, and the State, in Emerging
Conflicts, supra note 30, at 157.
238 See supra note 68 (discussing religious objections to interfaith marriage).
239 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5(c) (2010). The law excludes social clubs, fraternal organizations, employers with less than six employees, and religious organizations if
the challenged practice is in furtherance of religious doctrine or involves giving a preference to members of the organization. Id. § 1.
240See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-81d(b) (West Supp. 2011) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal
accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of such person’s sexual orientation or civil union status . . . .”); H.B. 5145, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Conn. 2012) (specifying jail sentences effective October 1, 2012). A public accommodation is “any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the
general public.” Id. § 46a-63.
241 See D.C. Code § 2-1403.13(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
242 See id. § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E-1).
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Similarly, the parallel claim that the coverage mandate does not
ask objectors to do anything also fails. Under the Obama administration’s accommodation to religiously affiliated employers, employees
receive the coverage as an adjunct to the insurance coverage the religious employer finances, making it part and parcel of the employerprovided coverage.243 Thus, the objector’s act of providing the mandated insurance facilitates an action the objector views as gravely immoral—the forestalling or ending of a life.244 The penalties for failing
to provide the underlying coverage—coverage without which the “free”
but objectionable coverage cannot be obtained—are staggering. If the
University of Notre Dame dropped its coverage for all employees rather than violate its religious convictions,245 under the regulations as
they now stand and assuming no change in its number of employees, it
would face an annual penalty of $32,830,000, although it may nonetheless come out ahead financially, as Part VI explains.246
Furthermore, if no one will truly be asked to do anything, then it
costs nothing to provide a specific religious liberty protection. If, however, someone will or may be asked to assist with an act that violates
deeply held religious beliefs, then it is incumbent upon legislators to
clarify whether individuals can step quietly aside.
V. Fifth Sticking Point: No One Should Have to Bear the Cost
of Another’s Religious Objection
In the fight over the coverage mandate, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pointedly maintained that “[r]eligious liberty does
243 See supra note 22–27 and accompanying text.
244 See Garvey et al., supra note 24, at 1 (“It is no answer to respond that religious employers are not ‘paying’ for this aspect of the insurance coverage.”).
245 Although some argue that institutions cannot have “beliefs,” institutions may be guided by institutional ethics that shape their internal character, culture, and mission. The Supreme Court addressed the free exercise rights of religious institutions in its 2012 decision in
Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706, 712 (2012)
(concluding that “the Free Exercise Clause . . . protects a religious group’s right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointment[]” of ministers, and noting that “[a]pplying
the protection of the First Amendment to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and
expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for the autonomy of any
religious group, regardless of its beliefs”). Some commentators argue that "[a] vibrant liberty
of conscience requires morally distinct institutions, not just morally autonomous individuals,"
and therefore that the state should recognize that institutions also have conscience claims. See
Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person and State (2010); Robert K. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good: An
Introduction, 49 J. Catholic Legal Stud. 293, 296 (2010).
246 See infra notes 343–355 and accompanying text (calculating penalties for failing to
provide mandated health insurance under the ACA).
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not mean the right to impose religious views on others. . . . Employers
should not be able to impose their moral views about birth control on
the women who work for them.”247 The same claim is made about
same-sex marriage.248
For the most part, appropriately crafted exemptions need not ask
same-sex couples to bear the cost of protecting others’ religious beliefs.249 The protections for individual objectors in government employment or commerce that I and others have proposed seek to balance two competing concerns—marriage equality and religious
liberty.250
247 See Steve Mistler, Groups Criticize Maine AG for Opposing Contraceptive Access, Me. Sun J.
(Feb. 22, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://www.sunjournal.com/news/state/2012/02/22/groupscriticize-maine-ag-opposing-contraception-m/1158735 (quoting a representative of the ACLU
of Maine); see also Written Statement of Laura W. Murphy, Dir., Wash. Legislative Office, &
Sarah Lipton-Lubet, Policy Counsel, ACLU, to U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Health, Committee on Energy & Commerce 1 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.
aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_statement_for_11-2-11_health_subcomm_hearing.pdf (“Religious
liberty does not come with the right to impose one’s faith on others.”).
248 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 319 n.3 (“[C]hurches should not get to push their beliefs
onto their employees by denying benefits. There is no reason for the government to recognize a right to bigotry in civil matters.” (quoting seller11, Comment to Robin Fretwell Wilson,
A Marriage Equality Bill That Respects Religious Objectors, Wash. Post (Nov. 1, 2009), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102601653.html)
[hereinafter Wilson, Marriage Equality Bill]).
249 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text (discussing employee benefits).
250 The proposed protections do not, however, cabin the exemption for religious organizations. Instead, religious organizations would be permitted to refuse to “(1) provide
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a purpose related
to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or (2) solemnize any marriage; or (3)
treat as valid any marriage.” See infra app. B. In other words, religious organizations could
choose not to provide benefits to spouses when recognizing any marriage that would force
them to violate their religious beliefs. The argument for an unqualified exemption even as
to benefits coverage—one of the thorniest and least intuitive issues facing legislators—is
taken up in Part VI. See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text. The model provision
would also permit religious organizations to refuse to rent their space for receptions celebrating marriages that are not recognized by their faith traditions. It is possible that this
unqualified exemption would create hardship for same-sex couples if, for example, there
were no other spaces available in the marketplace, although it seems very unlikely that
same-sex couples would be unable to find another space. Where a religious organization
occupies a monopoly position in the marketplace, however, this pivotal position would
justify qualifying the right to object even for religious organizations. See Alta Charo, The
Celestial Fire of Conscience—Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 2471, 2473
(2005) (arguing that a health care provider’s claim of “unfettered right to personal autonomy while holding monopolistic control over a public good constitutes an abuse of the
public trust,” and that health care providers who benefit from the monopolies created by
state licensing systems have a corresponding collective obligation to provide services to all
patients who seek them); Wilson, supra note 98, at 479–83 (arguing that any exemption for
religiously affiliated adoption placement providers should be qualified if an absolute exemption would erect a significant barrier to a same-sex couple’s ability to adopt). With
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A government official could refuse to solemnize a marriage only if
another government official is promptly available and willing to do so
without inconvenience or delay.251 Under this construction, in an unavoidable contest between religious liberty and marriage equality, religious liberty must yield. Thus, no state official may ever act as a chokepoint on the path to marriage. In the private commercial context, small
business owners could say no because unlike government officials, they
do not control access to the status of marriage.
The conditional nature of this protection is by deliberate design:
an absolute exemption for government employees or officials— unqualified by hardship252—could erect a roadblock to marriage for
respect to health care providers’ collective obligation to serve all patients, Professor Alta
Charo notes that the obligation:
does not mean that all members of the profession are forced to violate their
own consciences. It does, however, necessitate ensuring that a genuine system
for counseling and referring patients is in place, so that every patient can act
according to his or her own conscience just as readily as the professional can.
Charo, supra, at 2473. Professor Charo acknowledges that although it may be difficult to
strike such a balance, doing so “represent[s] the best effort to accommodate everyone and
is the approach taken by virtually all the major medical, nursing, and pharmacy societies.”
Id. This may occur with religiously affiliated hospitals that, for example, do not want to
recognize the same-sex spouse of a patient for purposes of hospital visitation. As Part I
documented, Catholic hospitals frequently do occupy a monopoly position in the marketplace, making these denials particularly burdensome, leading to significant and deserved
public outcry. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. This public backlash precipitated new federal regulations that address this “very tender and sensitive topic” for
both sides. See Rogers, supra note 35 (quoting Mitt Romney). The regulations, which govern all Medicare- and Medicaid-participating hospitals, allow patients to decide for themselves who they want to visit during their hospital stay, including same-sex partners. See 42
C.F.R. §§ 482.13(h), 485.635(f) (2012). The new regulations give the force of law to recommendations made by President Barack Obama in his April 15, 2010 Presidential Memorandum. See Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate
Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511, 20,511–12 (Apr.
15, 2010) (prohibiting hospitals from denying visitation privileges on the basis of race,
color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability).
251 See infra app. B.
252 Several states provide illustrative hardship restrictions. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit.
24, § 1790 (2011) (prohibiting the termination of a pregnancy unless the pregnancy: “(1)
is likely to result in the death of the mother; (2) [t]here is substantial risk of . . . deformity
or mental retardation; (3) [t]he pregnancy resulted from . . . [i]ncest, or . . . rape . . . ;
[or] (4) [c]ontinuation of the pregnancy would involve substantial risk of permanent injury to the . . . mother”); Md. Code. Ann., Health–Gen. § 20-214 (LexisNexis 2009) (providing that no person shall be required to perform an abortion or refer a patient to another for an abortion, except when failure to refer the patient would reasonably be
determined as “[t]he cause of death or serious physical injury or serious long-lasting injury
to the patient” or if the failure was “contrary to the standards of medical care”); Mo. Ann.
Stat. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215 (West 2011) (mandating that public employees shall
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same-sex couples at least some of the time.253 For example, an accommodation that absolutely exempts clerks from processing a marriage
license application would hobble a couple’s access to marriage in a
number of foreseeable circumstances. This might occur when a solitary
clerk is available within a twenty-mile radius and he or she objects for
religious reasons to facilitating a same-sex marriage.254 An absolute
roadblock would also be erected when an otherwise willing clerk is unavailable due to illness or other reason, leaving no one else to assist the
couple. Our proposed exemption forestalls such hardships to same-sex
couples.
As with any rule that seeks to balance two separate interests, the
proposed hardship exemption will involve some line drawing— specifically, what will count as “promptly,” or as “inconvenience” or “delay.”
Such line drawing could be accomplished in the legislative process,
which would permit states to make choices that reflect the facts on the
ground in that state—for instance, how many clerks process the necessary paperwork in any given office.255 Legislators would be wise to denot perform abortions, except when “necessary to save the life of the mother”); S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 44-41-40, 44-41-50 (2002) (mandating that “[n]o private or nongovernmental
hospital or clinic shall be required to . . . permit their facilities to be utilized for the performance of abortions . . . provided, that no hospital or clinic shall refuse an emergency
admittance”).
253 Many commentators are rightly concerned about conferring upon religious objectors an absolute, unqualified exemption to facilitating same-sex marriages. For instance,
Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle observe that:
[T]he political community has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all people have equal access to publicly available goods and services, whether provided by the state, commercial entities, or others. This interest primarily arises
from concern about those who are excluded from such benefits. Exclusion may
imperil health and safety, limit opportunities for personal development, deny
political and social equality, or impose psychic distress. State policies protecting against such exclusion also express the political community’s concerns
about its own character and experience, because such exclusion may result in
segregation and conflict.
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 46, at 280–81 (emphasis added). Because my colleagues and
I share this concern, the protections we propose would not give an absolute exemption for
government employees or commercial providers.
254 Such considerations are contextually sensitive and might vary considerably among
specific state regulations. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 37:1-3 (West Supp. 2012) (“[A] marriage
or civil union license shall be issued by the licensing officer in the municipality in which
either party resides or, if neither party is a resident of the State, in the municipality in
which the proposed marriage or civil union is to be performed.”).
255 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39 (presenting empirical evidence about the operation of clerks’ offices in Massachusetts, including the number of clerks and same-sex
marriage license applications, suggesting that same-sex marriage licenses constitute a min-
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cide to explicitly define such terms in any same-sex marriage legislation, as they routinely do in other statutes, rather than leaving it to the
courts to construe those terms.256 That said, asking same-sex couples to
wait any significant amount of time for a license that heterosexual couples would receive immediately would not be “prompt.”
The protection we propose will strike many religious objectors as
cold comfort. In a head-to-head contest between religious liberty and
marriage equality, religious liberty yields under this construction. Restricting the ability to object to only those situations in which no hardship for same-sex couples would result is principled: the state should
not confer the right to marry with one hand and then take it back with
the other by enacting broad, unqualified religious objections that could
operate to bar same-sex couples from marrying.257 Although the proposed protection does not help every objector in every instance, the
exemption still has value. As I have argued elsewhere, a hardship exemption will likely allow the vast majority of objectors to step aside.258
Some will ask why same-sex couples should ever have to experience any dislocation, however slight or remote. A common refrain is
that religious objectors in government service should do all of their job
or resign.259 This stance conflates the public receipt of a service offered
by the state with the receipt of that service from each and every employee in the office who is available to do it. Same-sex couples clearly
iscule part of the workload for state clerk offices, and thus that staffing around religious
objections would pose negligible costs).
256 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text (discussing promptness and the virtues of making accommodations as invisible as possible so that same-sex couples “never
stand in another line”).
257 See Laycock, supra note 169, at 200 (“[A hardship qualification on religious objection] is inevitable in the governmental and commercial sectors. Religious dissenters can
live their own values, but not if they occupy choke points that empower them to prevent
same-sex couples from living their own values. If the dissenters want complete moral autonomy on this issue, they must refrain from occupying such a choke point.”).
258 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 335–39 (arguing that few cases of hardship to same-sex
couples would actually arise).
259 See Letter from James E. Gregory, supra note 226, at *2 (“[W]e fully expect the
Town Board to direct Ms. Belforti to either perform her essential duties, including the
issuance of marriage licenses to eligible applicants whether same sex or opposite sex, or to
resign immediately.”). One D.C. Council member expressed the idea this way:
If [an objector is a clerk] who chose[s] not to provide [a] service that [she
has] accepted the job to provide but . . . still want[s] an entire salary as if
[she] were providing 100% of the service, [then she is asking for] all of the
benefits of the position [yet feeling] entitled to discriminate.
Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:57:55 (statement of Councilmember David Catania).
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have the right to receive marriage licenses and all other services from
the state, but they do not necessarily have a claim to receive the service
from a particular public servant. Indeed, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 imposes upon governmental employers a duty to accommodate an objecting employee if reasonably possible without undue
hardship to the government, while also reasonably preserving the employee’s employment status.260 Given Title VII’s protections, it is simply
insufficient to require that religious objectors “put up or shut up.”
More fundamentally, this stance vilifies people who could not have
known when they took their jobs that they would be asked to facilitate a
same-sex marriage. A New York clerk who resigned “just one day before
gay marriage became legal” took her position as a clerk thirteen years
before, in 1998—three years before the Netherlands first recognized
260 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 348–59; see also Am. Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster
Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that employment status includes compensation, conditions, terms, and privileges of employment). There are other problems with
the “do-the-whole-job-or-get-out” approach. As a pair of cases involving claims for accommodation of employees in predictable administrative jobs illustrates, speculative predictions regarding possible future disruptions are not to be considered; instead, employers
are to be guided by the facts on the ground. See McGinnis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 512 F. Supp.
517, 524 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.D.C. 1979).
In its 1979 decision in Haring v. Blumenthal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia noted:
“[U]ndue hardship” must mean present undue hardship, as distinguished
from anticipated or multiplied hardship. Were the law otherwise, any accommodation, however slight, would rise to the level of an undue hardship
because, if sufficiently magnified through predictions of the future behavior
of the employee’s co-workers, even the most minute accommodation could be
calculated to reach that level.
471 F. Supp. at 1182. The best empirical evidence suggests, however, that allowing government employees to recuse themselves from facilitating same-sex marriages will cost the
government and same-sex couples very little, if anything at all. See Wilson, supra note 46, at
335–39. Moreover, although accommodations for certain government employees who
protect the public (like police officers and firefighters) have raised special difficulties and
received special scrutiny in a string of cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, at most these cases stand for the proposition that employees of “paramilitary” organizations responsible for public protection must check their consciences at the door. See
id. at 349–58 (citing Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925–27 (7th Cir. 2003); Rodriguez v. City of Chi., 156 F.3d 771, 775–80 (7th Cir. 1998); Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991)). Patently, religious accommodations for employees of
marriage licensure offices and other government employees who may object to facilitating
same-sex marriages pose far less difficulty than accommodations for public protectors
because these employees perform routine, predictable, easily staffed-around tasks. See id. at
349. Moreover, even in the public protector cases, which are the most hostile to the need
for accommodations, public employers can and routinely do offer new assignments, transfers, and low-level work-arounds short of a new assignment, which allow the religious objector to step aside from services that violate deeply held religious beliefs. See id. at 354.
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same-sex marriage and six years before same-sex marriage was recognized anywhere in the United States.261
Like the New York clerk, many state employees in the United
States began working for the government long before same-sex marriage was legally recognized anywhere. The Council of State Governments reports that many public sector employees have held their jobs
for decades.262 Many state employees are eligible for retirement.263
Generally, to be eligible for retirement, an employee must have worked
for the state for a substantial length of time.264 Roughly one in every
four or five employees working for state government in Iowa (17%),
New Hampshire (22%), and Vermont (25%) qualified for retirement
in 2002.265 There is no reason to think that clerks in state registrar offices or other employees as a group are more likely to be newcomers to
the job than their counterparts.
Moreover, dismissal or resignation will likely be very costly for these employees. A job in the state licensure office pays well, and many
long-time employees have built up retirement and other benefits that
would be wiped out or significantly curtailed if they felt forced to exit
rather than violate a religious conviction.266
Just as important as these very human costs to objectors is the fact
that collisions will gradually become less and less prevalent. Resistance
to recognition of same-sex marriage largely follows generational lines.
In 2011, the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute annual national survey of college freshmen found that 71.3% of college freshmen
supported same-sex marriage.267 In 2010, 53% of those surveyed between eighteen and twenty-nine supported same-sex marriage; 39%
261 See Graham, supra note 220; see also supra note 234 (discussing the origin of samesex marriage in the Netherlands and Massachusetts); see also Wilson, supra note 113, at
328–31 (offering a more extensive discussion of this issue).
262 See James B. Carroll & David A. Moss, Council of State Gov’ts, Trends Alert:
State Employee Worker Shortage: The Impending Crisis 17 (2002), available at http://
www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/TA0210WorkShortage.pdf.
263 See id. at 16 (providing data for some states that recognize same-sex marriage).
Numbers for Massachusetts are not available. See id.
264 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 330 n.66 (discussing length of service requirements for
retirement).
265 See Carroll & Moss, supra note 262, at 16. On average, state workers in Iowa had
worked thirteen years by 2002, in New Hampshire nine years, and in Vermont eleven years—
all more than a decade before same-sex marriage was recognized by their states. See id. at 17.
266 See Wilson, supra note 46, at 329–30.
267 John H. Pryor et al., Higher Educ. Research Inst. at UCLA, The American
Freshman: National Norms Fall 2011, at 6 (2011), available at http://heri.ucla.edu/
PDFs/pubs/TFS/Norms/Monographs/TheAmericanFreshman2011.pdf.
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opposed it.268 Among older Americans fifty to sixty-four, 52% oppose it,
with only 38% in support.269 This data suggests that conflicts over samesex marriage rights will recede over time.270 As Professor Douglas Laycock has written, these conflicts will “gradually fade away, and nearly all
the rest [of those who oppose same-sex marriage] will go silent, succumbing to the live-and-let-live traditions of the American people.”271
In the commercial realm, our proposal gives more latitude to say
“no” because the objector does not control access to the status of marriage. The wedding photographer and cake decorator are classic examples of commercial actors associated with marriage. Even the protection for these commercial actors is not unqualified, however. An
objector in the stream of commerce may object only if a “substantial
hardship” would not result.272 This provision allows them to step aside
only when other providers can do the job. Because same-sex marriage
laws remain largely a “blue state” phenomenon, the number of refusals
should be vanishingly small.273 As Professor Laycock has explained:
Few same-sex couples . . . will have to go far to find merchants,
professionals, counseling agencies, or any other desired service providers who will cheerfully meet their needs and wants.
268 Gay Marriage Gains More Acceptance, Pew Research Ctr. for People & Press (Oct.
6, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1755/poll-gay-marriage-gains-acceptance-gays-inthe-military. Forty-six percent of individuals thirty to forty-nine approved of same-sex marriage in 2010. See id. This group experienced the greatest shift in opinion favoring samesex marriage rights—up from only thirty-nine percent in 2008. See id.
269 See id; see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Politics of Accommodation: The American Experience with Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, in Religious Freedom and Equality:
Emerging Conflicts in North America and Europe (Timothy S. Shah ed., forthcoming
2013) (analyzing voter opinion in states that have yet to enact same-sex marriage statutes,
as well as states that have enacted amendments banning same-sex marriage).
270 In perhaps one sign that same-sex marriage is decreasingly controversial and polarizing, a national poll conducted two weeks after President Obama’s endorsement of samesex marriage revealed that the President’s stand had done little to affect public perceptions of him. See Julie Pace, Obama Team Trumpets New Polling on Gay Marriage, Huffington
Post (May 23, 2012, 7:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120523/usobama-gay-marriage. Only seven percent of registered voters stated that President Obama’s
open support for same-sex marriage raised concerns about supporting him, whereas sixtytwo percent stated that his position did not make a difference to them. See id.
271 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, supra note 48, at
261.
272 See infra app. B.
273 See Fed. Election Comm’n, Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the
U.S. President, U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives 17 (2009), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/federalelections2008.pdf (reflecting the “blue
state” presidential electoral results in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington).
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And same-sex couples will generally be far happier working
with a provider who contentedly desires to serve them than
with one who believes them to be engaged in mortal sin, and
grudgingly serves them only because of the coercive power of
the law. Religious exemptions could also be drafted to exclude the rare cases where these suppositions are not true,
such as a same-sex couple in a rural area that has reasonably
convenient access to only one provider of some secular service. Such cases are no reason to withhold religious exemptions in the more urban areas where most of the people—and
most of the same-sex couples—actually live.274
Of course, same-sex couples may experience inconveniences or
dislocations under any exemption, even an exemption qualified by
hardship.275 So why allow any dislocation? First, a qualified exemption
“lowers the stakes” in the debate about same-sex marriage, where pub274 See Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor John Baldacci, supra note 48, at
261 (predicting that without religious accommodations, the number of people opposing
same-sex marriage will increase); see also Berg, supra note 46, at 229 (noting that marketing
surveys indicate that more than seventy-four percent of same-sex couples live in large urban areas).
275 One way to mitigate such dislocation is through information-forcing rules like those
used with health care services. California law, for example, requires that any facility that does
not offer abortion “on its premises shall post notice . . . in an area . . . that is open to patients
and prospective admittees.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123420(c) (West 2012). This
advance notice allows the patient to seek services knowing whether a provider is willing to
provide such services. Information networks may also close knowledge gaps and ease dislocation. These information networks have been used to promote patient access to emergency
contraceptives and to allow the patient to get emergency contraceptives without great dislocation, while allowing unwilling providers to live by their convictions. See Kyung M. Song,
Women Complain After Pharmacies Refuse Prescriptions, Seattle Times, Aug. 1, 2006, at A5 (arguing that “with better information, the patient would obtain the service without hardship or
inconvenience”); Comments from Nathan J. Diament et al., Comments Submitted to the U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. with Regard to the Proposed Rescission of the “Conscience
Regulation” Relating to Healthcare Workers and Certain Healthcare Services 4 (Apr. 7,
2009), available at http://www.ouradio.org/images/uploads/HHS_Conscience_Regulation_
Comments.pdf (“[W]omen who have experienced difficulty in obtaining emergency contraceptives have encountered ‘search costs’ that would be eliminated with better information.
Thus, the patient in one complaint filed with the Washington State Board of Pharmacy obtained [emergency contraceptives] less than an hour after the initial refusal took place.”).
Advance notice of refusals will likely satisfy no one in the same-sex marriage context,
despite the fact that it would avert needless inconveniences. We would no more tolerate
signs saying, “This photography shop does not photograph same-sex ceremonies” than we
would tolerate “Irish Need Not Apply” signs. The promise and hope of antidiscrimination
laws is that they will erase differences or the importance of differences, not accentuate
them. Thus, the information gain comes at an unacceptably high price—a loss of dignity—
which is explored in Part VII. See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text.
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lic opinion continues to be deeply divided.276 It preserves as much religious freedom as possible in a liberal society without significantly encroaching on others—a goal we should generally strive for, especially
when the costs to the public are cabined.277 A qualified exemption also
provides “elbow room” for citizens with widely divergent views to live
together in a pluralistic society.
As Professor Laycock notes, “[t]he larger problem for same-sex
couples is the insult, the pointed reminder that some fellow citizens
vehemently disapprove of what they are doing. But same-sex couples
know that anyway, and the American commitment to freedom of
speech ensures that they will be reminded of it from time to time.”278
The fact that the government should not violate deeply held religious
beliefs in order to protect others from insult does not mean that the
government should not be concerned about whether same-sex couples
are subjected to insult.279
Precisely to minimize any offense to same-sex couples, the process
for accommodating religious objectors should make any objection as
invisible as possible. As the next Part explains, this is achievable if the
objector works in a large private-sector organization or government
office.280 The couple asked by the Ledyard, New York town clerk to return at a later time to secure a marriage license from a deputy rightly
276 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Noah’s Curse and Paul’s Admonition: How the Civil
Rights Revolution Helps Us Understand Recent Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Gay Equality,
in Andrew Koppelman & George W. Dent, Jr., Must Gay Rights Conflict with Religious Identity? (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author). Professor William Eskridge
notes that:
[J]udges are incompetent to resolve these issues where the nation is closely
but intensely divided but they can and ought to lower the stakes of such primordial politics. Lowering the stakes means that judges should not prematurely constitutionalize fundamental issues where the nation is not settled; on
the other hand, judges can sometimes ameliorate local conflicts that have escalated.
Id.; see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, Bangor Daily News (Oct. 16, 2009, 8:41 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2009/10/16/opinion/
samesex-marriage-law-lacks-religious-protection (arguing that religious liberty exemptions
in same-sex marriage laws “go a long way to turning down the temperature in the heated
debate over” same-sex marriage).
277 Federal and state laws reflect this intuition. See supra note 14 (discussing the federal
RFRA and look-a-like statutes in sixteen states). In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court found that the federal RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states,
hastening the enactment of state RFRAs. See 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1993).
278 Laycock, supra note 169, at 198.
279 I am indebted to Professor Laycock for this observation.
280 See infra notes 289–357 and accompanying text.
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felt “demean[ed],” as any of us would have.281 The felt disapprobation
resulted not from having to make an appointment to secure the needed license—all couples must now do this282—but from the clerk’s articulated reasons for the change: “I don’t think it’d do the couple any
service to have me as their person, because it . . . grieve[s] the Holy
Spirit that resides in my heart, and I don’t know if I’d be able to cover
that up for them. So, I want to remove myself from this process.”283 If
New York law allows the delegation of one task to a deputy and the
clerk followed the correct procedure for making this delegation, no
one need ever have known the animating reason behind the change.
In the commercial context of a large organization, sensitivity and
forethought sometimes will allow religious objections to recede from
public view. In businesses owned by sole proprietors or with few employees, however, a member of the public who is turned away will always
know it. Some will find this cost too high.
Here, the case for a qualified exemption rests, in part, on two predictive judgments. First, as discussed earlier, public attitudes are likely
to harden against same-sex marriage in the absence of accommodations.284 Second, it seems likely that the market itself will police religious objectors. As noted above, in August 2011, a New Jersey bridal
salon owner refused to assist a woman with her gown because she was a
lesbian; the owner reportedly said that the customer “came from a nice
Jewish family, and it was a shame that [she] was gay.”285 Although the
281 See Kingkade, supra note 223 (quoting Katie Carmichael as saying, “It’s demeaning,
degrading and bottom line, it’s discrimination”).
282 Some of the early reporting suggested that same-sex couples could not secure a license at all. See id. (indicating that “the publicly elected official responsible for issuing marriage licenses[] refused to issue one herself and told the couple to make an appointment
with a deputy town clerk. There’s just one problem: There is no deputy town clerk”). Town
officials later confirmed that the clerk “informed the town board on Aug. 8 that she would
not issue same-sex marriage licenses because of her fundamental Christian beliefs. . . . [She]
‘agreed’ . . . to let her deputy clerk . . . issue all marriage licenses, including those to same-sex
couples, in the future,” but “the bottom line for the town is that no one will be turned away
and everyone will be treated the same.” See Scott Rapp, Same-Sex Couple Threatens Legal Action
Against Cayuga County Town Whose Clerk Refused to Issue Marriage License, Post-Standard (Syracuse) (Sept. 14, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/
same-sex_couple_threatens_lega.html (quoting Town Attorney Adam Van Buskirk).
283 See Karla Dial, Friday Five: Rose Marie Belforti, CitizenLink (Aug. 19, 2011), http://
www.citizenlink.com/2011/08/19/friday-five-rose-marie-belforti.
284 See Rauch, supra note 90, at 24–27; Letter from Douglas Laycock to Me. Governor
John Baldacci, supra note 48, at 260.
285 See Nina Terrero, N.J. Bridal Shop Refused to Sell Wedding Dress to Lesbian Bride: Owner
Says: “That’s Illegal”, ABC News (Aug. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nj-bridal-shoprefused-sell-wedding-dress-lesbian/story?id=14342333.

2012]

Clashes Between Church & State in Accommodations: Same-Sex Marriage

1489

owner denied the charges, the story went viral, and precipitated an onslaught of comments on the store’s Facebook profile condemning the
alleged discrimination.286
This example illustrates that objectors will often pay a cost in the
market for objecting. Presumably, the salon owner lost all the business
of gay couples in her community—in itself a sufficient penalty, likely to
limit refusals to those who feel quite strongly about it.287 And it appears
that the salon owner also lost business from friends of those gay couples
and others who heard about her stance. The possibility of social sanctions is not confined only to commercial businesses, as the significant
penalties faced by nurses who object to abortion in the workplace illustrate.288
In short, appropriately crafted exemptions should carefully balance marriage equality and religious liberty. Such exemptions should
take into consideration whether an objection will create an actual
roadblock to marriage and should therefore apply differently to actions
taken by governmental officials and private businesspersons.
VI. Sixth Sticking Point: We Cannot Deny Same-Sex Spouses and
Women Insurance Coverage They Need
The benefits issue raises especially thorny questions in the same-sex
marriage and health care contexts. Unlike facilitation, where a hardship
exemption can affirm both values at stake—access and religious liberty,
with one prevailing sometimes and the other prevailing at other times—
insurance coverage does not allow both interests to be affirmed simultaneously. Religious liberty will either prevail (with no benefits required)
or it will not (with benefits required). Thus, it matters a great deal how
policymakers choose to handle the benefits question.
The argument for a benefits exemption is not that exemptions will
pose no hardship, but that failing to give an exemption often leads to
greater hardships. Before the ACA, federal tax policy provided a significant “carrot” to employers to induce them to provide health care

286 See Here Comes the Bride, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Here-Comesthe-Bride/202112169814595 (last visited Sept. 17, 2012); Review of Here Comes the Bride, Yelp,
http://www.yelp.com/biz/here-comes-the-bride-somers-point (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
287 See supra notes 112–133 and accompanying text (discussing sincerity and the problem of lukewarm objectors).
288 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (discussing Danquah v. University of
Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hospital).
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coverage to employees, but it did not provide a “stick.”289 No federal law
required employers to provide benefits to employees or their spouses—
they simply could elect not to provide health care coverage.290 Although twenty-eight states mandate that any insurance sold in the state
must offer contraceptive coverage,291 all but eight “allow certain employers and insurers to refuse” to include such coverage.292
289 Employers are motivated to provide such benefits because they are tax-preferenced.
See Alliance for Health Reform, Tax Treatment of Health Insurance: A Primer 9–11
(2008), http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/Transcript-1367.pdf. Although employers “can deduct the cost of health insurance,” as they would for any business expense,
[t]he real subsidies for health insurance come[] from the fact that employees
do not get taxed on the health benefits provide[d]. So, in other words, when
an employer provides wages to an employee, those wages are taxed as income.
When an employer provides health benefits to an employee, those benefits
are not taxed as income. They’re essentially provided tax-free and, in effect,
lower the taxes that an employee would otherwise pay.
Id. at 9–10; see also Gamage, supra note 25, at *9–10 (“The primary sources of this tax advantage were the tax exclusions for employer-provided health insurance,” permitting employees to “exclude the value of those subsidies from taxable income” and payroll taxes,
and to take advantage of “cafeteria plan[s],” if offered by their employer, allowing them to
use pre-tax dollars “to pay for health insurance premiums.”). For the specific tax treatment, see 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006) (excluding employer contributions to fund health
care benefits from employees’ income); id. § 105(b) (excluding from employees’ income
benefits paid by employer-sponsored health care plans to the extent that benefits are paid
to reimburse the cost of medical care for employees, their spouses, and dependents); id.
§ 162(a) (permitting employer deduction for ordinary business expenses); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.162-10(a) (2012) (providing that amounts paid for health care benefit plans may be
deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) if they are ordinary and necessary business expenses).
After the ACA, small employers are incentivized to offer health care coverage to employees
through tax credits. See Gamage, supra note 25, at *21 n.123.
Professor Amy Monahan calculates that, for two employees in the twenty-five percent tax
bracket, both of whom “desire the same insurance coverage, [say, for example,] an individual
policy that costs $3,750,” the taxpayer who receives the policy through her employer “receives
an effective subsidy of $1,412 to purchase her health insurance coverage solely because her
employer makes such coverage available to her, and regardless of whether her employer
makes any contribution toward such coverage.” Amy Monahan, The Complex Relationship Between Taxes and Health Insurance 3–4 (Minn. Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 10-1 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531322.
290 Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health
Insurance: Of Markets, Courts and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1037, 1042
(1996) (“There is no statutory mandate requiring that employers must provide health
insurance for their employees.”).
291 See Insurance Coverage for Contraception Laws, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Feb. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/insurance-coverage-forcontraception-state-laws.aspx (providing a state-by-state summary of mandated benefits);
see also Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives *2 (2012) [hereinafter Guttmacher Report], available at http://www.
guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf (listing states that require insurers that
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Far more crucially, however, such state mandates did not extend to
private employer health plans unless the employer purchased insurance coverage from an insurer.293 This occurred because employee
benefit plans of private employers enjoy substantial insulation from
state law as a result of the broad preemptive shield erected by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).294 Thus, employers
that provided health care coverage to their employees could easily esprovide prescription drug coverage to include “the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices”).
292 Guttmacher Report, supra note 291, at *2 (describing ‘a “‘limited’ refusal clause” in
three states “that allows only churches and church associations to refuse to provide coverage,
and does not permit hospitals or other entities to do so;” a “‘broader’ refusal clause” in seven
states that “allows churches, associations of churches, religiously affiliated elementary and
secondary schools, and, potentially, some religious charities and universities to refuse, but
not hospitals;” an “‘expansive’ refusal clause” in nine states allowing “religious organizations,
including at least some hospitals, to refuse to provide coverage,” which extends in two states
to “secular organizations with moral or religious objections;” a right to refuse in one state,
Nevada, rather than an exemption; and an exemption in two states for insurers as well as
employers); see Timothy Jost, Newland v. Sebelius: The General Welfare, Religious Liberty, and
Contraception Coverage Under the ACA, HealthAffairs Blog ( July 30, 2012), http://
healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/30/newland-v-sebelius-the-general-welfare-religious-libertyand-contraception-coverage-under-the-aca (“[T]wenty-one [states] have some form of religious exemption . . . .”).
293 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst., ERISA and Health Plans 4–6 (1995), available
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/1195ib.pdf (“States can indirectly regulate health
care plans that provide benefits through insurance contracts by establishing the terms of
the contract. . . . But they cannot do the same with respect to self-funded plans. That is one
of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of self-funded plans.”); see also
Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts statute requiring mandatory minimum health care benefits in any general insurance
policy, even if sold to an employee health care plan, was not preempted by ERISA because
it applies to insurance contracts purchased by the plan).
294 ERISA broadly preempts state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan. See 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). The “saving clause,” however, saves state laws that regulate insurance
from preemption. See id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The “deeme[r] clause” provides an exception to
the saving clause exception. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Under the deemer clause, self-funded plans
are exempt from state laws that “regulat[e] insurance within the meaning of the saving
clause.” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, ERISA preempts state laws regulating insurance with respect to self-funded plans,
whereas insured plans are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. See id.
As a result of this broad preemption, a persistent criticism of ERISA has been that
Congress, by failing to regulate meaningfully employee health benefit plans at the federal
level, created a federal “regulatory vacuum.” William J. Curran et al., Health Care
Law and Ethics 1076 (5th ed. 1998). One notable exception is mental health parity. See
Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and Specific Essential Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 471, 488–89 (2012) (noting that because the
essential mental health and substance use disorder benefit that is part of the ACA’s “essential health benefits” provision, § 1302, doesn’t apply to all health plan settings, even after
health care reform is fully implemented, full mental health parity will not be achieved
because mental health and substance use disorder benefits will not be fully covered).

1492

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1417

cape state-mandated benefits by simply “self-funding” —or paying for
health care costs out of their own funds, sometimes backed up by a
stop-loss insurance policy.295 ERISA’s significant insulation from state
law “is one of the factors that has caused a great rise in the number of
self-funded plans,” in which eighty-two percent of employees in large
companies now find themselves.296
295 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst. supra note 293, at 4–6. Employers that have selffunded “may not themselves be regulated as insurance companies even if the self-funded
or self-insured plan purchases stop-loss insurance to cover losses or benefits payments beyond a specified level.” Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 361, 363 (4th Cir.
1997) (concluding that ERISA’s preemptive shield prevented Maryland from regulating
self-funded private health benefit plans that used stop-loss coverage with a very low dollar
threshold for payment by the insurer, because such regulations did not qualify as the regulation of the business of insurance and thus fell outside the saving clause). Although the
Supreme Court has never addressed the question, lower courts have held that the purchase of stop-loss insurance does not cause self-funded plans to loss their status as selffunded. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or ‘One Good Loophole
Deserves Another,’ 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 113–15 (2005).
296 See Emp. Benefit Research Inst. supra note 293 at 4–6. According to a 2012 survey,
81% of covered workers in large firms (with two hundred or more workers) were in partially or completely self-funded plans, whereas only 15% of covered workers in small firms
(with three to one hundred and ninety-nine workers) were in similar plans. Kaiser Family
Found. & Health Research Educ. Trust, Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Annual
Survey 186 (2012), http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf; see also Michael J. Brien &
Constantijn W.A. Panis, Self-Insured Health Benefit Plans 1 (2011), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/deloitte2011-1.pdf (estimating that 42.7% of plans that
filed a Form 5500 had a self-insured component); U.S. Dep’t Labor, Emp. Benefits Security Admin., Group Health Plans Report 1 (2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
ACA-ARC2012.pdf (reporting that, as of 2009, for the “approximately 50,000 private sector
employer-sponsored group health plans that filed a Form 5500” 42%, or 21,000 plans, “can
be categorized as self-insured” or as mixed-insured).
Drawing on state-mandated benefit laws, some commentators urge that “[t]he battle
against legal contraception has been fought and lost before, not only in the 1960s, but also
in the 1990s, when state legislatures and courts repeatedly rejected the argument that religious liberty provides a justification for undermining women’s equality and denying them
contraceptive insurance.” 158 Cong. Rec. E1370 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2012) (statement of
Representative Laura Richardson). These commentators cite such cases as Catholic Charities
of Sacramento v. Superior Court, in which the California Supreme Court upheld California’s
Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act against claims that it violated the establishment and
free exercises clauses of the California and United States Constitutions. See 85 P.3d 67, 95
(Cal. 2004). Unlike the employer in Bartlett, discussed above, the church-affiliated employer in Catholic Charities of Sacramento did not enjoy the benefit of ERISA preemption
because it had not self-funded; this necessitated its ultimately failed attempt to secure an
exemption on constitutional grounds. By emphasizing that “state legislatures . . . repeatedly rejected the argument that religious liberty provides a justification for . . . denying
them contraceptive insurance,” these commentators overlook the fact that ERISA’s broad
preemptive shield made it unnecessary for religious objectors to aggressively advocate for
religious exemptions in the handful of states that provide no exemption to the state’s contraceptive mandate.
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As with the health care context, employers may also choose not to
provide other insurance benefits, such as life insurance benefits, for an
employee’s spouse.297 Thus, religious employers who believed they
could not “recognize” same-sex spouses by providing insurance coverage
could avoid the whole theological morass by refusing to provide benefit
coverage to spouses of employees who are not already covered.298
This is precisely what happened several years ago after the District
of Columbia recognized same-sex marriage. When the D.C. Council
gave groups like Catholic Charities no other option—that is, no exemption—the religious organization took the nuclear option by eliminating
coverage for the spouses of its 850 employees going forward rather
than cover spouses in marriages that it could not recognize for religious
reasons.299 When Catholic Charities chose this path, both sides lost out.
Its employees could no longer add spouses to their health care cover-

297 Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires
employers to establish employee benefit plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of
benefits employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.”). Employers are motivated to provide such benefits because they are tax-preferenced. See Alliance for Health
Reform, supra note 289, at 2, 9–10.
298 Some religious organizations may offer “employee plus one” coverage to side-step
the collision between their religious doctrines and existing legal mandates when no exemption is forthcoming. The American Civil Liberties Union has urged that Catholic organizations do not need a benefits exemption because they could copy the Archdiocese of
San Francisco, which took the “employee plus one” path. See Letter from Reverend John
W. Wimberly, Jr. et al. to the Honorable Vincent C. Gray regarding D.C. Bill 18-482, the
Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, at 1 (Nov. 20,
2009) (on file with author); see also Michelle Martin, Area Catholic Hospitals Prepare for Ramifications of Civil Unions Bill, Catholic New World (May 22, 2011), http://www.catholic
newworld.com/cnwonline/2011/0522/2.aspx. “Employee plus one” coverage may itself
represent a rollback of existing insurance coverage. See Beth Levin Crimmel, Agency for
Healthcare Research & Quality, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance for Employees of State and Local Governments, by Census Division, (2010), available at
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st302/stat302.pdf. Whether all
Catholic groups would accept this work-around is unclear. But, one can easily imagine that
some religious employers would believe that this work-around is immoral.
299 See William Wan, Same-Sex Marriage Leads Catholic Charities to Adjust Benefits, Wash.
Post, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/01/
AR2010030103345.html.
Starting Tuesday, Catholic Charities will not offer benefits to spouses of new
employees or to spouses of current employees who are not already enrolled
in the plan. . . . Staff members at the charity were not given advance notice of
the new policy and will not be able to add a spouse now because the most recent open enrollment period ended in November. Those who use their
health benefits to cover spouses will be grandfathered into the new policy.
Id.
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age, paid primarily by the employer with tax-free dollars.300 As a result,
the employees had to buy new coverage for their spouses on the individual market, at higher prices and with after-tax dollars.301 Catholic
Charities lost out as an employer, too. When an employer sheds or reduces benefits, it becomes harder for it to compete in the marketplace
for employees.302
The ACA did not substantially alter the calculus for private employers. The nuclear option remains available to some religious objectors at
no cost, as explained below. To others, it comes at a price, measured by
the number of employees, although the cost of the penalties will almost
certainly be much less than the cost of providing subsidized insurance to
employees, as the objecting institution may have in the past.303
Under the ACA, employers providing health care coverage must
comply with the interim final rules on the scope of coverage for preventative services.304 No plan can be sold—and no employer can selfinsure—unless it complies with coverage requirements.305 The Obama
administration’s “accommodation” requires insurers, and not employers directly, to provide those services free of charge.306 This arrangement simply does not work for self-insured employers because there are
no insurers available to provide the mandated benefits for free, unless
the government forces a plan’s third-party administrator to do this.307
Further, since more than one-third of employers act as their own ad300 See Alliance for Health Reform, supra note 289, at 9–10.
301 See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is Employer-Based Health Insurance Worth Saving?, N.Y. Times
(May 22, 2009, 6:05 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/is-employerbased-health-insurance-worth-saving.
302 See infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text (discussing the need for employers
to offer a greater salary when they fail to provide benefits in order to compete in the marketplace for employees).
303 See infra notes 313–317 and accompanying text.
304 45 C.F.R. § 156.275 (2012) (mandating that qualified health plans comply with clinical quality measures in various areas, including preventive care). See generally Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011)
(specifying the scope of required coverage for preventative care).
305 See 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,622–23.
306 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. A third-party administrator is an “entity required to make or responsible for making payment on behalf of a group health plan
. . . [or a b]usiness associate that performs claims administration and related business
functions for a self-insured entity.” See Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Glossary,
http://www.cms.gov/apps/glossary/default.asp?Letter=T&Language=English (last visited
Sept. 17, 2012). Third-party administrators, however, assume no liability for claims made in
the insurance pool. See id.
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ministrators, there is not even a third-party administrator to provide the
coverage.308
Putting aside whether this arrangement will even work, religious
objectors, whether institutional or individual, remain stuck receiving
coverage that violates their religious convictions. This leaves only one
way out: the nuclear option. Under the ACA, some employers can in
fact take this way out, although at significant—but perhaps not devastating—cost.
Consider an employer who falls outside the ACA’s penalty threshold—that is, an employer with fewer than fifty employees or an employer with fifty or more employees, not one of whom receives a “premium credit” or government subsidy for his or her cost-sharing for
coverage.309 If that employer objects to the new coverage mandate for
religious reasons, it can simply trigger the nuclear option and abandon
all health care coverage for its employees. Zaytuna College, which selfidentifies as a “Muslim institution of higher learning,” provides one example.310 Zaytuna College reported twenty-five employees on its 2009
Internal Revenue Service Form 990,311 meaning that it can simply drop
all coverage and pay no penalty.312
308 Press Release, HighRoads, HighRoads Study Shows Employers Anticipate Rising Costs
in Outsourced Health Benefits Administration (Nov. 26, 2010), available at http://www.busi
-nesswire.com/news/home/20101116005643/en/HighRoads-Study-Shows-Employers-Anticipate-Rising-Costs (noting that an employer’s incentive to self-administer its health plan may
change because of the ACA).
309 The ACA’s premium credit subsidizes an employee’s cost sharing when the employee’s household income is less than 400% of the federal poverty level and the employee is
required to pay more than 9.5% of his or her household income for health care coverage. See
ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1513(a), 124 Stat. 1029; I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i)
(Supp. I 2011); Hinda Chaikind & Chris L. Peterson, Cong. Research Serv., Summary
of Potential Employer Penalties Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act 6 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/Documents/
Employer Penalties.pdf.
310 See Our History, Zaytuna C., http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/our_history
(last visited Sept. 17, 2012). Zaytuna’s cofounder joined the leaders of other universities in
opposing the coverage mandate. See Garvey et al., supra note 24 (listing signatories).
311 See Zaytuna College, IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/330/
330720978/330720978_201007_990.pdf (indicating that Zaytuna College had twenty-five
employees for the taxable year beginning August 1, 2009 and concluding July 31, 2010).
312 Religiously affiliated colleges and universities may employ the nuclear option in
other ways, too. The Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio recently announced that
it would terminate its student health insurance plan rather than obey the new requirement
that the plan cover birth control. See Franciscan University Drops Student Health Insurance Plan
over Birth Control Mandate, Costs, MSNBC.com (May 15, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://usnews.

1496

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 53:1417

For employers that do meet the penalty threshold (those with fifty
or more employees, at least one of whom receives a “premium credit”),
there would be substantial penalties for failing to provide coverage.313
The annual fine for an employer with fifty employees would be $40,000.
This penalty, although considerable, would be offset by savings the objecting institution realizes by eliminating coverage, as a consequence of
which their employees will fall on the insurance exchanges.
A substantial literature has developed showing that private employers will frequently come out ahead financially by eliminating the
subsidized health care coverage they previously provided to their employees.314 With the health care costs for American families now ex-

msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/15/11720706-franciscan-university-drops-student-healthinsurance-plan-over-birth-control-mandate-costs.
313 The formula for determining the annual penalty is: (total number of employees – 30)
x ($2000). See ACA § 1513(a); I.R.C. § 4980H(a); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Research
Found., ACA: Employer Mandate Penalties, CribSheet 11-1 (2011), available at http://
www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/cribsheets/employer-mandate-penaltiesnfib-cribsheet.pdf. If an employer offers a health plan that simply does not include the mandated coverage, a different penalty is assessed, up to $100 per day per employee. See, e.g.,
Cynthia Brougher, Cong. Research Serv., R42370, Preventive Health Services Regulations: Religious Institutions’ Objections to Contraceptive Coverage 14, 16 (2012)
(describing an excise tax under the Internal Revenue Service Code for noncompliant employment-based group health plans, as well as possible penalties under the Public Health
Service Act for self-insured governmental plans, health insurance issuers providing group
health coverage, and coverage in the individual market, and under ERISA for insured and
self-insured group health plans and insurance issuers providing group health coverage). The
fine for noncompliant plans and the annual penalty for failing to provide health care coverage appear to be alternative penalties. See, e.g., Jennifer Marshall & Dominique Ludvigson,
Judge Issues Preliminary Injunction on Behalf of Business Owner in HHS Mandate Fight, Foundry
( July 29, 2012, 8:17 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/07/29/judge-issues-preliminaryinjunction-on-behalf-of-business-owner-in-hhs-mandate-fight/ (describing the “alternative[s]”
facing religious objectors and calculating penalties under each scenario).
Employers that offer coverage that is deemed “unaffordable” also face penalties. This
penalty equals one-twelfth of $3000 multiplied by the number of full-time employees that
receive the exchange subsidies because the insurance offered to them by their employer was
“unaffordable,” capped by “the amount that the employer would have been liable for had the
[I.R.C. §] 4980H(a) penalty been triggered instead.” Gamage, supra note 25, at *22 (citing
I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1)).
314 See Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4 (noting that some employers will be financially better off by paying the penalty and “dumping” their employees on the exchanges,
rather than paying the employer’s portion of coverage costs); see also Kathryn L. Moore,
The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 89 U. Neb. L. Rev. 885, 906–12 (2011) (analyzing empirical data from Massachusetts
and San Francisco to predict whether certain employers will choose to pay the ACA’s penalty rather than provide health care coverage); supra note 25 (citing scholarly opinion that
the ACA creates perverse incentives that will lead some employers to drop certain employees on the insurance exchanges).
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ceeding, by one estimate, $20,000 annually315—and with average employers picking up 82% of the coverage costs of single individuals and
72% for families, on average316—it is easy to see why employers may be
eager to drop subsidized coverage, even in the absence of a religious
exemption. Not all employees will be disadvantaged by such a move,
especially employees who are low- and moderate-income earners. These
employees qualify for substantial premium tax credits if their employer
fails to provide health care coverage entirely or offers “unaffordable”
coverage.317
It is true that employers that provide fewer benefits generally have
to pay greater salaries to compete for employees, all other things being
equal.318 Indeed, “[e]conomists generally agree employee benefits are a
dollar-for-dollar substitute for wages.”319 Nevertheless, an objecting institution that drops coverage would not have to increase pay for lowerincome employees to compensate for the missing benefit because such
employees will be made better-off financially by receiving premium tax
credits. For higher-income employees, the institution likely would have
to adjust pay.320 Ultimately, the cost of the nuclear option may not be

315 See Milliman, 2012 Milliman Medical Index 1 (2012), available at http://
publications.milliman.com/periodicals/mmi/pdfs/milliman-medical-index-2012.pdf. A 2011
study by the Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that the total average annual cost of health
care coverage for a family was $15,078. See Julie Appleby, Costs of Employer Insurance Plans Surge
in 2011, Kaiser Health News (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/
2011/september/27/employer-health-coverage-survey-shows-employer-spend-ing-spike.aspx.
316 Employer Health Benefits: 2011 Summary of Findings, Kaiser Family Found. & Health
Research Educ. Trust (Sept. 27, 2011), http://ehbs.kff.org/.
317 See Gamage, supra note 25, at *17, *23 (estimating that, for a worker in a family of
four whose household income is 100% of the federal poverty level ($24,000 a year), the
value of premium tax credits received, together with the value of cost-sharing subsidies
received, equals $18,433, more than dwarfing the tax value of any employer-provided
health care coverage, and, in one break-even analysis, calculating the net-benefit to the
employee at $16,309). Coverage is considered “affordable” when the employee’s contribution for employee-only coverage is less than 9.5% of the employee’s household income.
I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II) (Supp. I 2011).
318 See Thomas J. Atchison et al., Internet Based Benefits & Compensation Administration (2012), available at http://www.eridlc.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=textbook.
chpt20.
319 Devon Herrick, Health Exchange Subsidies Will Reduce Employer Health Plans, Nat’l
Center for Pol’y Analysis (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba758.
320 Predicting the true cost of the nuclear option to an employer would require knowing how many full-time or part-time employees it has, the cost of existing coverage, the
amount of the employer’s subsidy for that coverage, what the mix of low- and moderateincome employees is to higher-income employees, and the household income of lowerincome employees (in order to determine the value of premium tax credits to them),
among other factors.
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nearly as great as the calculated penalty suggests and certainly may not
be prohibitive for smaller religious employers.321
As the number of employees increases, however, so does the annual
penalty. It does not take long for the financial penalty to become massive. For example, the Catholic cable television broadcaster that filed
suit challenging the coverage mandate would pay more than $700,000
annually.322 Colorado Christian University, which self-identifies as a
nondenominational, evangelical university and employs 922 people,
would face an annual penalty of $1,784,000 if it dropped coverage for its
employees rather than violate its religious beliefs; this threat prompted
the school to sue the Obama administration as well.323 But here again,
the true cost of the nuclear option needs to be adjusted to account for
the religious objector’s savings in eliminating coverage for all its em-

321 Epstein & Hyman, supra note 25, at 4.
322 Eternal Word Television Network (ETWN) reported 384 employees on its 2010
Form 990, filed with the Internal Revenue Service. See Eternal Word Television Network,
IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2010), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/630/630801391/630801391_2
01012_990.pdf. This yields a penalty of $708,000 [(384 - 30) x $2000]. See also Tyler Kingkade, Catholic Colleges File Lawsuit Against Feds over Birth Control Rule, Huffington Post
(Feb. 22, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/22/catholic-collegesfile-lawsuit-feds_n_1293814.html (reporting that EWTN filed suit to challenge the ACA).
323 See What We Believe, Colo. Christian Univ., http://www.ccu.edu/welcome/webelieve.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2012); see also Colo. Christian Univ., IRS Form 990, Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/840/840442429/840442429_201006_990.pdf (indicating 922 employees for the tax year beginning July 1, 2009 and concluding June 30, 2010).
This yields a penalty of $1,784,000 [(922 - 30) x $2000]. See Kingkade, supra note 322 (reporting that Colorado Christian University has been joined in its legal challenge to the
ACA by Ave Maria University, Belmont Abbey College, and Geneva College, all of which
argue that even with the Obama administration’s accommodation for religious employers,
the coverage mandate nonetheless conflicts with their belief that birth control is immoral).
Ave Maria University reported 631 employees on its 2009 Form 990, which means it would
pay a penalty of $1,202,000. See Ave Maria Univ., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/
990_pdf_archive/030/030482006/030482006_201006_990.pdf. Belmont Abbey College
would incur penalties of approximately $1,050,000 if it were to drop coverage for its 555
employees. See Belmont Abbey Coll., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_
archive/560/560547498/560547498_201005_990.pdf; FAQs: Becket Fund’s Lawsuits Against
HHS, Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/faq (last visited
Sept. 17, 2012). Geneva College reported 1439 employees on its 2009 Form 990, which
would yield a penalty of $2,818,000 [(1439 - 30) x $2000]. See Geneva Coll., IRS Form 990,
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://
dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/250/250965376/250965376_201005_990.pdf.
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ployees, offset by the additional wages that it must offer to remain competitive in the marketplace.324
For much larger employers, the annual costs of the nuclear option
would seem at first blush to be almost unsustainable. For Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Washington, which employs over 1000 people, penalties would crest $2 million annually;325 the University of Notre
Dame,326 with its 16,445 employees, would face an annual penalty of
$32,830,000.327 As before, however, these gargantuan penalties would
324 Supra notes 318–321 and accompanying text.
325 See Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Wash., IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.
fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/530/530196524/530196524_201006_990.pdf (indicating 1118
employees for the tax year beginning July 1, 2009 and concluding June 30, 2010). This
yields a penalty of $2,176,000 [(1118 – 30) x $2000].
326 On May 21, 2012, the University of Notre Dame brought suit against the federal government over the coverage mandate. See Complaint at 1–4, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius,
No. 3:2012-cv-00253 (N.D. Ind. May 21, 2012), available at http://opac.nd.edu/assets/69013/
hhs_complaint.pdf. As Notre Dame president Father John Jenkins, C.S.C., explained:
Let me say very clearly what this lawsuit is not about: it is not about preventing women from having access to contraception, nor even about preventing the Government from providing such services. Many of our faculty, staff
and students—both Catholic and non-Catholic—have made conscientious
decisions to use contraceptives. As we assert the right to follow our conscience, we respect their right to follow theirs. And we believe that, if the
Government wishes to provide such services, means are available that do not
compel religious organizations to serve as its agents. We do not seek to impose our religious beliefs on others; we simply ask that the Government not
impose its values on the University when those values conflict with our religious teachings. . . .
This filing is about the freedom of a religious organization to live its mission, and its significance goes well beyond any debate about contraceptives.
For if we concede that the Government can decide which religious organizations are sufficiently religious to be awarded the freedom to follow the principles that define their mission, then we have begun to walk down a path that
ultimately leads to the undermining of those institutions. For if one Presidential Administration can override our religious purpose and use religious organizations to advance policies that undercut our values, then surely another
Administration will do the same for another very different set of policies,
each time invoking some concept of popular will or the public good, with the
result these religious organizations become mere tools for the exercise of
government power, morally subservient to the state, and not free from its infringements. If that happens, it will be the end of genuinely religious organizations in all but name.
Press Release, Office of the President, Univ. of Notre Dame, A Message from Father Jenkins on the HHS Lawsuit (May 21, 2012), available at http://president.nd.edu/communications/a-message-from-father-jenkins-on-the-hhs-lawsuit (emphasis added).
327 The University of Notre Dame reported 16,445 employees on its last Form 990,
filed with the Internal Revenue Service. See Univ. of Notre Dame, IRS Form 990, Return of
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be offset by the savings to the religious objector in no longer subsidizing health care coverage for its employees, although the objectors
would need to provide some additional wages to higher-income employees to remain competitive as an employer.328
It would not be surprising if some employees of religious groups
shared the group’s religious objections to the mandated coverage, nor
would it be surprising for ordinary individuals employed elsewhere to
have religious objections.329 Yet, the impact on individuals has been
largely lost in the debate over mandated coverage. Under the ACA’s
individual mandate, an individual must show coverage through an employer or public insurance, or privately purchase coverage,330 unless
exempt from the duty to do so as the result of low income or the lack of
an affordable plan in the market.331 Failing to do so prompts a monetary penalty like those paid by employers, which varies with the individual’s income.332

Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://dynamodata.
fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/350/350868188/350868188_201006_990.pdf. This yields
a penalty of $32,830,000 [(16,445 – 30) x ($2000)]. Other universities have also objected
to the coverage mandate. For example, Liberty University, which reported 5457 employees
on its 2009 Form 990, would pay a penalty of $10,854,000. See Liberty Univ., IRS Form 990,
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, pt. I, l. 5 (2009), available at http://
dynamodata.fdncenter.org/990_pdf_archive/540/540946734/540946734_201006_990 .pdf;
Reaction to Obama’s Birth Control Compromise, Guardian (London) (Feb. 10, 2012), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10087882 (reporting the views of Liberty University’s vice president and dean of the law school).
328 See supra notes 318–321 and accompanying text.
329 Some may ask how the coverage mandate is different from a general duty to pay
taxes, which fund wars and other services to which an individual might object on secular
or sectarian grounds. The coverage mandate has a disproportionate and direct impact on
individuals who believe that by participating in an insurance pool, they are facilitating the
use by others of drugs that cut off potential life, both before fertilization and after. Many
faith groups are not opposed to taxes because government decisions are intervening acts
and the result of those acts are too removed from the believer for the believer to have any
moral culpability. Here, the objector, charged with responsibility for his or her own moral
act of facilitating the end of a potential life, must decide whether to comply with the law or
violate a religious tenet.
330 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(f), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
331 The individual mandate applies only if an individual is able to secure health care
coverage that costs less than eight percent of the individual’s household income, after
applying premium tax credits or employer contributions, if any. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)
(Supp. IV 2011). Moreover, “workers with household incomes below 133 percent of the
federal poverty line will generally qualify for Medicaid.” Gamage, supra note 25, at *2, n.8.
332 If an employer exercises the nuclear option, some lower-income employees may come
out ahead because they will receive subsidies to purchase coverage from an insurance exchange. See supra notes 314–317 and accompanying text (estimating that low- and moderateincome workers may benefit financially by securing health care coverage through ex-
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So what recourse does the individual who objects to mandated
coverage have? First, although the ACA contains an individual religious
exemption, it is extremely narrow.333 ACA’s exemption parrots the religious exemption in the Social Security Act for the Amish, who are exempted from paying social security taxes.334 Although the Amish and
substantially similar religious groups335 will qualify for ACA’s religious
exemptions, most individual objectors will fall outside the exemption’s
narrow bounds.336 A second option for the individual objector is to join
a health care sharing ministry, shielding the individual from a tax penalty.337 These sharing ministries, however, offer very limited benefits.
Few ministries exist, and because any qualifying sharing ministries must
have been in existence on December 31, 1999, the market cannot
grow.338 Further, even though members of sharing ministries pool their
resources, participation in a ministry does not provide the security of a
real insurance product: ministries do not guarantee payment or retain
financial reserves.339 Regulators presumably could increase the protecchanges). An employee who objects to mandated coverage on religious grounds, however,
wants no coverage if it includes the objectionable service, not cheaper coverage.
333 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A).
334 Samuel T. Grover, Note, Religious Exemptions to the PPACA’s Health Insurance Mandate,
37 Am. J.L. & Med 624, 629 (2011).
335 See Jost, supra note 2, at 42 n.119 (identifying the religious groups likely to qualify).
336 To qualify for the individual religious exemption, an individual must meet five criteria. The first three establish basic elements: (1) he or she must belong to a religious sect
and subscribe to its tenets; (2) the individual must waive Social Security benefits; and (3)
the sect must establish these tenets. The remaining requirements are much more limiting:
(4) the sect must have a substantial history of providing for and taking care of its dependent members; and (5) the sect has been in existence since December 31, 1950. 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(d)(2)(A) (exempting from the individual mandate any “member of a recognized
religious sect or division thereof which is described in section 1402(g)(1), and . . . an adherent of established tenets or teachings of such sect or division as described in such section”); see id. § 1402 (g).
337 26 U.S.C. § 5000a(d)(2)(B)(2) (Supp. IV 2011) (exempting from the individual
mandate members of health care sharing ministries).
338 See id.; Jost, supra note 2, at 43 (estimating that 100,000 people are members of such
health care sharing ministries, which are generally restricted to Christians who abstain from
alcohol, drugs, smoking, or extramarital sex); Michelle Andrews, Some Church Groups Form
Sharing Ministries to Cover Members’ Medical Costs, Kaiser Health News (Apr. 25, 2011), http://
www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insuring-Your-Health/Michelle-Andrews-on-Health-CareReligious-Cooperatives.aspx (estimating that “the total number of people who are sharing
their medical costs [is] roughly 120,000”).
339 Andrews, supra note 338 (“If there's a shortfall one month . . . every household
seeking help gets a prorated portion of its needs covered, and the ministry asks members
for voluntary contributions to make up the difference. If the shortfall continues, members
vote on raising the share amount.”). Fact sheets for the ministries explain that they do not
operate as an insurance product. See, e.g., Alliance Health Care Sharing Ministries,
http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012) (“HCSMs [health
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tion that sharing ministries provide to members, but it remains to be
seen whether this will occur.340
The ACA’s individual mandate does contain a hardship exemption, but it provides very little detail about what would qualify for such
an exemption.341 No regulations have been issued as to the scope and
availability of any hardship waiver. Thus, it remains to be seen whether
religious objectors can avail themselves of this way out.
The individual employee-objector’s third option is to drop his or
her health care coverage and “go naked.” The costs for “going naked”
include not just the monetary penalties, which may be stiff, but also the
financial risks associated with having no health care coverage at all.342
The individual mandate applies if an individual or family’s income
exceeds the federal threshold for taxation.343 For 2011, the threshold
care sharing ministries] are not insurance companies. HCSMs do not assume any risk or
guarantee the payment of any medical bill. Eighteen states as of May, 2012 have explicitly
recognized this and specifically exempt HCSMs from their insurance codes.”). “By contrast, insurance companies face considerable regulation as to solvency, reserves, and other
matters [like actuarial estimates] precisely because the companies agree by contract to
guarantee payment for covered services.” See Andrews, supra note 336. Although these
ministries may provide important assistance with payment of smaller claims, in the case of
catastrophic claims, participation in a sharing ministry may not be materially better than
“going naked.”
340 The Obama administration has not yet released regulations fleshing out the scope
of the individual religious exemption. One prominent supporter of ACA, Professor Timothy Jost, has noted that “these questions are unavoidable in a society that attempts to on
the one hand adopt generally applicable laws addressing controversial subjects, and on the
other hand maintain a high regard for religious liberty.” Jost, supra note 292. He suggests
that a promising way forward for “reconciling” the “religious freedom of employers with
the right of employees to access vital health services” would be to mimic federal legislation
“excusing employer contributions to Social Security where both the employer and employee had religious objections, but not otherwise.” Id.
341 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1411, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
342 See No Insurance Creates Serious Health Risks, ACP Internist, available at http://www.
acpinternist.org/archives/2000/01/atpress.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2012) (noting studies that indicate that “the uninsured may be three times more likely than the insured to
experience adverse [health] outcomes . . . partly because uninsured individuals are less
likely to have a regular source of care or to have visited a physician recently . . . [and] are
also less likely to use preventive services”).
343 Any individual or family that does not meet the taxation threshold will be exempt
from the individual mandate. See Kaiser Family Found., Focus on Health Reform:
Summary of New Health Reform Law 1 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/
healthreform/upload/8061.pdf. There are seven other groups exempted from the individual mandate: incarcerated individuals, undocumented immigrants, individuals for
whom the required contribution exceeds eight percent of an individual’s income, individuals with a coverage gap less than three months in duration, individuals with a hardship
exemption, Native Americans, and individuals with a religious exemption. See id. The individual religious exemption is very narrowly tailored and is generally used only by the
Amish and some Mennonites. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2009); Maura
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was $9500 for individuals and $19,000 for families.344 If an individual or
family refuses to comply with the individual mandate, the monetary
penalty, starting in 2016,345 will be the greater amount of either: (1) a
flat fee ranging from $695 per year346 up to three times that amount
(maximum $2085),347 or (2) two and a half percent of income.348 Four
examples clarify how the penalty would play out in different circumstances:349
1) A family of four earning the median U.S. household income of $49,445350 would pay a fee of $2025 for “going naked,” because their flat fee amount is greater than the percentage fee.351

Reynolds, Health Bills Allow Some a Religious Exemption, Cong. Q. Pol. & MSNBC.com (Aug.
3, 2009, 9:46 AM), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32267628/.
344 See I.R.S. Publ’n 501, at 3 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p501.pdf.
345 The penalties begin to take effect in 2014, but do not reach their full amounts until
2016. See Kaiser Family Found., supra note 343, at 1.
346 The $695 will be adjusted for inflation yearly after 2016. See Blue Cross Blue
Shield of R.I., Federal Healthcare Reform: Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act Individual Mandate & Subsidy 2 (2010), available at https://www.bcbsri.
com/BCBSRIWeb/pdf/Individual_Mandate_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
347 The $695 is calculated for each spouse, plus $695 for each dependent over the age
of eighteen, with dependents under the age of eighteen resulting in a fractional amount of
$695. See id. The limit on the flat fee is $2085 per family, no matter the number of dependents. See id. Thus, for example, a family of five with three children over the age of eighteen
still will pay only the $2085 flat fee. See id.
348 The 2.5% of income is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount
(for example, $19,000 for families in 2011) from the total amount of income reported. See
id. A family earning $100,000 a year in 2011 would subtract $19,000, for a total of $81,000.
The 2.5% would then be calculated against the $81,000, equaling $2025, the amount the
family would have to pay as the penalty under the percentage. In other words: (Gross Income - Tax Threshold Amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; (100,000 $19,000) x 0.025 = $2025.
349 All of the following examples are made using the 2011 tax threshold and the 2016
penalty schedule. See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text.
350 See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/
newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html.
351 This family’s penalty will be the greater of their percentage penalty or flat fee. The
percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the
total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($49,455 - $19,000) x 0.025
= $761.38. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will apply to a family of four. Because $2025 is greater than $761.38, this family will pay $2025—the flat fee amount.
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2) A family of four earning $150,000 would pay $3275 for “going naked,” because their percentage fee is greater than the
flat fee.352
3) An individual earning $50,000 would be subject to a penalty of approximately $1010, because the percentage fee is
greater than the flat fee.353
4) An individual earning $26,364, the 2011 median annual
wage,354 would be subject to a penalty of $695, because the
flat fee is greater than the percentage fee.355
Of course, objectors who drop coverage and pay the fine will not
be able to purchase an unobjectionable insurance product in the market once the ACA’s extensive regulation of the insurance exchanges
begins.356
Whether they be individuals or groups, religious objectors to the
coverage mandate can solve the collision between their religious convictions and the demands of the law only by taking extreme measures,
sometimes at great personal costs to themselves. A benefits exemption
would give religious objectors a less extreme way out, which permits
them to comply both with the law and with their religious tenets. Thus,
352 This family’s penalty will be the greater of their percentage penalty or flat fee. The
percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from the
total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($150,000 - $19,000) x 0.025
= $3275. The flat fee has a maximum of $2025 which will apply to a family of four. Because
$3275 is greater than $2025, this family will pay $3275, the percentage fee amount.
353 This individual’s penalty will be the greater of the percentage penalty or flat fee.
The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from
the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($50,000 - $9500) x 0.025 =
$1012.50. As noted earlier, the individual’s tax threshold is lower than that for a family.
The flat fee has a maximum of $2025, which will not be used here since we are concerned
with an individual. Instead, the flat fee amount is $695. Because $1012.50 is greater than
$695, the individual will pay $1012.50, the percentage fee amount.
354 See Jillian Berman, U.S. Median Annual Wage Falls to $26,364 as Pessimism Reaches 10-Year
High [Correction], Huffington Post ( Jan. 23, 2012, 8:48 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/10/20/us-incomes-falling-as-optimism-reaches-10-year-low_n_1022118.html.
355 This individual’s penalty will be the greater of the percentage penalty or flat fee.
The percentage penalty is calculated by subtracting the tax filing threshold amount from
the total amount of income reported, multiplied by 2.5%: (gross income - tax threshold
amount) x 0.025 = amount of percentage penalty; in this case ($26,364 - $9500) x 0.025 =
$421.60. As above, the individual’s tax threshold is lower than that for a family. The flat fee
has a maximum of $2025, which will not be used here since we are concerned with an
individual. Instead, the flat fee amount is $695. Because $695 is greater than $421.60, the
individual will pay $695, the flat fee amount.
356 See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text.
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the question for policymakers becomes not whether to avoid harm, but
rather which harm to avoid as they seek to balance two competing
goods—access to a full range of health care services and religious liberty. Rather than forcing religious employers and individuals into taking extreme measures, policymakers may well choose to give them a
less extreme option. The Obama administration has a ready vehicle for
providing this way-out—the hardship waiver.357
VII. Seventh Sticking Point: Exemptions Will
Undermine Dignity
Many contend that religious liberty exemptions encourage or facilitate discrimination and bigotry and thus will undermine the dignity
of same-sex couples.358 As a threshold matter, the possibility of dignitary
harm will not take policymakers very far because there are two impositions of indignity here—the possible affront to lesbian and gay couples
who are turned aside, and the affront to religious believers who are told
that their beliefs are not to be tolerated, at least not in the public
sphere. As Judy Brown, president of the American Life League, noted:
The Rev. John A. Leies, . . . president emeritus of St. Mary’s
University, . . . reminds us that Vatican II declared, “In the
depths of their conscience, men and women detect a law
which they do not impose on themselves but which holds them
to obedience, a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of men and women. According to it they will be judged.”
This is what Obama’s mandate violates. He will strip us of the
dignity that obedience to God’s moral law provides.359
357 See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing the hardship waiver).
358 See Hearing on D.C.’s Same-Sex Marriage Bill, supra note 40, at 6:57:55 (statement of
Councilmember David Catania describing religious exemptions as a “get out of jail free” card
authorizing discrimination); see also Wilson, supra note 46, at 319 n.3 (“Tolerate intolerance?
Not a chance. Bigotry is bigotry, even if they’re pretending God told them to do so.” (quoting anarcho-liberal-tarian, Comment to Wilson, Marriage Equality Bill, supra note 246)).
359 Press Release, Judy Brown, President of the Am. Life League, HHS Mandate Strips
Catholic Freedom and Human Dignity (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.all.org/
article/index/id/MTAwMTk. The controversy over the New York town clerk’s “creative
solution” to her religious objection to same-sex marriage illustrates the competing claims
of intolerance and harm. One of the women seeking the marriage license in New York told
the New York Times that “[g]ay people have fought so long and hard to get these civil rights
. . . . To have her basically telling us to get in the back of the line is just not acceptable.” See
Kaplan, supra note 221. The clerk countered in the Wall Street Journal, stating that “people
are opposed to accommodating [my] faith.” Gay Marriage, Religion Issues in NY Clerk Race,
Wall. St. J. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://sec.online.wsj.com/article/APdc4e266cbfe34cfc97b0
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Legislators face dueling dignitary harms, and thus dignitary considerations cannot by themselves resolve the question of whether to have exemptions. They can, however, help us structure exemptions—at least
some of the time.
In a perfect world, no one would ever know that a religious objector stepped aside. How would this work? Consider a government marriage license office with four clerks: Faith, Hope, Charity, and Efficiency.
Only Faith objects to assisting with same-sex marriage license applications. If all four clerks randomly greet individuals and couples who present, disaster looms. Faith could easily pop up to assist a young man,
Steve, only to find him later joined with his same-sex partner. If Faith
refuses to assist the couple, surely they will notice and be offended.
Contrast this with a Division of Motor Vehicles-style intake scheme
in which one clerk does the intake and farms out work to the others. In
this scheme, Efficiency might serve in the intake role, or she, Hope,
and Charity might switch off, leaving Faith to spend her day processing
paperwork without greeting the public. When Steve arrives, Efficiency
quickly and efficiently directs him and his partner to a willing provider.
Faith does not receive a pass; she still has the duty to serve other couples.
But note what does not happen in this system: same-sex couples
are not asked to step into another line. They are not asked to wait
longer. And they never even know that they have been queued to a
non-objecting clerk. Obviously, any dignitary harm evaporates if the
exemption is invisible.
How an office chooses to staff around an objector would be within
its sound discretion, absent some other provision of state law,360 since
the best arrangement may change with the specific circumstances facing the office—such as the number of willing providers, the number of
religious objectors, the volume of requests for marriage applications in
relation to other work, and so forth.
Some voice a nagging “suspicion that, for some of these people—
not all, but some—what’s cast as a ‘principled religious objection’ boils
down to simple gut feeling.”361 The possibility of unfair surprise is a serious one and warrants attention. Willy-nilly refusals can be avoided by
making objectors state their objections in advance and in writing—a
8b5a3e786654.html?mod=WSJ_NY_LEFTAPHeadlines. This trope is gaining a lot of traction. See Goodstein, supra note 100.
360 See supra note 227 (discussing a New York law allowing the delegation of tasks to
other personnel).
361 See Corvino, supra note 165.
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common device used to implement health care conscience clauses and
conscientious objection to military service.362 Checking in with employees about possible objections is crucial in order to enable employers to
staff around those who object and avoid unfair surprise to both the
public and the employer.
Four concrete commitments would limit the possibility of dignitary
harm to same-sex couples and should guide the staffing arrangement:
(1) Same-sex couples should never have to stand in another
line;
(2) Same-sex couples should receive the service in the same
manner that any other couple receives it (so that if heterosexual couples receive a service by appointment or mail-in
request, same-sex couples would, too);
(3) Any scheme to staff around an objector should be invisible to same-sex couples; and
(4) If an employee gave no advance statement of a religious
objection, no refusal should be allowed.
The controversy in New York over the town clerk’s delegation of
marriage license applications to an assistant is again instructive. If New
York laws indeed permitted such a delegation,363 there was no compelling reason for the clerk to articulate the reason behind this staffing
change. The clerk’s public explanations created a lot of needless rancor.364
Obviously, these commitments make sense for a government office
or for a large bureaucratic organization in the private sector. They
would not, however, shield same-sex couples from the insult of being
denied services from small “Mom and Pop” businesses in the wedding
industry. Nonetheless, as noted above, same-sex couples have considerable recourse in the marketplace for such refusals.365 In short, we
should strive to make accommodations as cost-free as possible when we
can do so, but the fact that we cannot achieve that end in each and every case does not negate the good that we can do.
362 Legislators can, and should, authorize employers to ask about potential objections
or demand that potential objectors state their objections ex ante in writing. See Wilson,
supra note 30, at 299–327 (excerpting selected state statutes permitting an objection only if
the invoker shows proof or states his or her reasons in writing).
363 See supra note 227.
364 See, e.g., Dial, supra note 283.
365 See supra notes 118, 285–286 and accompanying text (discussing the backlash
against a New Jersey bridal shop that refused to serve a lesbian customer).
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Conclusion
This Article considers a burning issue in society today—whether,
and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should
be exempted from the dictates of civil law. A number of the “sticking
points” to providing religious liberty exemptions to same-sex marriage
laws collected in this Article bear an uncanny resemblance to those raging in the debate over the Obama administration’s sterilization and
contraceptive coverage mandate. Among these real-world points of resistance to providing religious accommodations are legitimate, troubling concerns in a pluralistic, democratic society: why should legislators accommodate anyone’s beliefs; how can we distinguish between
legitimate religious beliefs and animus or mere silliness; how attenuated can one’s participation in an objectionable activity be and still warrant protection, among other issues. As this Article demonstrates, access and religious liberty need not be mutually exclusive social goods if
policymakers embrace nuanced religious liberty accommodations qualified by hardship to the public. Indeed, qualified exemptions can transform a zero-sum proposition into one in which both access and religious freedom can be affirmed.
Ultimately, religious objectors must make convincing claims for
legislative accommodations because they are not shielded from generally applicable, neutral laws as a matter of federal constitutional right.
In the end, no matter how thoughtful an exemption or a claim for exemptions may be, realistically to obtain religious liberty protection requires that proponents understand how exemptions look to decisionmakers on the ground.
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Appendix A: Core Religious Liberty Protections in Same-Sex
Marriage Legislation
All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly exempt
clergy from requirements to solemnize or celebrate marriages inconsistent with their religious faith.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a (West Supp. 2011); D.C. Code
§ 46-406(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 457:37 (Supp. 2011); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11(1)(1-a)
(McKinney Supp. 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5144(b)
(Supp. 2011); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(4) (West
2005); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly allow a
religiously-affiliated group to refuse to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for the solemnization or
celebration of a marriage.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1)
(McKinney Supp. 2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(l)
(Supp. 2011); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.010(2)(5); H.B.
438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
All jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) expressly protect
covered religious objectors from private suit.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(1);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4502(l); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.04.010(2)(6); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
Six jurisdictions (Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, and Washington) expressly protect religious objectors, including religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations, from
being penalized by the government for such refusals through, for example, the loss of governments grants.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-35a; D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(2);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-
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b(1); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010(2)(4); H.B. 438, 2012
Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
Three jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, Maryland, and New
Hampshire) expressly protect religious organizations from promoting
same-sex marriage in violation of the religious society’s beliefs through
religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats.
See D.C. Code § 46-406(e); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III)
(exempting “the promotion of marriage through religious
counseling, programs, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals”); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th
Sess. (Md. 2012) (provided so long as the program receives
no government funding). New York may provide this protection as well. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 10-b(2) (“[N]othing in
this article shall limit or diminish the right . . . of any religious
. . . organization . . . from taking such action as is calculated by
such organization to promote the religious principles for
which it is established or maintained.”).
Two jurisdictions (New Hampshire and New York) expressly protect
religious organizations from promoting marriage through . . . housing
designated for married individuals.
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 10-b(2) (“[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the
right . . . of any religious . . . organization . . . to limit employment or sales or rental of housing accommodations or
admission to or give preference to persons of the same religion or denomination.”).
Three states (Maryland, New Hampshire, and Vermont) expressly allow
religiously-affiliated fraternal organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus, to limit insurance coverage to spouses in traditional marriages.
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(IV); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8,
§ 4501(b) (Supp. 2011); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md.
2012).
Two states (Connecticut and Maryland) expressly allow a religiouslyaffiliated adoption or foster care agency to place children only with
heterosexual married couples so long as they don’t receive any government funding.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135b; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th
Sess. (Md. 2012).
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Three states (Maryland, New Hampshire and New York) expressly exempt individual employees who are managed, directed, or supervised
by or in conjunction with a covered entity from celebrating same-sex
marriages if doing so would violate their religious beliefs.
See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:37(III); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§ 10-b(1); H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012).
Two states (Maryland and New York) include non-severability clauses in
their legislation.
See 2011 N.Y. Laws 752; H.B. 438, 2012 Leg., 430th Sess. (Md.
2012).
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Appendix B: Proposed Same-Sex Marriage Legislation
The Marriage Conscience Protection Act that I and others have proposed366 would read:
Section ___
(a) Religious organizations protected.
No religious or denominational organization, no organization operated
for charitable or educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious organization, and no individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while acting in
the scope of that employment, shall be required to
(1) provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges for a purpose related to the solemnization
or celebration of any marriage; or
(2) solemnize any marriage; or
(3) treat as valid any marriage
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such
organizations or individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small business shall be required to
(A) provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that directly facilitate the perpetuation
of any marriage; or
(B) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
(C) provide housing to any married couple
if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such
individuals or sole proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to
violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(2) Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if

366 This proposal has previously appeared in Wilson, supra note 46, at 367–68.
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(A) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar
good or services, employment benefits, or housing elsewhere
without substantial hardship; or
(B) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another government employee or official
is not promptly available and willing to provide the requested
government service without inconvenience or delay; provided
that no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall
be required to solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer’s sincerely held religious beliefs.
(3) A “small business” within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) is a legal entity other than a natural person
(A) that provides services which are primarily performed by
an owner of the business; or
(B) that has five or fewer employees; or
(C) in the case of a legal entity that offers housing for rent,
that owns five or fewer units of housing.
(c) No civil cause of action or other penalties.
No refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges protected by this section shall
(1) result in a civil claim or cause of action challenging such
refusal; or
(2) result in any action by the State or any of its subdivisions
to penalize or withhold benefits from any protected entity or
individual, under any laws of this State or its subdivisions, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, educational
institutions, licensing, government contracts or grants, or taxexempt status.
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